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Introduction* 1
Jan Wielgohs and Arnaud Lechevalier
Border studies involve scientiﬁc research on the creation, perception, 
destabilization, relocation, transgression, opening, or dissolution of bor-
ders. Since the 1980s, they have advanced to prominence within many 
academic disciplines and in a broad variety of interdisciplinary endeavors. 
The rise of border studies during the last twenty to thirty years can be 
attributed mostly to the acceleration of globalization processes since the 
1980s and the end of the Cold War in 1990 (see Sendhardt in this volume). 
Conventionally, we think of borders as territorial borders between nation 
states or state-like political entities such as the European Union. Howev-
er, globalization has made these kinds of borders increasingly permeable 
for people, goods, capital, social practices, ideas, symbols etc. On the one 
hand, territorial borders have lost some of their salience as separators and 
dividers because new spaces for economic, political, administrative, and 
cultural cooperation have been created (see Albert/Brock 2001: 33). On the 
other hand, because the increasing permeability of territorial borders has 
been accompanied by uncertainty about the perceived and real destabi-
lizing eﬀects of economic competition, migration, and multiculturalism, 
there has been a reactivation of “national ‘policies’ as well as processes of 
exclusion based on culture, nation, or ethnicity” (EUV 2012: 9). These am-
biguous and puzzling eﬀects of globalization lay behind the current bur-
geoning of contemporary border studies, ﬁrst in the USA, where the new 
*1The editors wish to thank the Deutsch-Französische Hochschule – Université 
franco-allemande for its support of the project on French-German cooperation, on 
which the present volume is based, as well as the Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin, for 
promoting this publication. Our special thanks go also to Scott Stock Gissendan-
ner for his work in proofreading and editing the manuscripts.
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dynamics of the US-Mexican border attracted the attention of social sci-
entists and cultural anthropologists. In this context, new conceptual and 
analytical perspectives on borders were developed and authors eventually 
went beyond the traditional, static understanding of territorial borders as 
separators to pay more attention to the social practices that continually 
create and recreate symbolic borders or the varied spatial dimensions of 
physical borders (ibid: 10).
The end of the Cold War unexpectedly opened new opportunities for over-
coming the territorial borders that separated east from west. These bor-
ders insulated Eastern European societies from global developments and 
clove the European continent. But the borders that had served as barriers 
before 1989 changed thereafter into zones of contact in which new oppor-
tunities for cross-border mobility and cooperation emerged. At the same 
time, the collapse of the imperial power structure of the Cold War left 
some geopolitical disorder in the region, which gave rise to “spontaneous” 
processes of territorial restructuring in Europe as national borders were 
redrawn either by negotiation as in Czechoslovakia or by violence as in Yu-
goslavia and some of the post-Soviet territories. The eastern enlargement 
of the EU (2004/7) and the European Neighborhood Policy (launched in 
2004), despite having been driven also by the internal logic of European 
integration (Vobruba 2008), can be understood as part of a strategy to 
reduce the disorder and uncertainty created by the end of the old east-west 
conﬂict. These policies of integration and stabilization were inevitably 
accompanied by signiﬁcant “rebordering” processes as the EU’s external 
border rolled eastward. Moreover, The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 as 
well as the lingering conﬂicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, 
and Nagorno Karabakh clearly indicate that territorial restructuring in the 
wider European context is nowhere near to completion. The belief that a 
“borderless world” will emerge in the 21st century was widely held just af-
ter the end of the Cold War but since proved to be illusory. Border conﬂicts 
have in fact increased worldwide during the previous two decades, accom-
panied by the construction of new border fences and walls (see Falke in 
this volume).
In the context of globalization, accelerated European integration, and 
the ongoing territorial and political restructuring of the European con-
tinent, border regions have become subject to intense multidisciplinary 
research by European scholars, too, in recent years. What makes these 
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regions interesting is that they are emerging, dynamic social spaces. New-
ly created border regimes deﬁne the new opportunity structures framing 
cross-border cooperation, and residents and their representatives decide 
continually anew how to react to them. In this volume, the problems of dif-
ferent types of European border regions are analyzed. The opening of the 
internal borders within the EU and within the Schengen space have set 
oﬀ a new dynamism in economic and cultural cross-border cooperation. 
But a reluctance to fully use the newly available opportunities also has 
been revealed. This reluctance is perhaps rooted in inherited stereotypes, 
institutional inertia, or structural legacies. As a result, the EU is expe-
riencing new challenges. In the aftermath of the recent extension of its 
external borders to the east and southeast, the EU is struggling to balance 
its internal security needs, economic growth targets, and normative power 
ambitions. The limited usefulness of its traditional “soft power” approach 
now seems to have become quite obvious at its periphery.
THEORE TICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BORDERS
In the ﬁrst section of this volume, theoretical approaches commonly used 
in border studies are discussed. Bastian Sendhardt introduces the concept 
of Debordering/Rebordering. Based on modern systems theory, it has had 
increasing inﬂuence within border studies since the end of the 1990s. 
The major advantage of this constructivist approach, he argues, is that it 
helps us to grasp the constantly changing interplay between territorial, 
functional, and symbolic borders with a single, internally consistent theo-
retical framework. It helps us interpret the apparent contradictions in the 
EU’s attempts to both tighten its external borders and promote coopera-
tion across them. The same contradictions are also evident in the policies 
of those member states situated at the external EU border toward their 
non-EU neighbors.
Interested in the intellectual beneﬁts that could accrue to border stud-
ies from the sociology of space, Sabrina Ellebrecht experiments with using 
Georg Simmel’s concept of qualities of space for analyzing the EU border 
regime in the Mediterranean Sea. This way of linking border processes 
to their spatial fulcra, she argues, could help to highlight the particular 
logics by which border regimes function and by which borderlands devel-
op. Examples include the way in which persons are enabled or allowed to 
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cross the EU border into the protected internal space of EU territory, the 
diversiﬁcation of bordering processes, the geographic transfer and exter-
nalization of border control functions to third countries, and the asym-
metric distribution of resources for moving across borders. The later is, 
according to Bauman (1998: 86), “the key variable to stratify societies in a 
globalising world.”
BORDERS AS “L ABOR ATORIES” OF  
TR ANSNATIONAL COOPER ATION
The second part of the book is concerned with recent developments be-
tween and within border regions as they emerged after the external EU 
border was moved eastward amidst much public debate. In this context, 
Euroregions were created and promoted through European Regional Poli-
cy programs. These were intended to enhance economic, cultural, and po-
litical cross-border cooperation, to gradually reduce economic gaps among 
the border regions along which old and new EU member states are ad-
joined, and to counterbalance the negative eﬀects of restrictive protection 
measures at the EU’s new eastern border. Barbara Despiney-Zochowska 
compares the development of two Euroregions with Polish involvement: 
the Neisse Euroregion in the Czech-German-Polish triangle and the Car-
pathian Euroregion, which includes local communities in Hungary, Po-
land, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Returning to the concept of the 
“industrial district” developed by Alfred Marshall (1920), she explores 
prospects for cross-border economic cluster building through the revi-
talization of local productive systems. For this purpose, the creation of 
networks of small and medium-sized companies, supported by cross-bor-
der cooperation between local administrative authorities, is thought to 
be crucial. She identiﬁes some important barriers to the proliferation of 
clusters in the investigated regions, including local governments that do 
not appreciate the role they could be playing in economic development 
and the absence of a tradition of cooperation among competing compa-
nies. Her analysis shows that socio-economic structures inherited from 
the past largely determine the sectoral mix of clusters and their chances 
of success in any given region. Another approach to cross-border regional 
cooperation is presented by Roswitha Ruidisch, who discusses the concepts 
of “territorial cohesion” and “territorial capital,” both of which are key con-
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cepts in recent European Regional Policy. EU documents contain no clear 
deﬁnition of “territorial cohesion,” she argues. Using the example of the 
Czech-German border region, she shows that EU measures to increase 
territorial cohesion are swayed by competing interests and that these in-
terests are not always compatible with the goal of reducing regional dis-
parities.
THE AMBIGUOUS WORK OF STEREOT YPES
If national borders within the EU are losing relevance for the everyday 
life of borderland inhabitants, and if prospects for socio-economic devel-
opment in such areas increasingly depend on cross-border cooperation, 
the construction of collective identities there will inevitably be aﬀected. 
The social environment for identity-building is thus becoming more dy-
namic and more complex and, despite persisting traditional categories of 
collective identity such as nation, ethnicity, and language, the emergence 
of multidimensional identities is becoming more likely. In this context, 
stereotypes, understood as positive or negative images of “the other,” play 
a major but ambivalent role. Stereotypes can, as Antje Schönwald argues, 
enhance cross-border cooperation in that they systemize and simplify 
complex information and thus help residents deal with cultural bound-
aries. Using the example of the “Greater Region,” comprised of Saarland, 
Lorraine, Rhineland-Palatinate, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and 
Wallonia, Schönwald examines factors that encourage the emergence of 
multidimensional and patchwork identities and presents a typology of 
sub-identities in this region. 
Stereotypes can, of course, impede integration and cooperation, as they 
block receptiveness to change in the social environment and promote 
negative discrimination. A case in which stereotypes had rather negative 
eﬀects is the subject of the analysis of French, German, and Polish me-
dia debates on the Schengen agreement presented by Angela Siebold. The 
Schengen Treaty was signed in 1985, long before the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain. When it was implemented in 1995, the circumstances had changed 
radically. The major reason for the protracted implementation of the trea-
ty, in fact, was the fear of mass immigration from Eastern Europe after 
German Uniﬁcation. Thus, the central topic in the French and German 
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print media was the issue of eﬀectively protecting and consolidating the 
German-Polish border, i.e. the new external border of the EU. Here, it was 
said, “the poor and the rich part of Europe” meet (Siebold). In Siebold’s 
interesting observation, in the run-up to Poland’s accession to the Schen-
gen agreement in 2007, the same fears were raised in regard to the new 
external border of the EU where Poland meets Ukraine, White Russia, 
and Russia. In both cases, fears centered on migration and insecurity. She 
writes that in media assessments, “persistence of Western stereotypes and 
of the idea of a divided Europe” was manifest. Before 1989, the Schengen 
project seemed to interest technocrats only. It lacked public resonance. 
This changed when the new internal EU border was opened in 2007. Re-
porting became loaded with symbols of the bright future of a united and 
prosperous Europe. At the same time, however, the print media raised 
again concerns about mass migration and crime from the East, whereas 
in Poland unlimited drug traﬃcking from the Netherlands as well as an 
expected loss of general national sovereignty became important Schengen 
issues. These triggered long debates on identity and security.
Stereotypes can persist and reproduce themselves over generations, 
even long after national territorial borders disappear. From the perspec-
tive of the “Third East German Generation,” born between 1975 and 1985 
and socialized in the 1990s, Jaqueline Flack analyzes the emergence and 
articulation of a common self-perception among this group of young 
adults as they respond to the images of East Germans constructed by West 
Germans in the mass media. Whereas the collective identity of young 
adults from the former East Germany is mainly shaped by the rapid and 
all-encompassing changes they experienced during the transformation of 
East German politics, economics, administration, education, and daily life 
after German uniﬁcation, the image publicly ascribed to them is largely 
a reproduction of old West German stereotypes of GDR citizens. These 
diﬀerences and ongoing processes of mutual cultural contra-distinction 
create a cultural boundary that will continue to impair the formation of a 
common national identity, at least among this generation.
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VIE WS ON THE HISTORY OF  
POLISH-GERMAN BORDER REGIONS
The ongoing dynamics characteristic of the EU’s newly conﬁgured bor-
der regions cannot be fully grasped without exploring the history of the 
regions involved. Using the example of the region around Szczecin/Stet-
tin, Agata Ładykowska and Paweł Ładykowski describe the beginnings of 
a transnational space in which cultural, political, and economic identi-
ties not only co-exist but fuse. In contrast to the usual image of the Pol-
ish-German border as a persisting “welfare borderline between the poor 
and the rich part of Europe,” streams of mobility in both directions can 
be observed here. Whereas the rather underdeveloped counties on the 
German side have become an attractive destination for Poles looking for 
new housing, unemployed Germans have started to search for new job 
opportunities on the Polish side. The authors suggest that this speciﬁc de-
velopment has been spurred by resources rooted in the region’s post-war 
history. They reconstruct mobility patterns across the Oder-Neisse border 
during diﬀerent periods of regional history between 1945 and 1989 and 
describe social processes and practices that made the politically demarcat-
ed borderline relatively porous. Especially striking is their argument that 
the new post-war border, which created arbitrary divisions in cities and 
spaces that had grown “naturally,” forced the new settlers (refugees and 
expulsed Germans as well as Poles) to cooperate informally and formally 
across the border despite all resentments and mutual unfamiliarity. Coop-
eration was necessary simply in order to survive economically, they write.
Another experience is described by Bianca Szytniewski. The author 
examines the particular eﬀects of unfamiliarity and familiarity with the 
“other” side in diﬀerent historical border situations. In the immediate 
post-war era, after the redrawing of the Polish-German border along the 
Oder and Neisse rivers, diﬀerences between Poles and Germans were 
ampliﬁed, partly due to the fact that both sides of the new border were 
settled largely by forced emigrants from the former eastern territories of 
Poland and Germany, and partly as a result of the Polish government’s 
eﬀorts of nationalizing the new Polish territory. The contrast, however, 
between the oﬃcial propaganda of friendship among the two “socialist 
nations” beginning in 1950 and the fact that the border remained physi-
cally closed for another 20 years produced interesting patterns of unfamil-
iarity that became quite relevant during subsequent open-border periods. 
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After 1970, Szytniewski argues, unfamiliarity triggered curiosity, which 
was an important factor motivating cross-border mobility. This, howev-
er, ended in feelings of resentment because of shortages in basic goods 
and inadequate tourism infrastructure. When the border was re-opened 
in 1990, new opportunities for cooperation were only partially used. In 
the situation of economic decline and transformation in those years, both 
borderland Poles and Germans looked westward. European enlargement 
and cross-border cooperation turned out to be mainly top-down political 
projects. Among residents, the unfamiliarity inherited from the past man-
ifested itself in a widespread indiﬀerence that was especially pronounced 
on the German side.
However, as we learn from Thomas Serrier, it would be superﬁcial and 
perhaps misleading to look only at the post-war history of the Oder-Neis-
se region in order to understand current developments. Borders between 
Poland and Germany had been re-drawn several times during the last two 
centuries, and this happened in diﬀerent regions. In his case studies, Ser-
rier presents Eastern Prussia, Danzig, Greater Poland, and Silesia as “geo-
graphic systems of historically evolved relations,” the social appropriation 
of which is a multi-state process involving diﬀerent levels of memory that 
are at best partially shared by contemporary inhabitants and can display 
disintegrative eﬀects in times of tension. He thus shifts our attention to 
the fact that all contemporary advocates of “multicultural” identities in the 
new Polish-German borderlands should respect the historical experience 
of destroyed multiculturalism. Thus, despite all institutional validation, 
cross-border cooperation, including intense de-bordering processes as 
achieved in recent decades, is vulnerable to unexpected external change. 
Even from a neo-realistic view point, territorial borders between national 
states can change their functions within international relations regimes, 
as Eloi Piet illustrates in his analysis of the changing view of French diplo-
macy on the redrawing of the German-Polish border between 1940 und 
1950.
CROSS-BORDER INTER ACTION IN EUROPE’S NEIGHBOURHOOD
As mentioned above, the opening of internal borders and the consolida-
tion of external ones are only two of several factors inﬂuencing further 
integration and the development of the EU’s external relations. Securi-
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ty and prosperity are also aﬀected by border dynamics in the European 
neighborhood. As commonly known, the outer periphery of the EU is bur-
dened by frozen or latent territorial conﬂicts and contested borders. Two 
such situations are the ongoing Kosovo and Israeli-Palestinian conﬂicts, 
and many others haunt the post-Soviet space. “Stability” in such regions 
– a major concern of EU policies since the end of the Cold War (Lippert 
2004) – requires that at least a modicum of “normal life” among the local 
population be established. Otherwise, mass migration, traﬃcking in per-
sons, and organized crime will get out of control. All of these problems are 
perceived by the EU as major security issues. In this context, the perme-
ability of disputed borders or frozen ceaseﬁre lines allow for regional mo-
bility and trade, and they are thus of crucial importance. In her analysis of 
the political economy of borders and borderlands, Giulia Prelz Oltramonti 
explains the opportunities for residents, private businesses, and political 
administrations inherent to the logic of such contested borders. Using the 
example of the post-Soviet de facto states South Ossetia and Abkhasia, 
she demonstrates how the interplay of actors hardens and softens borders. 
This process was undertaken by various actors in the interwar period be-
tween 1992/1994 and 2008, when the areas oscillated between periods of 
“normal life” and times of open violence. Whereas the conﬂicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia were “re-frozen” at a diﬀerent level as the result of 
the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the territorial conﬂict between Israel 
and Palestine promises to be much more protracted and much less pre-
dictable, as Simon Falke suggests in his analysis of the separation fence Is-
rael has been maintaining since 2002 on the borderline to the West Bank. 
As this line was never an oﬃcial territorial border, it is also not accepted 
as a possible future national border by the majority of Jewish Israeli cit-
izens. Thus the fence, although justiﬁed by security concerns, functions 
ﬁrst and foremost as a symbolic boundary. As Falke argues, it promoted 
the process of national unity building in the (Jewish) Israeli society and 
made Israelis focus for the ﬁrst time on “normal” internal social conﬂicts. 
But it also symbolizes the exclusion of Palestinian Israelis from the rest 
of Israeli society. As the ﬁrst real physical and visible demarcation line, 
the separation fence could, according to Falke, inspire both Israelis and 
Palestinians to envisage at least the need for a territorial border. How to 
get to that place from the current starting position in which the borderline 
between the two societies is represented not by a territorial border but by 
“the settler” remains, however, vague.
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Theoretical Perspectives on Borders

Border Types and Bordering Processes 
A Theoretical Approach to the EU/Polish-Ukrainian Border 
as a Multi-dimensional Phenomenon
Bastian Sendhardt
INTRODUCTION
Events in 2011 such as the “biblical exodus” of refugees on the Italian is-
land of Lampedusa or the decision of the Danish government to reinstate 
border controls have underscored the ongoing signiﬁcance of borders in 
Europe. To date, however, there has been little agreement in academia 
on what borders actually are, and border studies remain under-theorized. 
The objective of this contribution is to augment the ongoing theoretical 
discussion within border studies by elaborating upon the overarching the-
oretical approach of “Debordering/Rebordering.” This approach interprets 
borders not as static lines but as multidimensional bordering processes. 
The empirical situation of the EU/Polish-Ukrainian border1 is used as a 
means to illustrate and focus theoretical aspects of border research. 
After introducing the history of the Polish and EU border with Ukraine 
after 1989, this article brieﬂy reviews the state of the art of border studies 
after the end of the Cold War. For improving on these approaches, the 
paper then reviews the concept of Debordering/Rebordering, a construc-
tivist approach to border studies. First, the nature of bordering processes 
is explained and diﬀerent types of borders are distinguished. Then, terri-
torial borders are explained in their fuller complexity as a form of diﬀer-
entiation separate from the diﬀerentiation of functional and symbolic bor-
1 | This neologism refers to both the supranational and the national dimension of 
this border, which must be thought together.
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ders. Finally, the EU/Polish-Ukrainian border is discussed as a complex 
bordering process involving diﬀerent types of borders.
The EU/Polish-Ukrainian Border
During the Cold War, the borders between the Soviet Union and other 
socialist states in Europe’s east were almost as impermeable and closely 
guarded as the Iron Curtain separating the “East” from the “West.” The 
situation changed rapidly after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These events set up the 
conditions for an independent Ukrainian state with full sovereignty over 
its own territorial borders. 
From the 1990s onward, the character of the Polish-Ukrainian bor-
der changed dramatically, “from a border of alienation to an ‘open’ bor-
der” (Wolczuk 2002: 246; Kennard 2003: 193f.). While the border mainly 
served as a barrier before 1989, it now became a zone of contact enabling 
new forms of political, economic and cultural cooperation across the 
border. Poland’s EU accession in 2004 and the gradual enforcement of 
the provisions of the Schengen agreement, however, seriously aﬀected 
cross-border relations between Poland and Ukraine. Having maintained 
a visa-free travel regime before 2004, Poland now had to introduce visas 
for Ukrainian citizens, a measure that had a negative impact “on trade, 
labor market dynamics, and cross-border cooperation” between the two 
countries (Scott 2005: 442). This was one of the events that caused many 
authors to decry the European Union as a hermetically sealed “Fortress 
Europe” (Anderson 1996; Busch/Krzyżanowski 2007; Dimitrovova 2010). 
However, as eastern enlargement proceeded in 2004, the EU attempt-
ed to counter the alienation of its eastern neighbors with the new Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The primary goal of the policy was 
“to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged 
EU and its neighbours” (European Commission 2004a: 3), to be achieved 
by supporting political, economic, and cultural cooperation initiatives in 
neighboring countries. According to the ENP Country Report on Ukraine, 
the ENP aims “to allow partners on both sides of the EU’s external border 
to work jointly to address common challenges such as economic and social 
development of the border areas, the environment and communicable dis-
eases, illegal immigration and traﬃcking, eﬃcient border management 
and people-to-people contacts” (European Commission 2004b: 5). Also, 
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the Eastern Partnership, established in 2009, aims speciﬁcally at extend-
ing cross-border cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbors 
(European Commission 2008: 8).
From this perspective, it seems that the EU’s policy aims at creating 
a shared “borderland” with its neighbors, not a “Fortress Europe” (see 
Comelli et al. 2007). Moreover, Poland established a bilateral agreement 
with Ukraine, voluntarily instating policies conform to EU policy, to give 
visa-free passage across the border to all residents living within 30 to 50 
kilometers on either side of the border. Encouraged especially by Presi-
dent Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Poland also has advocated Ukrainian in-
terests within the EU and has promoted the goal of Ukrainian accession.
Thus, the policies of the EU are not strictly consistent. They aim to 
seal oﬀ the EU to the east but also to enable cross-border cooperation with 
Ukraine. Some authors conclude that the EU’s neighborhood policy is 
manifestly self-contradictory (Scott/Matzeit 2006: 4; see also Anderson 
2001; Apap/Tchorbadjiyska 2004; Vermeersch 2007). Moreover, Poland’s 
Ukrainian border policy facilitates local border traﬃc and helps to main-
tain a rather open border. Thus, Polish and EU border policies vis-à-vis 
Ukraine also seem to contradict each other.
This apparent contradiction in border policies parallels the contradict-
ing theoretical positions in EU border studies: “Fortress Europe” versus 
“borderless Europe.” Below, a brief review of the state of current approach-
es in border studies is provided together with a critical view of their lim-
itations. It is followed by an elaboration of the better suited theoretical 
framework of Debordering/Rebordering.
Border Studies After 1989
When looking back at the recent history of border studies, one is immedi-
ately struck by its interdisciplinarity. Following the collapse of socialism 
in central and eastern Europe, interest in borders increased markedly in 
various academic disciplines, including political science, international re-
lations, sociology, anthropology, history, and geography (Newman/Paasi 
1998: 186). To this day, however, border studies remains a composite of 
many disciplines and has yet to yield a uniﬁed theoretical framework gen-
erally accepted by the diverse community of border scholars (Newman 
2006b: 145; Kolossov 2005: 612). However, there has been no paucity of 
attempts (see, for example, Anderson 2001; Brunet-Jailly 2005; Delanty 
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2006; Kolossov 2005; Martinez 1994; Newman 2003b; Paasi 1996; Rum-
ford 2006). 
Driving the renaissance of border studies were the eﬀects of global-
ization and the end “of the static West-East dichotomy” after 1989 (Paa-
si 1999b: 14). From the perspective of globalization, what is particularly 
interesting is the increasing permeability of borders. Ideas, goods, peo-
ple, and capital move across borders more easily than ever before. An ex-
treme interpretation of these phenomena is Ohmae’s “borderless world,” 
where state borders and the state itself have become meaningless, having 
withdrawn to make room for a world dominated by marketplaces (Ohmae 
1994). On the other hand, the 1990s also saw an increase in states and, 
with them, state borders. Developments in the former eastern bloc exem-
plify these changes in an especially vivid manner. Here, multiethnic and 
multiregional states broke up, and ethnic conﬂicts led to violent wars in 
Yugoslavia. The European map became dotted with many new states, and 
it seemed as if the importance of state borders had been reasserted.
Writing on the EU and its new borders, diﬀerent authors come to dif-
ferent and often contradictory conclusions. Some scholars emphasize the 
decreasing signiﬁcance of borders in the EU context. They focus on Eu-
ropean integration, the abolition of border controls within the European 
Union, and the perception of the EU’s eastern border as a “traveling” bor-
der (Popescu 2008: 424) that will gradually travel eastward to encompass 
the whole neighborhood and ﬁnally create an EU without borders, “the 
‘borderless Europe’ represented by the single market and the Euro-zone” 
(Delanty/Rumford 2005: 120).
A second group of scholars focuses on the attempts of the European 
Union to tighten its external borders, emphasizing their “barrier func-
tion.” More precisely, the EU’s external borders are seen as a barrier that 
keeps out illegal migrants, criminals, unwanted goods, and people who 
cannot aﬀord the costs of visas. This group of authors refers to the Euro-
pean Union’s external borders as a means to create a “Fortress Europe,” 
shutting itself oﬀ from its neighbors (see, for example, Scott 2005, 2009; 
van Houtum/Pijpers 2007; Grabbe 2000).
In the wake of the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy, several au-
thors stressed the “bridge function” of borders by referring to cross-bor-
der cooperation (CBC) initiatives by the EU and Poland (see, for example, 
Dandiş 2009; Perkmann 2003). Here, cross-border cooperation is seen 
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as a means to lessen the separating eﬀect of the external border and to 
implement the EU’s regional policy. 
Quite clearly, contradictory processes have been set in motion. On the 
one hand, movement has been made towards “increased protection of the 
external borders of the EU,” but “a new trend has become perceptible with-
in the EU towards increased political, security, economic, and cultural 
cooperation” with its eastern neighbors (Vermeersch 2007: 475). To date, 
none of the aforementioned authors has been able to make sense of this 
basic contradiction in border policies within a single, coherent theoretical 
framework.
THE CONCEP T OF DEBORDERING/REBORDERING 
Borders as Processes
For a long time, the study of borders was focused on state borders as static 
ontological entities with predominantly physical features, but the past two 
decades have seen a sea change in the study of borders. During the recent 
history of border studies, there has been a shift from the consideration of 
borders as mere geographical demarcations to a perspective that empha-
sizes the changing meaning of borders, diﬀerent types of borders with 
diﬀerent functions, and the social construction of borders.2 
The new perspective shifted the focus onto process-like and socially 
constructed qualities of borders. The ontological question of what a border 
is became gradually replaced by the question of how borders are social-
ly constructed, thus shifting the focus from the border to the process of 
bordering. As Newman pointed out, “it is the process of bordering, rather 
than the border line per se, that has universal signiﬁcance in the ordering 
of society” (Newman 2003c: 15). In this way, the traditional view of borders 
as static structures made room for a new theoretical understanding of 
borders as “historically contingent processes” (Newman/Paasi 1998: 201), 
2 | See, for examples, Anderson (1996); Anderson/O’Dowd (1999); Donnan/
Wilson (1999); Newman (2003c, 2006a, 2006b); Newman/Paasi (1998); Paasi 
(1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2005); van Houtum et al. (2005); van Houtum/van 
Naerssen (2002); Wilson/Donnan (1998); Zielonka (2002).
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an understanding that includes in the deﬁnition of borders their ready 
potential to change. 
This constructivist strand of border studies looks beyond the visible, 
material, and seemingly objective manifestations of borders such as fenc-
es, walls, rivers, or mountains and focuses on the “social practices and dis-
courses in which boundaries are produced and reproduced” (Paasi 2005: 
18). It understands borders as “dynamic cultural processes” (Paasi 2003: 
464). State borders can now be analyzed as “social practice[s] of spatial 
diﬀerentiation” (van Houtum/van Naerssen 2002: 126) and as institutions 
“established by political decisions and regulated by legal texts” (Anderson 
1996: 1). 
In other words, this strand of theory no longer views borders as some-
thing given or natural. Borders are always (potentially) “subject to political 
contestation and change.” They “do not exist prior to political action but 
acquire their societal relevance only as a result of […] political processes 
and the accompanying legitimization strategies that produce these bor-
ders.” Consequently, from this point of view, borders must be considered 
as “historically and politically contingent”; they “are continuously remade 
on the basis of concrete political, cultural, and economic practices” (Stet-
ter 2008a). Borders are understood as manifestations of “social practices 
and discourses that may be simultaneous and overlapping” (Paasi 1999a: 
670). From a social constructivist perspective, the focus shifts from the 
entity to the process itself: from borders to bordering.
Types of Borders
The constructivist perspective in border studies emerged concomitantly 
with approaches that distinguish diﬀerent functions and types of borders.3 
However, authors often do not explain why they chose particular types of 
borders (e.g. cultural, political, language) as their unit of analysis or how 
each of these kinds of borders interrelate. Bonacker (2006) and Stetter 
(2005b), however, provided a more systematic approach by proposing the 
general distinction between territorial, functional, and symbolic borders.
3 | See, for example, Anderson (2001); Anderson/O’Dowd (1999); Donnan/Wil-
son (1999); Anderson et al. (2003); Delanty (2006); Gropas (2004); Kolossov 
(2005); Newman/Paasi (1998).
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We often think of territorial borders as state borders, meaning “the 
lines that enclose state territories” (Newman 2003a: 123). Accordingly, ter-
ritorial borders are those that separate states or regions and serve ﬁrst 
and foremost as a means of control, of ascribing areas of competence and 
demarcating jurisdictions (Bonacker 2006: 81). This view and the focus 
on nation-states have prevailed in most border studies (Newman 2003a: 
124). Following this understanding, borders are by deﬁnition more closed 
than open, and their main function is to separate diﬀerent entities, mostly 
states. This is also reﬂected in much of the existing literature on borders 
(Anderson et al. 2003: 2), which seems to follow a tacit agreement that 
borders are self-evidently territorial borders. The assumption of borders’ 
territorial “boundedness” is unquestioned and often the term “border” is 
equated with territorial borders without further explanation.
The conventional perception of borders has come under criticism be-
cause of a signiﬁcant increase in the variety of transnational cross-border 
activities such as migration and trade and because of the emergence of 
supra- and transnational actors such as the EU. These changes are com-
monly understood as outcomes of globalization, although in central and 
eastern Europe (CEE), they emerged clearly only after the collapse of so-
cialism.4 More precisely, one of the consequences of globalization is an 
increasing permeability of territorial borders. According to Albert and 
Brock, these transformations “point to a change in the function of [ter-
ritorial] borders.” In order to adapt to the new circumstances, territorial 
borders must “cease to act as separators and […] change from transit zones 
into spaces of economic cooperation, political-cum-institutional innova-
tion, and transnational communication” (Albert/Brock 2001: 33). 
This means that borders “are not merely physical, empirical lines or 
zones that can be frozen on maps and atlases as naturalized entities” but 
must be conceived of as multidimensional social constructs (Paasi 2001: 
22). Some border scholars, therefore, began distinguishing diﬀerent 
types of borders in contrast to previous approaches, which took for granted 
the priority of territorial over other types of borders. Territorial borders 
(such as state borders) are then but one type of border. Other types include 
4 | Of course, cross-border activities in Europe took place long before 1989, es-
pecially in the context of European Integration in western Europe. In terms of the 
EU border with Poland and Ukraine border, however, the collapse of socialism was 
the watershed event.
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functional and symbolic borders (Stetter 2005b; see also Ferrer-Gallardo 
2008). “Functional borders separate diﬀerent functional systems, such as 
politics, law, science, economy, sports, love or the health system” (Stetter 
2005b: 5), whereas symbolic borders “constitute collective identities” and 
allow us to “diﬀerentiate between the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’ Through the 
marking of symbolic borders forms of political, ethnic or religious identity 
emerge” (Bonacker as cited in Stetter 2005b: 5). 
These three types of borders, however, do not necessarily coincide. 
Therefore, territorial borders are in a “complex relationship with cross-cut-
ting functional (and, at times symbolic) borders” (Stetter 2005b: 5). In a 
nutshell, one can say that instead of clear-cut lines separating diﬀerent 
(state) territories, borders have a rather “fuzzy” character as a consequence 
of the interplay of the three aforementioned border types (Christiansen et 
al. 2000).5 
Debordering/Rebordering
In the wake of globalization, borders do not become obsolete. Globaliza-
tion processes continuously change the relation of the diﬀerent types of 
borders to one another and thus require “a constant process of adjust-
ment” (Stetter 2005b: 6) to these changes. A concept that does justice to 
this “fuzziness” in a theoretically adequate way is the concept of Deborder-
ing/Rebordering (Albert/Brock 1996).6 Based on a constructivist under-
standing, Debordering/Rebordering conceives of borders as processes and 
distinguishes between diﬀerent types of borders. By drawing on modern 
5 | Detailed descriptions of territorial, functional, and symbolic borders are pro-
vided below. 
6 | Although other border scholars point to an increasing dif ferentiation of bor-
ders as a reaction to globalization processes (see, for example, Anderson et al. 
[2003]; Rumford [2007]), to date, only few border scholars have taken up the 
concept of debordering and rebordering (e.g. Stetter [2005b]; Bonacker [2006], 
[2007]). Moreover, the concept of debordering and rebordering is a good example 
of the lack of exchange among border scholars. In their otherwise theoretically 
well-crafted and empirically rich EXLINEA project report, James Scott and Silke 
Matzeit (2006: 21) claim that the terms “bordering” and “de-bordering” were 
coined by the EXLINEA Nijmegen research team when in fact, Albert and Brock 
(1996) had introduced the concept ten years earlier.
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systems theory, all of these types of borders are conceived of as societal 
borders constituted by communication. Albert and Brock established the 
basis of Debordering/Rebordering, and subsequent applications of the 
concept placed greater emphasis on distinguishing diﬀerent types of bor-
ders (Stetter 2005b; Bonacker 2006). 
Within this concept, debordering “is understood as an increasing per-
meability of [territorial] borders together with a decreasing ability of states 
to shut themselves oﬀ” against all kinds of cross-border activities (Albert/
Brock 2000: 20). In other words, debordering refers to the transgression of 
territorial borders, for example by functional systems (such as “the econ-
omy”) or symbolic systems (such as cross-border identities). Debordering 
and can thus be described as “the dissolution of the territorial congru-
ence of state, economy, and society” (Brock 2004: 89). Debordering can 
be deﬁned as “the functional change of borders, the loss of importance 
of their territorial anchoring and – as a consequence – the decoupling of 
(functional) system borders and territorial borders” (Bonacker 2007: 24).
The aﬀected political entities – mostly states but also other political en-
tities such as the European Union – have to react to the challenges posed 
by debordering processes. One possible “response to this increasing per-
meability of borders” is the “adaptation of statehood” and the adjustment 
of policies to debordering processes. Adaptation can result “in the emer-
gence of new political spaces that transcend territorially deﬁned spaces” 
like state borders, for example “in the emergence of multilevel systems of 
governance in transstate contexts” such as the European Union (Albert/
Brock 2000: 20).
At the same time, however, processes of debordering are accompanied 
(and seemingly contradicted) by rebordering processes, such as a tighten-
ing of (new) borders, an increase in border controls and the re-territorial-
ization of space (Albert/Brock 2000: 39-40; Rumford 2006: 157). But the 
simultaneity of debordering and rebordering processes does not necessar-
ily have to be considered a contradiction. Instead, processes of rebordering 
can be described
as social phenomena within the framework of an overall debordering of the world 
of states, […] as a specific reaction to the debordering processes that are actu-
ally taking their course within the framework of globalization. Viewed in this light, 
demarcation (rebordering) would be, first and foremost, a way of regulating the 
process of transformation, not of arresting it (Albert/Brock 2000: 42f.). 
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RECONSIDERING DEBORDERING/REBORDERING
Subsequent applications of Albert and Brock’s concept attach greater sig-
niﬁcance to the distinction of diﬀerent types of borders (Bonacker 2006; 
Stetter 2005b). This slight shift of emphasis makes sense, because not 
only does debordering point to the increasing permeability of territorial 
borders but also to the decreasing signiﬁcance of the nation-state. Debor-
dering can then be considered a decoupling of functional and symbolic 
borders that were formerly coupled in the form of nation-state and other 
territorial borders (Bonacker 2006: 80).
This intention of this contribution is to add to the concept of Deborder-
ing/Rebordering by looking more closely at the interrelations of diﬀerent 
border types. In particular, this contribution challenges previous usages of 
Debordering/Rebordering that adhere to the conception of territorial bor-
ders as a type of border sui generis (see, for example, Bonacker 2006; Stet-
ter 2005a, 2005b, 2007). According to these approaches, territorial borders 
possess an inherent quality that makes them distinguishable from other 
kinds of borders such as functional and symbolic ones. While recognizing 
that territorial borders are of relevance especially for the functional systems 
of “politics” and “law,” both Bonacker and Stetter continue to treat territori-
al borders as a unique type of border. Against this approach, the argument 
is presented below that territoriality is a strategy of bordering applied in 
diﬀerent functional and symbolic bordering processes. Consequently, this 
study suggests understanding territorial borders as but one possible form 
of internal diﬀerentiation of functional and symbolic systems. Therefore, 
it is necessary to take a closer look ﬁrst at functional and then at symbolic 
borders. In a third step, it is possible to analyze how functional and symbol-
ic borders relate to the principle of territoriality.
FUNCTIONAL BORDERS IN WORLD SOCIE T Y
The theory of world society as employed in this study stems in large part 
from modern systems theory (MST) as developed by the sociologist Ni-
kolas Luhmann.7 MST understands society as the “comprehensive social 
7 | For other, non-system theoretical approaches to world society see for example 
Burton 1972, Meyer et al. 2009.
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system that includes all other social systems” (Luhmann 1998: 78). Thus, 
society does not consist of human beings or their actions (Luhmann 1998: 
24); it is created by communication alone (Luhmann 1991: 249). Only that 
which is communicated is of societal relevance (Luhmann 2002: 40). 
Starting with the printing press in the fourteenth century and gain-
ing momentum with the emergence of modern telecommunication, each 
and every communication is (potentially) global today. With society being 
communicatively constituted, society can then only be conceived of as one 
single social system: world society (Luhmann 1998: 145). This means that 
society can no longer be identiﬁed with a system of political rule (Luh-
mann 1998: 147). Thus, the world does not consist of territorially deﬁned 
societies (such as the German, the Polish, the Ukrainian society, and so 
on) but of one single world society (see Stichweh 2000: 245). 
With functional diﬀerentiation being the primary form of diﬀerenti-
ation in world society, territorial borders can no longer be viewed as the 
limits of social processes. Instead, the theory of world society holds the 
view that world society is internally diﬀerentiated into functional systems 
such as the economic, the legal, the political, or the scientiﬁc system. 
Each of these subsystems fulﬁls one speciﬁc function within society. This 
particular function is then “of priority for this (and only for this) system 
and precedes all other functions.” In the case of the political system, for 
instance, this means that the “political […] is more important than any-
thing else, and a successful economy is important only as a condition for 
political success” (Luhmann 1998: 747). Hence, the diﬀerent functional 
systems communicatively demarcate their own functional system borders 
according to their individual systemic needs. 
Functional systems establish borders of communication that separate 
them from their environment. Functional systems constantly produce 
and reproduce themselves by drawing a border between system and en-
vironment. Conceiving of borders as communications, therefore, not only 
means that borders can be constitutive (as content) of particular acts of 
communication, but also that the very process of creating borders is an act 
of communication. Bordering is communicating by drawing borders, that 
is, communicating by making a distinction.
Therefore, these functional systems must not be understood as a pri-
ori entities. Just like the larger society, functional systems are themselves 
constituted by communication. Functional borders are constantly being 
negotiated and drawn, thus revealing their procedural character and their 
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tendency to change (Stetter 2009: 105). Thus, functional systems should 
not be understood as ﬁxed functional containers in which social processes 
take place. Instead, these very functional bordering processes constitute 
the various functional systems and spaces.
IDENTIT Y AS DIFFERENCE:  
SYMBOLIC BORDERS IN WORLD SOCIE T Y
During the past two decades, social science scholars have paid increasing 
attention to symbolic borders (Lamont/Molnár 2002). Symbolic borders 
can be thought of as an expression of collective identities based on the 
distinction between “self” and “other.” The constitutive role that “symbol-
ic borders [play] in the construction of contested social identities” (Paasi 
2005: 17) is widely accepted among scholars of borders (see, for example, 
Lapid 2001; Paasi 2005). Collective identities are not taken to be exoge-
nously given essentialist categories. Rather, they are understood as social-
ly constructed.
Of particular interest are collective identities that have a spatial point 
of reference: nations, regions, cities, and so on. Other reference points 
for identiﬁcation such as gender, class, and race do exist but will not be 
explored further here. The understanding of collective identities used be-
low follows Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities”; for 
him, symbolic borders are “ﬁnite, if elastic, boundaries” that separate dif-
ferent imagined communities from one another (Anderson 2006: 7). Al-
though Anderson primarily deals with but one kind of collective identity, 
the nation, his concept is applicable to other imagined communities. “All 
communities larger than primordial villages […] are imagined” (Anderson 
2006: 7).
Luhmann’s modern systems theory informs the approach to borders 
used here in two respects. First, not only territorial and functional borders 
but also symbolic borders are constituted by communication and thus are 
constantly subject to change (Stetter 2009: 106). Collective identities gain 
societal relevance only via communication. Consequently, authors using 
this approach are less concerned with the “bearers of identity” (Weller 
2000: 52) and more concerned with how collective identities are consti-
tuted by communicatively established symbolic borders. Second, the start-
ing point of an analysis of symbolic borders is not identity but diﬀerence. 
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According to this understanding, diﬀerence is constitutive of identity, 
and identity emerges only as a product of diﬀerentiation (Luhmann 1991: 
27 fn. 11): “identity is possible only by diﬀerence” (Luhmann 1991: 243). 
Consequently, collective identities are devoid of essentialist roots and have 
nothing to do with quasi-natural a priori givens. Instead, collective identi-
ties are constituted via symbolic bordering processes.
Symbolic bordering processes in the form of “self/other distinctions” 
involve the simultaneous construction of the self and “other” (“other-
ing”) which “is itself part of the construction of the self.” Therefore, the 
construction of identities necessarily includes the construction of a self 
“against the diﬀerence of an other” (Diez 2004: 321).
Thus, paradoxically, diﬀerence has to be created ﬁrst. Identity emerges 
in a second step. The construction of the “self” always entails the creation 
of the “other.” More precisely, the construction of the “self” is the very 
same process as the construction of the “other.” However, the distinction 
between two identities, that is the symbolic bordering process itself, must 
not be equated with the attribution of certain values to these identities. It 
is the particular “character of [some] symbolic bordering” processes that 
may value one side as a “positive” and the other as a “negative” (Stetter 
2005a: 343-4).
In regard to value ascriptions, what matters is not so much the “self/
other distinction” but rather “the question as to which discursive ﬁeld the 
Self/Other coding of collective identities is embedded” (Stetter 2005a: 
336). In other words, the “other” can have positive or negative connotations 
and is thus perceived neutrally, as a foe, or as a friend to the self’s collec-
tive identity. In this way, “value attributions become intermingled with 
Self/Other distinctions” (Stetter 2005a: 336). Consequently, these kinds of 
symbolic bordering processes lead to diﬀerent perceptions of the “other.” 
The relations with the “other” are then either potentially conﬂictual (neg-
ative “other”) or based on the idea of cooperation (positive “other”). Either 
way, these value-laden constructions of an “other” tend to be one-sided 
because they turn a blind eye to the multi-facetedness of the relations with 
the “other” (Stetter 2005a: 336f.).
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DECONSTRUCTING TERRITORIALIT Y
As suggested above, territorial borders are not considered as a type of bor-
der sui generis but merely as secondary form of diﬀerentiation of some 
functional (and at times symbolic) systems. The remainder of this section, 
therefore, aims at showing which function territoriality serves for func-
tional and symbolic systems.
Robert D. Sack deﬁnes territoriality as “the attempt by an individual 
or a group to aﬀect, inﬂuence, or control people, phenomena, and relation-
ships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 
1986: 19). One of the major advantages of territoriality is the fact that what 
is under control does not have to be deﬁned beforehand (Sack 1986: 27). 
Therefore, territorial control fundamentally diﬀers from earlier attempts 
at controlling people and things, for example by enumeration. Only now, 
through “classiﬁcation by area” (Sack 1986: 21), has it become possible to 
control and govern vast tracts of land, inhabitants, and resources. As a con-
sequence, in order to prevent misunderstandings, territorial borders must 
be demarcated exactly. On the other hand, this precision is more theoret-
ical than practical and does not reﬂect bordering practices on the ground. 
Even clearly deﬁned territorial borders have “fuzzy edges” (Sack 1986: 21).
As clear-cut, “razorlike” lines (Schlögel 2009: 137), territorial borders 
exist only on maps. Since territorial borders are a pre-condition for the 
modern territorial state it comes as no surprise that both the modern ter-
ritorial state and modern maps emerged as a consequence of progress in 
cartography since the sixteenth century (Biggs 1999: 380). In this way, 
cartography helped create “a new kind of space” in which “boundaries 
were made congruent with the cartographic ideal” (Biggs 1999: 387). 
Thus, rather than maps being a representation of borders in reality, map 
lines are actually predecessors of borders on the ground. 
Among the most striking examples of the social constructedness of 
borders are the straight-line territorial borders running for hundreds and 
even thousands of kilometers in North America and on the African conti-
nent. However, borders that follow river courses and mountain ranges are 
no less socially constructed. What matters most is the fact that territories 
are created by drawing borders on maps, regardless of whether the point 
of reference is seemingly natural like a river, a mountain, or a language 
border or is rather seemingly arbitrary like a wall, a fence, or a pre-existing 
administrative unit. The decisive point is that both reference points are 
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communicatively constructed and thus historically contingent. The point 
of reference always could have been diﬀerent.
The obvious fact that many territorial borders are materially and phys-
ically fortiﬁed does not support the argument that territorial borders have 
an essentialist character. Rather it is precisely evidence against such an 
argument. Territorial borders are in need of physical representations pre-
cisely because they are neither essential nor natural. “The necessity of 
re-narrating and constantly patrolling boundaries is evidence of their in-
completeness” (Jones 2008: 183).
The question is, then, What function does territoriality fulﬁll in a 
world society diﬀerentiated into diﬀerent functional systems? As indicat-
ed above, political systems, in close coupling with legal systems, still rely 
heavily on territorial borders as a form of internal diﬀerentiation (see Luh-
mann 1998: 166; Bolz 2001: 11). The core advantage of territoriality, that 
one need not deﬁne what one has control over, must then be considered 
as a basic requirement for the emergence of the modern territorial state. 
Thus, functional systems such as “politics” and “law” are among those 
most challenged by the debordering eﬀects of globalization. However, the 
emergence of new polities such as the European Union and a global hu-
man rights regime demonstrate that even “politics” and “law” are able to 
adapt to debordering processes and transcend, at least in part, the borders 
of the territorial state.
Symbolic systems representing diﬀerent collective identities also refer 
at times to clear-cut territorial borders. The most obvious case is nation-
alism. One reason why states demanded a precise cartography of their 
territory in the nineteenth century was to enable the visualization of the 
nation (Osterhammel 2010: 150). From the standpoint of nationalism, ter-
ritorial borders neatly separate one nation from the other. Often, the de-
marcation of the borders was paralleled by a process of homogenization 
in the newly created territory (Biggs 1999: 388). The territorialization of 
space and the representation of the state as territory were prerequisites for 
the emergence of nationalism, despite the fact that national identity dis-
courses usually claimed the opposite: that the nation was a prerequisite for 
the territorial nation-state. Thus, “through the process of mapping, a new 
kind of territory and hence a new kind of state came into being” (Biggs 
1999: 399). This territorial coupling of diﬀerent functional and symbolic 
borders forms the basis of the modern nation-state. Globalization and pro-
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cesses of debordering can thus be understood as a decoupling of borders 
formerly coupled in the nation-state.
The territorialization of political rule through cartography also had 
ramiﬁcations for the representation of the state. Before its geographical 
depiction on maps, the state was never the territorial state. And this new 
political entity was then represented in an entirely new way. While realms 
and kingdoms were represented ﬁrst and foremost by images and symbols 
such as coats of arms, modern cartography came to symbolize the “state 
as territory” (Biggs 1999: 390). Thus, the modern territorial state is not 
only the result of a functional fusion of political rule and geographical 
area but simultaneously a fusion of the symbolic representation of state 
and its geographical extent. Through maps, this representation of the 
state as territory was preserved and reproduced so that, as a result, maps 
“[e]ngraved the distinctive shape of a particular territory on the imagina-
tion” (Biggs 1999: 390).
CONCLUSION
This contribution sought to enhance the theoretical depth of the Debor-
dering/Rebordering concept. Instead of interpreting Debordering/Rebor-
dering merely as a crossing or reaﬃrmation of pre-existing territorial di-
vides by functional and symbolic systems, this contribution understands 
Debordering/Rebordering to be an application of the principle of territori-
ality as a special mode of spatial diﬀerentiation within various functional 
and symbolic systems. Territorial borders, particularly in the form of state 
borders, are thus best understood as territorially converging borders of 
diﬀerent functional and symbolic systems.
With this complex concept of Debordering/Rebordering, it is pos-
sible to embed the development and changing permeability of the EU/
Polish-Ukrainian border in a theoretical framework and describe these 
developments as processes of debordering and rebordering. In this way, 
one can attempt to go beyond perceptions that either emphasize the debor-
dering character of European integration (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 
2008) or concentrate on the exclusionary eﬀects of EU bordering policies 
(Scott 2009; van Houtum/Pijpers 2007). 
Instead, this contribution has oﬀered an approach that conceives the 
EU/Polish-Ukrainian border as a process whereby the borders of the var-
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ious functional and symbolic spaces are constantly being drawn and re-
drawn. Consequently, the EU/Polish-Ukrainian border must be viewed 
as a ﬂuid social construct and as a result of ongoing communications at 
diﬀerent functional and symbolic levels, communications that do not nec-
essarily have to be congruent with the territorial border on the map that 
separates the EU and Poland from Ukraine. It is now possible to analyze 
the rationale behind EU and Polish policies towards Ukraine in the light 
of this concept. One can ask whether their policies can be seen as reac-
tions to the challenges posed by debordering (and rebordering) processes. 
Do EU and Polish border policies vis-à-vis Ukraine illustrate the Debor-
dering/Rebordering processes outlined above? The concept laid out in this 
contribution leads us to expect that various actors will attempt to adapt to 
debordering, for example by furthering cross-border activities, but also 
that new attempts of rebordering will create new spaces. From this point 
of view, it becomes clear that neither Poland nor the EU are in “the driver’s 
seat” as they set Ukrainian border policy (Stetter 2005b: 8), but rather that 
they are reacting to complex debordering dynamics occurring in a wider 
global context. 
Debordering/Rebordering promises to be an advance in the study of bor-
ders but also in the study of wider globalization processes and related de-
bates. Although the EU border to Ukraine may be regarded as a special 
case insofar as this one particular nation-state border is embedded with-
in the wider border regime of the EU’s external borders, the concept of 
Debordering/Rebordering promises to be useful for border studies in gen-
eral. It directly addresses one of the central problems of globalization pro-
cesses: the increasing permeability of territorial borders. However, instead 
of leading to oversimpliﬁed diagnoses like the “end of the nation-state” or 
“Fortress Europe,” Debordering/Rebordering allows us to analyze from a 
normatively neutral position the complex bordering processes that occur 
wherever the territorial anchoring of borders is called into question or 
actively reaﬃrmed by social practices.
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Qualities of Bordering Spaces 
A Conceptual Experiment with Reference to Georg Simmel’s 
Sociology of Space
Sabrina Ellebrecht
INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the spatial turn and with the consequent impetus of deessen-
tialising borders in general, this contribution is interested in the qualities 
of bordering spaces (Grenz-Räume). Assuming that borders can be con-
ceived of as spaces of their own right, some of their general qualities are 
inquired. For that purpose, this contribution applies Georg Simmel’s so-
ciology of space, set out in his 1908 essay on “Space and the Spatial Order 
of Society,” to the empirical example of the external border of the Europe-
an Union (EU) in the Mediterranean Sea. In the conceptual experiment 
below, each of Simmel’s qualities of space (Raumqualitäten) are brieﬂy ex-
plained. The experiment then consists of applying these qualities of space 
to selected analysis of the EU border management in the Mediterranean 
region. From this, some proposed general qualities of bordering spaces 
are extrapolated.1
1 | Passages in German or French texts have been translated by the author when 
not available in English. With regard to quotations from Simmel, I have decided to 
provide them in the respective footnote.
Sabrina Ellebrecht46
APPLYING SIMMEL’S QUALITIES OF SPACE TO  
BORDERING PROCESSES
Several authors refer to Simmel’s sociology of space and discuss its poten-
tial analytical value.2 Some of the more controversial aspects of Simmel’s 
approach are, ﬁrstly, his use of the euclidic, and with it the idea of an ab-
solute space, frequently subsumed under the metaphor of the container. 
Second, his purported support for the thesis that social ties are becoming 
emancipated from space. Finally, his analytical framework for a sociology 
of space in general. It is argued that his analytical frame, constructed on 
the building blocks of the “qualities of spaces” (Raumqualitäten) and of 
“spatial formations” (Raumgebilde), is not systematic. Moreover, Simmel’s 
approach is criticized as illustrative rather than conceptual.
Andrea Glauser explicitly addresses the ﬁrst two critiques in her essay, 
“Pioneering Work with Paradoxical Consequences”. Glauser shows that 
Simmel refers to Euclidean space as an “ideal-typical auxiliary construct” 
(Glauser 2006: 254). However, Simmel does not oﬀer a mere analysis of 
space as an abstract concept, but of space as perceived by and employed 
by societal groups. This is the context in which Simmel makes reference 
to Euclidean space.3 By emphasizing the relevance of human percipience, 
Simmel presents the antithesis to the thesis of mechanical causation as pro-
moted by the early natural sciences and as idealized by social scientists of 
his time. To Simmel, space is conceivable, perceptible, producible, design-
able; but it is not a ﬁxed, a priori constant. The sociologist analyzes social 
projections into space – from imagined, to architectural to institutions – 
and the way these projections turn back and aﬀect the lives and forms of so-
cial groups (Schroer 2006: 63). This emphasis on socio-spatial interactions 
(Wechselwirkungen) is not compatible with the second criticism which has 
reproached Simmel for his assertion that the social can be delinked and 
2 | See Konau 1973; Strassoldo 1992; Ziemann 2000; Löw 2001; Schroer 2006; 
Glauser 2006; Canto Milà 2006; Eigmüller 2006; Cuttitta 2006, 2007.
3 | Similarly, Vilém Flusser in his 1991 essay, “Räume,” describes humans as or-
ganic tubes, as worms that crawl up and down, left and right and which thus live 
in three-dimensional space. With regard to contemporary spatial perceptions, 
however, Flusser sees abstract and imaged forms of vir tual space and outer space 
as challenging the “worm’s” perception from the ground and enabling topological 
understanding and experiencing.
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emancipated from space (Läpple 1991; Löw 2001). Addressing the imputed 
unsystematic nature of Simmel’s analytical framework, Glauser argues that 
Simmel’s qualities of space “can be used as a kind of observer’s horizon, 
against which selectivity can be revealed and questioned” (Glauser 2006: 
265). Simmel’s framework does seem to lack a clear taxonomy. However, 
considering that Simmel’s program for the study of space was intended to be 
a counter-proposal to the emerging ﬁeld of anthropogeography4, his choice 
to employ qualities of space can also be attributed to a more sophisticated 
conceptual strategy. With regard to sociation, Simmel stresses the relevance 
of the qualities of space in contrast to the quantities of geometry. Moreover, 
he is interested in the analysis of historical and cultural manifestations of 
societal relations onto space, rejecting causal and geo-deterministic anal-
yses. In this spirit, he writes that “for nature, any demarcation of borders 
is arbitrary”5 (Simmel 1992: 695). Likewise, Simmel considers the social 
reception of “merely” political borders stronger than those of the so-called 
natural borders along rivers, seas, or mountains (Simmel 1992: 694). His 
analytical frame of using qualities of space turns out to be a methodological 
tool when aiming at strengthening the historic and cultural dimension of 
space, which, in essence, can be seen as an early premise of the spatial turn. 
Therefore, each of Simmel’s ﬁve qualities of space – exclusivity; decompos-
ability and delimitation; proximity and distance; ﬁxity; and movement – is 
4 | Werner Köster (2002) describes how the scientific dealing with space at the 
turn of the 19th to the 20th century had been shaped by the historical context of 
two emerging disciplines in the humanities – sociology and geography – compet-
ing for institutional viability. In this context, Georg Simmel and Friedrich Ratzel are 
often contrasted. Interestingly, both Simmel and Ratzel drew on Immanuel Kant’s 
concept of space as pure form of intuition. While Simmel sociologizes the Kan-
tian concept (Glauser 2006: 258), Ratzel turns it into a “naiv-empirical” spatial 
concept (Köster 2002: 62). However, a coeval review of Simmels On the Spatial 
Expressions of Social Forms by Émile Durkheim (1904) considered the Simmelian 
approach less comprehensive and less sophisticated than Ratzel’s thoughts on 
space. Yet, Durkheim pointed to a cer tain ambiguity within Ratzel’s works. Ratzel, 
he wrote, would vacillate between two premises: the logic of the social and a cer-
tain geo-determinism (Köster 2002: 93).
5 | “Der Natur gegenüber ist jede Grenzsetzung Willkür, selbst im Falle einer in-
sularen Lage, da doch prinzipiell auch das Meer “in Besitz genommen” werden 
kann.”
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explained below and applied to contemporary analysis of EU migration and 
border control policies in the Mediterranean.
E xclusivit y
In his ﬁrst lines on exclusivity (Ausschließlichkeit des Raumes), Simmel 
points to the uniqueness of every part of space. “Just as there is only one 
universal space, of which all single spaces are pieces, so is each part of 
space unique in a way for which there hardly exists any analogy” (Sim-
mel 1992: 690)6. According to Simmel, several objects of the same kind 
might be found in diﬀerent places, yet positing a plurality of the same 
space seems absurd. This apparently banal but crucial characteristic is 
best understood through its linkage to territory (Grund und Boden). “To 
the extent to which a societal formation is linked or is ‘loyal,’ so to speak, 
to a speciﬁc stretch of territory, it has a uniqueness and exclusivity that 
cannot be achieved otherwise”7 (ibid.). In this sense, territory renders the 
uniqueness of any part of space palpable. The state is the only example of 
a spatial formation fully characterized by exclusivity, as it is “so strictly 
linked to territory that it is impossible to think of the co-existence of an-
other state on the same territory” (Cuttitta 2006: 31 referring to Simmel). 
Due to its limited scope and reach, the modern national state provides 
an unambiguous point of orientation. It should also be mentioned that 
Simmel distinguishes between local manifestations and territorial appro-
priation or bonds. While the latter produces identity, or rather ‘territorial 
belonging’ in the sense of exclusivity, the ﬁrst refers to the manifestation 
of particular, social relations in buildings, architecture, and spatial ar-
rangements. Exclusivity thus alludes to membership and its signiﬁcance 
for the spatial organization of social structure, amongst which territory is 
but one mode. While territory evokes the uniqueness of each part of space, 
it is crucial not to confuse this with the social mechanisms of exclusion, 
6 | “Wie es nur einen einzigen allgemeinen Raum gibt, von dem alle einzelnen 
Räume Stücke sind, so hat jeder Raumteil eine Art von Einzigkeit, für die es kaum 
eine Analogie gibt.”
7 | “In dem Maß, in dem ein gesellschaftliches Gebilde mit einer bestimmten Bo-
denausdehnung verschmolzen oder sozusagen solidarisch ist, hat es einen Cha-
rakter von Einzigkeit oder Ausschließlichkeit, der auf andre Weise nicht ebenso 
erreichbar ist.”
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which are often organized and justiﬁed with reference to territory.8 With 
Simmel it is thus possible to obviate the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994), as 
he sees exclusivity as one element of the construction of territory, rather 
than as one of its eﬀects.9
E xclusivit y as a Qualit y of Bordering Spaces? 
Territorial (state) borders deﬁne the inside and outside by drawing a line. 
They demonstrate and materialize exclusivity by creating the space where 
membership is regulated. They allow for the operationalization of distinc-
tion and exclusion. The deﬁnition of inside and outside is manifested in 
fences and walls, as well as in the metaphor of ‘Fortress Europe’. Alluding 
to Simmel’s essay Brücke und Tür (1909), Paolo Cuttitta writes that “the 
EU, as all fortresses, does, however, have a gate and a drawbridge, which 
occasionally can be opened or lowered” (Cuttitta 2010: 29). Through the 
metaphors of the gate and the drawbridge, selection is posited as a bor-
dering process. In his article, “Das europäische Grenzregime: Dynamiken 
und Wechselwirkungen,” Cuttitta illustrates the extent to which exclusion 
and selection are conﬂated within the framework of EU migration and bor-
der-control management. Transit zones or detention centers, he argues, do 
not function as a means to ultimately exclude third-country members who 
arrive by boat on EU territory. Rather they are meant to decelerate (Pa-
nagiotidis/Tsianos 2007) the project of migration. According to Cuttitta 
(2010: 31ﬀ.), the status of illegality has become an intermediary stage in the 
migration process. But where do these (biographical) stages occur? And 
8 | Simmel fur ther distinguishes between supra-territorial formations (über-
räumliche Gebilde) and territorial formations (räumliche Gebilde). Territorial for-
mations are characterized by the liaison between territory and social ties while 
supra-territorial formations go beyond territorial definitions or belonging. The lat-
ter might correspond to what has recently been described as transnational forma-
tions (Pries 2008; Wimmer/Glick-Schiller 2002).
9 | The fact that borders and territory are defined in reference to one another has 
been explored by Stuart Elden (2010). According to Elden, borders are a second-
order phenomenon and depend on the historical meaning of territory as a dimen-
sion of space. The question whether border studies are territorially trapped has 
been of interest for David Newmann (2010), Fiona McConnell (2010) and John 
Agnew (2007, 2008, 2010).
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where would they come to an end? Locked in the status and the places of 
illegality, third country members can only get access to selection processes 
which operate along bordering questions: money enough to pay the facili-
tator?, ﬁt enough to make the trip?, castaway enough to be rescued on the 
high-seas?, victimized enough to apply for asylum?, patient enough to wait 
in a detention centre?, strong enough to survive in the irregular economy of 
European labor markets? A topology of illegalized border-crossings would 
reﬂect diﬀerent sites along the ‘way’, such as the refugee boat, the slums 
in Tripoli, the detention centers, or asylum oﬃces.10 In so doing, a spatial 
sociology would link bordering processes to their spatial fulcra.
Whereas inside and outside are about physical access and are decided 
‘on site,’ the tension between open and closed is about access to a legal 
sphere. In the negotiation of membership, the tensions between open and 
closed11 as well as between inside and outside are conﬂated. With regard 
to third-country nationals migrating by boat, the selection process seems 
to be aﬀected by an exclusionary logic.12 Analytically, however, these two 
dimensions need to be divided into distinct qualities of bordering spaces, 
precisely for the reason of disentangling the container-like connotation of 
an inside-outside binary, which might be at work along a border, from the 
idea of selection.
10 | An outstanding example for such a topology is Silja Klepp’s (2011) ethnog-
raphy of the sea border in the Mediterranean. With reference to Georg Marcus call 
for a multi-sided ethnography, Klepp follows the people in Tripoli, on arrival in 
European shores, in the detention center, in court.
11 | Having examined Simmel’s qualities of space, Schroer states they can, in 
fact, be applied to contemporary examples. He states that additional qualities or 
tensions might well exist and proposes the dichotomies of inside-outside as well 
as open versus closed (Schroer 2006: 77f.). My argument is that these tensions 
are already part of the quality of “exclusivity.”
12 | In their ongoing research project, “State Project Europe,” Sonja Buckel, John 
Kannankulam, and Jens Wissel analyze the re-grouping of the European popula-
tion into zones of stratified legal titles, one zone being illegalized migration. A first 
account is provided in the essay “State Project Europe: The Transformation of the 
European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life” (Buckel/Wissel 2010).
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Decomposabilit y and Delimitation
When Simmel is quoted on borders, the context from which the quota-
tions have been drawn is seldom mentioned. Under the second quality of 
space, namely ‘decomposability and delimitation’ (Zerlegbarkeit und Be-
grenzung), Simmel elaborates on borders between individuals and groups, 
which in a ﬁrst step, are deﬁned as ‘functional compartments’. He writes: 
“Another quality of space that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences societal interactions 
consists in the fact that for the purpose of utilization, space is divided into 
pieces that are considered discrete units and that are – as both cause and a 
result of this – framed by borders” (Simmel 1992: 694).13
According to Simmel, social diﬀerentiation is spatially marked by bor-
ders and boundaries. However, and this is important, social diﬀerenti-
ation is not necessarily exclusive. In this sense, Simmel deﬁnes border 
in the following way: “The border is not a spatial fact with sociological 
eﬀects, but a sociological fact that forms itself in space” (Simmel 1992: 
697).14 This deﬁnition is frequently quoted by way of stressing the socially 
constructed character of political borders and other boundaries between 
individuals and groups. Although Simmel does point to the constructed 
character of boundaries with this remark, he equally acknowledges the 
social repercussions of a materialized border, its “physical power,” and its 
“lively energy” (Simmel 1992: 697f.).15 Once it is materialized or repre-
13 | “Eine weitere Qualität des Raumes, die auf die gesellschaftlichen Wechsel-
wirkungen wesentlich einwirkt, liegt darin, dass sich der Raum für unsere prakti-
sche Ausnützung in Stücke zerlegt, die als Einheiten gelten und – als Ursache wie 
als Wirkung hiervon – von Grenzen eingerahmt sind.”
14 | “Die Grenze ist nicht eine räumliche Tatsache mit soziologischen Wirkungen, 
sondern eine soziologische Tatsache, die sich räumlich formt.”
15 | “Ist sie freilich erst zu einem räumlichen-sinnlichen Gebilde geworden, das 
wir unabhängig von seinem soziologisch praktischen Sinne in die Natur einzeich-
nen, so übt dies starke Rückwirkungen auf das Bewußtsein von dem Verhältnis 
der Parteien. Während diese Linie nur die Verschiedenheit des Verhältnisses zwi-
schen den Elementen einer Sphäre untereinander und zwischen diesen und den 
Elementen einer andren markier t, wird sie doch zu einer lebendigen Energie, die 
jene aneinanderdrängt und sie nicht aus ihrer Einheit herausläßt und sich wie eine 
physische Gewalt, die nach beiden Seiten hin Repulsionen ausstrahlt, zwischen 
beide schiebt.”
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sented by a physical or geographical border line, the border becomes a part 
of the interaction. This is congruent with his conceptualization of space 
as both the projection of societal relations and source of eﬀects on the 
lives and forms of groups (Schroer 2006: 61ﬀ.; Ziemann 2000: 250ﬀ.). 
The principle of interaction (Wechselwirkung) – prominent throughout 
Simmel’s œuvre – is at the heart of his assessment. Drawing on Simmel, 
Natalià Cantó Milà describes borders as the phenomenon in which social 
relations, including power relations, crystallize. She writes that “the pro-
jection of demarcation onto space strengthens the border and perpetuates 
it” (Cantó Milà 2006: 192).
At the same time, Simmel emphasizes the ordering and relieving 
function of borders, pointing to the “security” and “clarity” they provide 
(Simmel 1992: 699). Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Simmel thinks 
of darkness as a distorting circumstance for social and spatial arrange-
ments. Darkness transforms social borders, it brings about “a completely 
unique augmentation and combination of encompassing and expansion 
in the conﬁnement of space” (Simmel 1992: 705).16
These remarks will be considered in the following passage when an-
alyzing contemporary EU migration and border control policies against 
the background of the spatial quality of decomposability and delimitation. 
Decomposabilit y and Delimitation as a  
Qualit y of Bordering Spaces? 
An application of the second quality of space, “decomposability and delim-
itation,” to borders might not seem necessary at ﬁrst glance. Yet, Simmel 
writes about the “line of deﬁnition” and the “moment of decision” with 
regard to societal membership. In his view, physical boundaries facilitate 
and perpetuate social diﬀerentiation. Conceptualizing borders as spaces 
16 | “Andererseits läßt eben dies auch die wirklich vorhandenen Grenzen ver-
schwinden, die Phantasie erweiter t das Dunkel zu übertriebenen Möglichkeiten, 
man fühlt sich von einem phantastisch-unbestimmten und unbeschränkten Raum 
umgeben. Indem nun die im Dunkeln natürliche Ängstlichkeit und Unsicherheit 
hier durch jenes enge Zusammengedrängtsein und Aufeinander-Angewiesensein 
Vieler behoben wird, entsteht jene gefürchtete Erregung und Unberechenbarkeit 
des Zusammenlaufes im Dunkeln, als eine ganz einzige Steigerung und Kombina-
tion der einschließenden und der sich expandierenden räumlichen Begrenzung.”
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in their own right allows one to probe further into the decomposability of 
borders (its practices, institutions, and processes) and into the rationale 
for geographic demarcations of a given border.
Turning ﬁrst to the decomposability of borders, the work of the French 
philosopher Etienne Balibar (Balibar 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b) is sig-
niﬁcant “for the priority he accords borders in the study of democracy, 
citizenship and the question of European identity” (Rumford 2011: 37). 
Balibar argues that the term ‘border’
is profoundly changing in meaning. The borders of new politico-economic entities, 
in which an attempt is being made to preserve the functions of the sovereignty 
of the state, are no longer at all situated at the outer limit of territories: they are 
dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and 
things is happening and is controlled (Balibar 2002a: 71).
The (cross-border) movement of goods, information, money, and people 
challenges the ambition of public institutions to establish and maintain 
order, argues Balibar with much of the globalization literature. Just as the 
deconstruction of the territorial nation-state resulted in a diversiﬁcation 
and multiplication of spatial matters, bordering processes, too, have been 
diversiﬁed. They are becoming fragmented administratively, legally, and 
practically and they have become increasingly specialized. The transfor-
mation of borders over the past 20 years has often been described as the 
reconﬁguration of territorial borders – deﬁning the territorial nation-state 
– to a networked system of control and surveillance that reproduces the 
border both inside and outside the respective state. In this context, the 
metaphor of the network has attracted attention.17 Moreover, borders have 
been described as ﬂexible: “The diﬀerent kinds of frontier, far from dis-
17 | Doris Schweitzer’s (2011) analysis of Manuel Castells’ concept of a network-
society as it relates to the topography of borders shows that the topography of 
a networked society allows for a radicalization of bordering processes. Athana-
sios Karafillidis (2009) even argues that the network itself is a border. Stefan 
Kaufmann (2006) describes the transformation of borders as three topographical 
transformations of the border-line: forward relocation, tightening, an in-folding. 
He shows that the societal conceptualisation of a network-society has found 
its manifestation in the reconfiguration of the EU migration and border control 
regime.
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appearing, reproduce and diversify themselves. Therefore, they become 
potentially omnipresent, and their number and types are potentially in-
ﬁnite” (Cuttitta 2007: 2). With regard to the European external border in 
the Mediterranean Sea, the phenomena described above are “localizable” 
as in the case of ex-territorial detention camps in Libya (Nosh 2008) or in 
the vessels and advising oﬃcers provided by the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Coordination at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (Frontex) to patrols in Senegalese 
territorial waters – notably meant to secure the external borders of the 
Member States of the EU. The decomposition of borders has also been de-
scribed as de-localization, meaning a geographic transfer of border control 
into the territorial waters of a third country or onto the high seas, and as 
externalization, which refers to the outsourcing of tasks and responsibil-
ities to third countries (Cuttitta 2010: 26; Buckel 2011). A certain distrib-
utedness, in parallel to a specialisation, merge in the example of Frontex 
whose mandate is ‘pioneering’ in the ﬁeld of a supranational border man-
agement (Kasparek 2010: 116ﬀ.; Neal 2009; Fischer-Lescano/Tohidipur 
2007)18. In general, the spatial distribution of bordering practices corre-
sponds to a distribution of competencies and to an overlapping and conse-
quent blurring of legal spheres. The border-land appears as decomposable 
as it becomes reorganized in the process of Europeanization19. Bordering 
practices no longer run along a ﬁxed geographic borderline. Moreover, 
the means and practices of border control and surveillance are continually 
renegotiated and relocated. In keeping with this, the question of where? 
does not merely refer to a geographic coordinate. Where? also asks for the 
legal framework, the policy context, and the position. It asks for the topol-
ogy of bordering practices, processes, institutions, and sites. This where? 
not only challenges the concept of territory. It challenges the visibility of 
borders. Similarly, the technologies deployed for border control and border 
18 | The latest amendment concerning Frontex’s competencies has been formu-
lated in Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of 25th October 2011. Three aspects point 
to a strengthening of the Agency’s capacities: the possibility to acquire or lease 
equipment, the task to set up European Border Guard Teams which can be de-
ployed during Joint Operations (JOs), and the fact that Frontex may initiate JOs.
19 | Georg Vobruba (2010) provides a comprehensive discussion on the impact 
of the European integration on the formation and shaping of common external 
border policies.
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surveillance alter the visibility of borders and produce clandestine and in-
visible ﬁgures, such as the stowaway (Walters 2008). Divers surveillance 
technologies, such as radar, satellite, sensors, cameras as well as informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICT), contribute to the production 
of bordering spaces and determine their qualities. In any decomposition 
of space to produce a border, there is tension between (being) visible and 
(making) invisible (or vice versa). The tension between visible and invisi-
ble can thus be considered a quality of bordering spaces. While the border, 
as a contract between states, has hitherto limited the scope and visibility 
of sovereigns, the border now appears as the mandate for border-related 
surveillance and intelligence. This way state borders are not only blurred 
on the high seas where proactive patrolling and surveillance are untied 
from territorial limitations codiﬁed in geographic distances.
The tension between visible and invisible further plays out in the cat-
and-mouse game of unauthorized border-crossing vis-à-vis mandated bor-
der control and surveillance. In this context, Simmel’s remarks on dark-
ness add an astute aspect: under the distorting condition of darkness, the 
proportionality between means and ends are both on the side of law en-
forcement authorities while the potential trespassers enter a win or loose 
scenario. Night-watch cameras, radar and intelligence-driven operations 
on the one side counter the maybe strategic, maybe frightened attempts to 
cross the blue sea in dark hours.
Regarding issues of border delimitation and border qualities, these can 
be simpliﬁed into the question of where should we make the demarcation? 
This question raises concerns about the legitimization and the techniques 
of demarcation, of measuring, and of political decision making. If borders 
cannot be drawn arbitrarily, the question of demarcation touches upon 
the criteria which legitimize them, which render them considered “good,” 
“natural,” “necessary,” etc. This brings to the fore the tension between 
natural and cultural as relevant to bordering spaces. This tension often 
appears in border studies as “the enduring geographical myth of natural 
borders” (Fall 2010).
Proximit y and Distance
With the advent of globalization theories, Georg Simmel’s sociology of 
space frequently has been cited to shed light on the relations between 
proximity and distance (Nähe und Distanz), his fourth quality of space, 
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and on movement and migration (Bewegung, Wanderung), his ﬁfth quality 
of space. Both qualities are used to describe the eﬀects of modernity on 
social relations and to assess the ambivalence of urban life (Allen 2001). 
According to Simmel, proximity encourages intimacy and social cohesion. 
Social relations at a distance allow for individualization and freedom; yet 
they require the capacity to abstract (Simmel 1992: 717). How does the 
modern ambivalence between proximity and distance apply to bordering 
spaces?
Proximit y and Distance with Regard to Bordering Spaces?
If the border is a point of crystallization, as Cantó Mila suggests, tensions 
appear at the border more pronounced and more drastically. Asymmet-
ric power relations thus seem to be traceable both along a demarcation 
line and throughout unequal mobility policies. For the case of migration, 
distance implies that more than just geographic space is overcome. From 
the perspective of a person migrating to Europe from a place in Senegal, 
for instance, distance could rather be described as the amount of capi-
tal and resources required to arrive in the Schengen Area. The way in 
which asymmetric power relations play out in bordering processes is bit-
terly illustrated by the fact that the route of repatriation (for most routes 
less then ten hours by air) obliterates resources that may have taken the 
migrant months or years to accumulate. The tension between proximi-
ty and distance, which Simmel rather unsystematically introduced as a 
quality of space, has been noted in arguments about how social relations 
are becoming emancipated from their spatial limits. However, resources 
for overcoming geographic distance are unevenly distributed (Baumann 
1998). This alone bestows yet another quality to the tension between prox-
imity and distance on a global scale.20 For the case of the EU border on 
20 | Discussions on the global-local dichotomy echoed Simmel’s ambivalent 
take on the effects of proximity and distance on social relations (Robertson 1994; 
Massey 2005,2006). Recently, this tension has been widened to discussions on 
uneven development (Harvey 2005) and “spatial justice” (Soja 2010). Manuell 
Castell’s network-society is not organized around the ordering principle of dis-
tance and proximity; instead, one is either in or out of the network. Inside the 
network, distance approaches zero. According to Castells, black holes stand for 
radical exclusion (Castells 1996; Schweitzer 2011). Marc Augé argues that under 
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the Mediterranean Sea, the tension could be measured as noted above by 
comparing geographic distance to time, money, and resources invested 
in migration, as well as to the time individuals wait or are detained. Re-
formulated as tension, Simmel’s fourth quality of space, “proximity and 
distance” is also valuable when investigating border-spatialities.
Fixit y
“Fixity” (Fixierung) describes the extent to which a particular social con-
tent is ﬁxed or localized on a place or a building such as the house or 
the clubroom. Under this quality of space, Simmel addresses questions of 
belonging as they relate to physical presence or absence, and he discusses 
the function of a pivotal point to social relations. With regard to the lat-
ter, he writes that “meaning, as the fulcrum (Drehpunkt) of sociological 
relations, is held by a ﬁxed spatiality wherever the encounter or the en-
gagement of otherwise separated elements can only occur in a particular 
place” (Simmel 1992: 708).21 By means of the fulcrum, relations that oth-
erwise might have remained invisible appear, at least to the sociologist. 
These relations serve to support the continuation of social processes. Sim-
mel’s elaborations are perfectly compatible with the idea of virtual space, 
and the meaning of the chat room experience functions as a fulcrum for 
societal relations which otherwise would not occur or be tangible. 
Another interesting example that illustrates the spatial quality of “ﬁx-
ity” is the diﬀerence between individual and numeric naming of houses:
The ‘being numbered’ of urban houses signifies, in a higher sense, the spatial fix-
ation of individuals, as they can be traced with the help of a mechanical method. 
Obviously, this traceability dif fers in nature from the designation of particular 
quarters and streets to cer tain classes and professions and from the separa-
the condition of supermodernity there is merely the near, anything of no concern 
to the self would occur elsewhere (Augé 2008 [1992]) – a nuance not captured in 
the German translation “Das Nahe und das Ferne”.
21 | “Die Bedeutung als Drehpunkt soziologischer Beziehung kommt der fixier ten 
Örtlichkeit überall da zu, wo die Berührung oder Vereinigung sonst voneinander 
unabhängiger Elemente nur an einem bestimmten Platze geschehen kann.”
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tion into Christian, Jewish, and Muslim quarters in oriental towns (Simmel 1992: 
712).22
Contrasting houses that are numbered as parts of an ordering inventory 
and houses with names, Simmel works out the advantages and disadvan-
tages of aggregate and individual classiﬁcations. Simmel’s rather innocent 
example should not hide the momentousness of the underlying thought: 
diﬀerent ordering logics have diﬀerent implications for sociation.
Movement, Migration
Under the concept of “movement or migration” (Bewegung, Wanderung) 
Simmel analyses the extent to which the structure of a social group is 
aﬀected when some or all members of a group are migratory. Simmel 
argues that a sociological assessment which looks at the “eﬀects of mi-
grating” (Wirkung des Wanderns) (Simmel 1992: 748) does not have to 
distinguish between nomadism and migration, for the reason that “the 
eﬀect on the form of society is typically the same in both cases: oppres-
sion or removal of the internal diﬀerentiation of the group, a subsequent 
lack of actual political organization, which, however, is often compatible 
with despotic leadership” (Simmel 1992: 748f).23 When describing the 
advantages and disadvantages in social status of itinerant and sedentary 
individuals, Simmel writes, “the person who is sedentary in principle can 
at any time move anywhere, so that he, in addition to his sedentariness, 
enjoys all advantages of mobility, whereas not all advantages of sedentari-
ness apply to the same extent to the person who is mobile in principle” 
22 | “Die Nummerier theit der Stadthäuser bedeutet in einem höheren Sinne 
überhaupt erst die räumliche Fixierung der Individuen, indem diese nun nach einer 
mechanischen Methode auffindbar sind. Diese Auffindbarkeit ist ersichtlich ganz 
andrer Natur, als sie in der mittelalterlichen Designierung besonderer Quartiere 
und Straßen für bestimmte Stände und Berufe liegt oder in der Trennung von Chri-
sten-, Juden- und Mohammedanerquartieren orientalischer Städte.”
23 | “Denn jene Wirkung auf die Gesellschaftsform ist typischerweise in beiden 
Fällen die gleiche: Niederhalten oder Aufhebung der inneren Dif ferenzierung der 
Gruppe, daher Mangel eigentlicher politischer Organisation, der sich aber oft mit 
despotischen Einherrschaften durchaus verträgt.”
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(Simmel 1992: 764).24 According to Simmel, mobility implies more ad-
vantages when combined with a sedentary status. Simmel does not de-
scribe migration as a global phenomenon that aﬀects local circumstanc-
es; instead he is interested in processes of sociation within the migrating 
group itself. Moreover, he takes up the relationship between migrants and 
non-migrants but does not necessarily assume diﬀerent group aﬃliations. 
Note that, concerning membership, the itinerant is not the same thing 
as the stranger.25 Itinerant and the sedentary individuals compete for so-
cial resources. Subsequently, sociation implies a tension over negotiating 
membership policies. Reading Simmel, it becomes clear that movement 
policies and spatial clustering of social groups are interrelated, and this 
deserves attention.
Fixit y and Movement with Regard to Bordering Spaces?
In times of globalization, Markus Schroer argues, asking about space cor-
responds to asking about one’s origin, destination, and level of access in 
respect to a certain area (Schroer 2006). Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman con-
siders mobility as the key condition of social stratiﬁcation in a globalizing 
world. “The dimension along which those ‘high up’ and ‘low down’ are 
plotted in a society of consumers, is their degree of mobility – their free-
24 | “Es scheint überhaupt, als ob, je näher der Gegenwart, um so günstiger die 
Position des Seßhaften gegenüber dem auf Bewegung angewiesenen Gegner sei. 
Und dies ist durch die Erleichterung der Ortsveränderung begreiflich. Denn sie 
bewirkt, daß auch der prinzipiell Seßhafte dch jederzeit sich überallhin begeben 
kann, so daß er neben seiner Seßhaftigkeit mehr und mehr noch alle Vorteile der 
Mobilität genießt, während dem Unsteten, prinzipiell Beweglichen nicht im glei-
chen Maße die Vorteile der Seßhaftigkeit zugewachsen sind.”
25 | In his essay, “The Stranger” (1908), Simmel writes in the section on proxim-
ity and distance: “The stranger will thus not be considered here in the usual sense 
of the term, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as 
the man who comes today and stays tomorrow – the potential wanderer, so to 
speak, who, although he has gone no fur ther, has not quite got over the freedom 
of coming and going. He is fixed within a cer tain spatial circle – or within a group 
whose boundaries are analogous to spatial boundaries – but his position within 
it is fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not belong in it initially […]” 
(Simmel 1972).
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dom to choose where to be” (Baumann 1998: 86). According to Baumann, 
the consumer society has created the social ﬁgures of tourist and vaga-
bond. Vagabonds are stuck in a place because of their limited possibilities, 
watching the world go by. Tourists, however, move around the world as 
they please. In contemporary debates, the term “migrant” is commonly 
used for those whose mobility is restricted, whereas the term “mobility” 
is used to describe something possessed by “global elites,” who are able to 
overcome geographic distance quickly and with little disruption of their 
personal lives. This distinction is clear from the perspective of border 
management: the “bona ﬁde” passenger is supposed to be helped across 
the border as seamlessly as possible, but those who are not allowed to cross 
must be held up. Considering that movement can also be conceptualized 
as power, as Trutz von Trotha (2006) argues with reference to Albert O. 
Hirschman, mobility constraints cannot simply be reduced to an issue 
of resources. Rather they reveal asymmetric power relations, traceable 
within migration patterns and border control policies. With regard to the 
EU’s external border in the Mediterranean, practices such as interception 
operations at sea, the detention of migrants and asylum seekers, and the 
acquisition and storage of individual travel records or personal data in da-
tabases26 result from the tension between ﬁxity and mobility as a quality of 
bordering spaces. The small boat, with its undocumented (read un-ﬁxed) 
passengers, has thus not emerged by accident as the preferred means of 
transport into the EU. It rather indicates a constant maneuvering through 
ﬁxity and movement.27
26 | The tensions between visibility and invisibility and between fixity and move-
ment overlap in the example of databases as Leon Hempel (2011) shows in his 
essay “Das Versprechen der Suchmaschinen. Der europäische Sicherheitsraum 
als Sichtbarkeitsregime.”
27 | In her 2011 monograph, Silja Klepp provides compelling examples of the 
transit economy based around the small boat. Sicco Rah (2009) explores in de-
tail the dif ferent legal arguments relating to the small boats transporting asylum 
seekers, migrants, and refugees on the high seas and across territorial waters. 
In his lecture “Where are the missing vehicles?,” William Walters describes these 
small boats as the “anti-ship of state” (Walters 2011).
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AMPLIF YING SIMMEL:  
SOME GENER AL QUALITIES OF BORDERING SPACES
This essay set up a communication between Simmel’s qualities of space 
and contemporary analysis of migration and border control policies in the 
Mediterranean. Simmel’s qualities of space were examined to asses their 
potential merit for border studies and for further development when ap-
propriate. The qualities of bordering spaces (Grenz-Raumqualitäten), ex-
trapolated from this conceptual experiment, are meant to spur further 
debate.
Qualities of space, it was found, reﬂect social interactions and forma-
tions as much as they aﬀect them. In the speciﬁc case of bordering spaces, 
their qualities reﬂect and perpetuate social tensions, diﬀerences as well as 
mechanisms for the regulation of membership, and for the granting and 
negating of liberties. The qualities of bordering spaces, proposed here as 
tensions, are based on the premise that demarcation occurs as these ten-
sions are negotiated and resolved.
Discussing Simmel’s quality of exclusivity against selected analysis of 
contemporary EU migration and border control policies indicated two gen-
eral tensions inherent to bordering spaces. Both an inside-outside tension 
which captures distinction and an open-closed tension which addresses se-
lection, revolve around the quality of exclusivity and should be separated 
when analyzed and deployed as qualities of bordering spaces. Two further 
tensions, namely those between visible and invisible as well as between 
natural and cultural have proven relevant for bordering spaces when exam-
ining the decomposability and delimitation of borders. Whereas the latter 
tension addresses the legitimizing narrative of borders, the ﬁrst revolves 
around the scope, range, means of law enforcement on the one hand, and 
around the practices of border-crossing on the other. Although Simmel’s 
quality of space proximate-distant, proved applicable to bordering spaces, 
this did not work without the reinterpretation of geographic distances 
to uneven development, a reinterpretation which would require further 
investigation and critical reﬂection. Finally, Simmel’s qualities ﬁxity as 
well as movement and migration, could be applied to bordering spaces 
and taken together as the tension between ﬁxed and mobile. This tension 
allows for capturing policies regarding mobility, data storage, and deten-
tion. Table 1 provides an overview of both Simmel’s qualities of space and 
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spatial formations and the extrapolated tensions that are characteristic of 
bordering spaces.
Simmel’s ﬁve  
qualities of space 
(and his examples)
six proposed general 
tension characteristic 
of bordering spaces
practices and policies 
which negotiate the 
proposed tensions of 
bordering spaces 
exclusivity
(territorial  
nation-state)
inside-outside othering, exclusion
open-closed selection, biopolitics
decomposability and 
delimitation
(Gebietshoheit, 
Zentralität)
visible-invisible
cat and mouse game, 
sovereign and  
deviant
natural-cultural
routing borders, 
legitimising them
ﬁxity
(club, house, num-
bering of houses) ﬁxed-mobile
data storage, politics 
of identity
movement and  
migration
politics of mobility
proximity and  
distance
(empty space, the 
in-between)
proximate-distant
uneven distribution 
of resources and 
infrastructure
Table 1: Tensions of bordering spaces as extrapolated from Simmel’s qualities 
of space
Bordering spaces are characterized by the negotiation of these tensions. 
Demarcation is marked through a decision to inhibit these dichotomies. 
The proposed six tensions characteristic of bordering spaces should allow 
for a more methodical approach to those spatial formations which have 
emerged as the constitutive “architecture” of the EU border control regime 
in the last 20 years. For the purpose of testing its value, the proposed bor-
dering tensions need to be applied to diﬀerent empirical sites of European 
demarcation, such as, for instance, the French waiting zone, the European 
Surveillance System, the small boat, the court, the detention center, the 
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island of Lampedusa or Lesbos etc. Only then can we decide whether this 
approach, derived from Simmel, fulﬁlls its promise of conceptual rigor 
regarding the qualities of bordering spaces or whether it leads to essen-
tially descriptive outputs. Yet, in this ﬁrst experimental step, Simmel’s 
way of thinking sociology about space has indeed pointed to some possible 
general qualities of bordering spaces, applicable to many empirical cases 
of demarcation.
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European Border Regions as 
“Laboratories” for Cross-Border 
Cooperation

Euroregions 
Emerging New Forms of Cross-Border Cooperation
Barbara A. Despiney Zochowska
“When an industry has chosen a locality for itself 
it is likely to stay there long: so great are the ad-
vantages which people following the same skilled 
trade get from near neighborhood to one anoth-
er.” Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, Lon-
don, Macmillan, 1920. 
INTRODUCTION
One motivating factor driving the accession of Central European coun-
tries to the EU in 2004 and 2007 was the intention of preventing these 
countries from becoming economic backwaters in a “multi-speed Europe” 
(DATAR 1996). In this new context, economic clusters, which are thought 
to be more readily adaptable to unique or changing circumstances, may 
prove to be able to foster new and maintain established market actors and 
jobs in central Europe. Many examples from around the world demon-
strate that clusters are more stable than market sectors. Even when sectors 
are in decline, clusters are at times able to adapt and avoid crisis. Clusters 
may, then, emerge as even more important for less aﬄuent regions in the 
future.
In the context of eastward EU expansion, it was necessary to integrate 
new member countries into the European Spatial Development Perspec-
tive (ESDP) with its polycentric model of development. The three objec-
tives of the ESDP are: (1) social and economic cohesion, (2) sustainable 
development, (3) improved competitiveness of European regions (SDEC 
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2000). Regional production systems grouped together on the spatial level 
and integrated company networks at the regional level could become a 
basis for local hubs of competition. The problem lies in identifying assets 
held by central Europe for future endogenous development. This contri-
bution concentrates on identifying these assets, looking for the possible 
emergence of local competitive productive systems in Central European 
countries. The paper concentrates on instances of positive development in 
“industrial districts,” built around networks of small and medium-sized 
ﬁrms that survived the decline of industrial mass production in the tran-
sition countries after 1989. 
Before the transition to market economies, communist economic 
strategy favored a concentration of industry in highly specialized indus-
trial districts with priority given to heavy industry over consumer goods 
(Despiney-Zochowska 1982; Andreﬀ 1986). After the dissolution of the 
COMECON in 1989-1990, the globalization of previously protected mar-
kets obliged national economic actors to adapt to new competition. The 
rationalization strategies of multinational ﬁrms, which include among 
other things the international outsourcing of production processes, en-
tails the loss of autonomy of national productive systems and their even-
tual dissolution (Andreﬀ 1994). However, the contribution of new ﬂexible 
methods of production to local development and to the dynamics of re-
gional integration is not as negligible as has been suggested (Pellegrin 
1999). The traditions and production experience of any given local econ-
omy may ﬁt well to global needs, yielding products that are well-accepted 
in the marketplace or new ideas regarding production that can be used 
elsewhere, such as in processes of standardization, in the organization of 
production lines, in the reorganization of work, or through subcontract-
ing. If local knowledge of productive techniques, material usage etc. fails 
to ﬁnd a place in the global organization of production, it falls into the 
realm of folklore (Becattini/Rullani 1995). 
To place the recent changes in regional and local economies into global 
perspective, we must look at multinational ﬁrms. They still constitute the 
main creative economic force (Amin and Robins 1992). Localized produc-
tive systems (LPS) should be studied empirically, from a multidisciplinary 
perspective, with ﬁeld studies and a qualitative adaptation of statistical 
measurements. Studies should investigate local players with the goal of 
anticipating future developments. On the macro-economic front, the 
problem is to decide whether or not localized productive systems consti-
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tute a new form of industrialization in which small and medium-sized 
companies can ﬂourish. This is the goal of the study discussed below, 
which considers local characteristics in the context of macro-economic 
factors tied to the transition in the 1990s. 
THEORE TICAL FR AME WORK
Today, we can look back on a “geographical turn” in economics that en-
couraged three areas of research: (1) the spatial agglomeration of eco-
nomic activity; (2) the dynamics of regional growth convergence; and 
(3) neo-Marshallian district economics (Martin 2001). This contribution 
brieﬂy explains the Marshallian district concept and oﬀers some reﬂec-
tion on its relevance for the analysis of regional development in Central 
Europe, looking speciﬁcally at cross-border cooperation. 
It its initial conception, the industrial district was presented as a pro-
ductive complex created by market behavior and the rules of civil soci-
ety (Azais 1997). The notion of localized productive systems emerged at 
the same time as the term “ﬂexible production” (Piore/Sabel 1984). Piore 
and Sabel argue that a new logic of production, “ﬂexible specialization,” 
emerged to challenge mass production after markets for standardized 
goods became saturated and higher quality and more specialized goods 
attracted more consumers. This ﬂexibility is based on small-sized produc-
tion units, on the density of links between them and on the rapid reaction 
time of companies when faced with new internal and external conditions 
(Courlet 2000). This ﬂexibility also implies the capacity to adapt to new 
technologies.
One of many problems linked to the notion of ﬂexibility is that the 
debate has centered on the organization and spatial dynamics of the eco-
nomic system in its role as a productive system. If in the world of capi-
talist production, production is nothing more than a broader means of 
accumulating capital, then the district phenomenon should be under-
stood from within a broad political economy framework concerned with 
the nature of development and the ongoing transformation of capitalism. 
According to the American geographers Scott and Storper, there has been 
an “evolutionary tendency” towards ﬂexible specialization as a form of 
industrial organization, but also towards “ﬂexible accumulation,” which 
they see as harkening a new historic social era (Scott/Storper 1989). Flex-
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ible specialization and ﬂexible localization ﬁnd their signiﬁcance in the 
broader socio-historic context, they write. The competitive advantage of 
ﬂexible specialization strategies and networks of small-sized companies 
is based on very speciﬁc historical and social conditions. The advantage 
depends on irregular and diﬀerentiated demand and on low start-up costs 
(Dunford 1992). Various other factors may encourage a certain degree of 
regional concentration, such as, for example, certain sectors’ dependence 
on economies of agglomeration and the need for a faster and more ﬂexible 
adaptation of the productive system in all stages, from conception to ﬁnal 
manufacturing. Geographic proximity may help companies meet these 
challenges. Spatial concentration may also be made more likely by job 
insecurity in a traditional industrial zone, making it less necessary for 
companies to search for more ﬂexible, less costly labor abroad (Martinelle/
Schoenberger 1992). Flexible specialization also brings about more ﬂexi-
ble spatial relationships and competition between regions for industrial 
development, as the regions themselves face the problematic development 
of underprivileged regions and the gap between the center and the pe-
riphery. The emergence of industrial districts is an answer to this new 
problem; it is a type of industrialization that is particularly well adapted to 
the need for ﬂexibility, and it may serve the needs of industrial companies 
both in emerging countries and in transition countries (Courlet 2000). 
Another perspective on these issues is presented by the French regula-
tion school, which argues that the previous paradigm of mass production 
is not dead yet. Its research program has been informed by contributions 
from history, sociology, and political science. It focuses on how economic 
logic, social ties, and political power are combined to resolve conﬂicts that 
inevitably arise in socio-economic systems (Boyer/Saillard 1995). One of 
its founding principles is the hypothesis of the historicity of the develop-
ment process of capitalist economies. Special attention is paid to the ter-
ritorial dimension of the regulatory processes (Benko/Lipietz 1992). The 
economic geography of the era of “post-Fordism” presents the territory 
as a mosaic (or “leopard skin”) of diﬀerent types of regional economies 
(Krätke 1997b). This is particularly applicable to the economies of central 
and eastern Europe. As in the industrial district debate, doubt has arisen 
in this school, too, about whether it is possible to explain all geographical 
clusters in terms of any single, universal theory (Martin 2001). 
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THE MARSHALLIAN DISTRICT: A TOOLBOX 
The notion of the localized productive system (LPS) is based on the in-
dustrial district model proposed by Alfred Marshall (Marshall 1920). His 
insistence that the location of companies is important brought the notion 
of “territory” into the economic discourse (Azais 1997). He was the ﬁrst to 
propose a new interpretation of the market, leaving the perfect competi-
tion framework in favor of an analysis of companies gathered together in 
“industrial districts.” He described the speciﬁc socio-historic trajectories 
of territories and the territoriality of industrialization. Alfred Marshall’s 
work forms a starting point, or a toolbox, but it needs to be adapted in 
order to study company behavior, market structures, and industrial per-
formance. The revival of the industrial district concept was initiated by 
Beccatini in 1979 following the renewal of this type of local system in Italy 
in the form of a high geographic concentration of small companies active 
in the same sector.1 Another typical case is that of Silicon Valley in San-
ta Clara, California, although growth in this case was linked to the ﬁrst 
stages of the life cycle of computers. The Marshallian district of Greater 
Los Angeles and the ﬂexible industrial systems of Hong Kong are also 
noteworthy (Scott 1992). 
The industrial district is based on the external economies of agglom-
erations and the economics of urbanization. Those agglomeration econ-
omies can be intra-industrial or inter-industrial. Urban economies are 
external to the ﬁrm and to the branch, but they are internal to the urban 
region. 
A Marshallian district designates a collective way of living, thinking, 
and producing that is characteristic of a given society, space, and milieu. 
It is a socio-territorial entity characterized by the presence of an active 
community of people and a population of companies in a given geograph-
ical space. In his arguments, Alfred Marshall strongly emphasized the 
part played by human factors, pointing out “mental and moral” qualities 
such as integrity, self-conﬁdence, patience temperance, honesty, loyalty, 
et cetera (Arena 2000). The local productive system creates an “indus-
trial atmosphere,” in which an osmosis of know-how is made possible. 
1 | Early Italian research dates to the 1960s, so a great number of theoretical, 
historical, and socio-economic studies on this subject have been undertaken 
there.
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Its most noticeable characteristic is its relatively homogeneous system 
of values and thought, which may be seen as the expression of a certain 
system of ethics concerning work, activity, family, and reciprocity (Becat-
tini 1992; Becattini et al. 2009). The industrial district is governed by a 
set of community and religious values or corporatist practices. It has its 
own speciﬁc forms of know-how that are inimitable and deeply anchored 
in the territory, being the know-how of local artisans. Yet, economically 
relevant knowledge and customs are not unchangeable. Cultural change 
due to economic change was postulated by Alfred Marshall more than a 
century ago. Marshall understood that customs, making up a part of what 
economists today call “informal rules,” are not immutable but “have been 
imperceptibly growing and dwindling again, to meet the changing exi-
gencies of successive generations” (quoted in Winiecki 1998). 
THE EMERGENCE OF NE W FORMS OF  
GOVERNANCE AND REGUL ATION
It seems that it takes a long time to establish a Marshallian “atmosphere” 
in central European enterprises (Duche 2001). We may, however, see the 
rise of a culture of capitalism in central Europe sooner than in other for-
mer socialist countries, especially Russia. In central European countries, 
economic history and the capitalist culture that make up the national her-
itage have encouraged a new commercial and entrepreneurial spirit, espe-
cially in those countries in the German neighborhood. Poland, Hungary, 
and Slovakia are located between the richest and the poorest countries 
of Europe and suﬀer from considerable asymmetries and distortions of 
regional markets. The emergence of small and medium-sized companies 
acts as a motor for growth and job creation, whereby their presence is 
stronger near the German, Czech, and Baltic borders (Despiney/Baczko 
2001). Although the majority of small and medium-sized industries and 
ﬁrms were created in the commercial sector, new entrepreneurs are now 
beginning to redirect capital accumulated there into manufacturing en-
terprises. This is true especially in the Polish case. During the years of 
communist rule, Poland had large private agricultural, retail, and private 
crafts sectors. Furthermore, in the 1980s, the government introduced sev-
eral pro-market reform measures (economic self-government, relative au-
tonomy for enterprises, and partial price liberalization) as well as a basic 
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law in 1988 that allowed the creation of private commercial ﬁrms and re-
mained in force until late 1989. In the 1980s, social approval increased for 
entrepreneurship and of the role of ﬁnancial incentives in the regulation 
of economic behavior – important social preconditions of a private market 
economy. By the end of 1989, there were approximately 500,000 private 
enterprises outside agriculture, most of them created in the late 1980s 
(Surdej 2000). But the emergence of small and medium-sized industries 
and ﬁrms has been particularly visible since the beginning of the tran-
sition (Chmiel 1997; Grudzewski/Hejduk 1998; Duchêne/Rusin 2002). 
Small, private, and locally grown activities are the foundation stones of the 
Polish economic revival and the motor behind the relatively good perfor-
mance of the Polish economy. As an outcome of pro-market reform mea-
sures of the 1980s, relations between the central state and business en-
terprises had already begun to be shaped by indirect control mechanisms 
like market price-setting and the taxation of revenue. Thus, in Poland, the 
decentralization process did not start with the transition, but some years 
before (Rogulska 1985; Despiney-Zochowska 1988, 2001).
In Russia, the situation is diﬀerent. Small companies reappeared after 
becoming legalized in 1988, but they now play no role in the various plans 
of economic modernization. In fact, they were never an oﬃcial priority. In 
the 1990s, the Russian state preferred to give priority to the resolution of 
macroeconomic problems. After 2000, it paid attention almost exclusively 
to heavy industry (Kisline 2009).
NE W FORMS OF GOVERNANCE: EUROREGIONS
The three necessary preconditions of healthy localized productive systems 
in post-socialist Europe are decentralization, the resolution of disputes 
over property ownership, and personal mobility. Although the ﬁrst condi-
tion has been touched upon by administrative reforms, the recent admis-
sion to the EU seems increasingly vital in order to meet the second and 
third conditions. 
The regions need autonomy and the capability to carry out their own 
policies, all of which depend on territorial decentralization. In central Eu-
rope, state territorial structures are now decentralized. Can decentralized 
territories help spur an evolution toward improved productive organiza-
tion (Despiney 2001)? Will the two processes of decentralization and the 
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possible revival of localized production systems reinforce each other, or 
will they follow separate paths? To answer these questions, we turn in 
the analysis below to two examples of LPS emergence: one on the Pol-
ish-Czech-German border and one on the new eastern border of the EU. 
With their appearance, we can trace the development of a new system of 
dialogue between the respective central states, now also members of the 
EU, and local communities (Courlet 2000). 
Legal and tax frameworks, research institutions, and social relation-
ships are areas for innovation and entrepreneurship. The incompleteness 
of market and institutional reforms in the three countries studied height-
ened the risk of trans-border economic relationships (Krätke 1997a). How-
ever, the greatest barrier to the proliferation of clusters in our studied 
regions is the lack of a tradition of cooperation among companies, espe-
cially among competitors. These businesses avoid sharing information, 
and they do not communicate about dividing the market by specializa-
tion. This is closely related to the infancy of capitalism in this region and 
the heritage of the communist regime. Businessmen are more focused on 
competition and rivalry, not on partnership cooperation.2 Another serious 
barrier to cluster formation in the Polish regions is the lack of ﬁnancial re-
sources to establish and support such clusters. Most measures to support 
local economic initiatives aim to improve local entrepreneurs’ access to 
credit (Lewitas/Gesicka 1994). However, local entrepreneurs are few and 
the distance between these regions and their country’s ﬁnancial centers 
discourages those who would like to create a family business. The Polish 
experience of the 1990s conﬁrms the weak role played by local institutions 
in the fostering of entrepreneurship.
Although individual entrepreneurs can best move technology, indus-
try, and regions forward, local government policy also plays a role in pro-
moting entrepreneurship and clustering in central and eastern Europe. In 
fact, localized production systems will only emerge with the active support 
of regional authorities aiming to develop a network of diﬀuse industries. 
This was the case of the former East Germany, where the transition pro-
cess was not spontaneous and new economic development depended on 
massive ﬁnancial transfers from the central state (Samson/Goutin-Bour-
lat 1995; Nivet 2002). 
2 | Other studies on localized productive systems in Polish industry confirm the 
same phenomenon. See Duche (2000).
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Local authorities and the legal framework for cross-border cooperation 
(CBC) along Poland’s borders have been particularly important since the 
1990s, when former communist countries signed the Convention of Ma-
drid and the European Charter of Territorial Self-Management. This clar-
iﬁed the legal status of foreign activity for local and regional authorities, 
including those located near the borders, by unambiguously authorizing 
foreign contacts and establishing EU standards of cooperation. CBC is a 
speciﬁc form of international regional cooperation. Its territorial scope 
and content are shaped in large part by political factors, but their develop-
ment is also determined by socio-economic, technological, institutional, 
and geographic conditions on both sides of the border, as well as by more 
general factors like European integration. Regional CBC was regarded as a 
transitional phase for Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. 
These countries were thought to be on their way to incorporation into the 
uniform economic system of the Europe Union, a development that would 
obviate traditional borders. However, previously established CBC will re-
main an issue, particularly in the form of Euroregions, because political 
decisions to remove borders do not automatically liquidate longstanding 
diﬀerences in social and economic life (Starzyk 1996). 
As of 2012, sixteen Euroregions had been established along Poland’s 
borders3 (see ﬁgure 1). Two of them, the “Neisse” and the “Carpathian” 
Euroregions, serve as our laboratories of local governance. 
3 | These are: “Neisse – Nisa – Nysa” (December 1991), “Carpathian” (February 
1993), “Spree –Neisse – Bober/Sprewa – Nysa – Bóbr” (September 1993), “Pro 
Europa Viadrina” (December 1993), “Tatras” (August 1994), “Bug” (September 
1995), “Pomerania” (December 1995), “Glacensis” (December 1996), “Neman” 
(June 1997), “Pradĕd” (July 1997), “Cieszyn Silesia” (March 1998), “Baltic” 
(February 1998), “Silesia” (September 1998), “Beskydy Mountains” (February 
2000), “Białowieża Forest” (May 2002), “Lyna-Lawa” (March 2003). 
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Figure 1: Euroregions localized on Polish borders
Source: Euroregiony na granicach Polski 2007, WUS,  
Wroclaw, 2008.
For studying our two Euroregions, we employ the GREMI approach pio-
neered in 1984 by Philippe Aydalot and associated with French econom-
ic thought. Within the GREMI approach,4 post-Fordism is seen to have 
opened the way to the new “territorial” type of development based on a 
capacity for innovation better adapted to the task of encouraging local 
social and industrial networks (Aydalot 1985; Maillat 1988; Perrin 1989). 
The new spatial dynamics appear to be associated with innovation as ex-
pressed by the concept of “milieu innovateur.” The local milieu or the local 
4 | The GREMI (Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs – Euro-
pean Research Group on Innovative Areas) has been based at University Paris 1 
Pantheon-Sorbonne since 1984 with the support of the Ministry of Urbanization 
and Housing and the Caisse de Dépôts et de Consignation. 
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environment of the ﬁrm may perhaps be considered to be one of the most 
important sources of innovation on the local level. The approach empha-
sizes that a region’s development does not depend only on its capacity to 
attract external ﬁrms but also on its capacity to promote local initiatives 
and to activate a territorial dynamic of innovation. GREMI’s research 
methods approach, used throughout its empirical enquiries (GREMI I, II, 
III, IV and V), is divided into three phases (Ratti/Bramanti/Gordon 1997): 
(1) elaboration of the objectives and articulation of a common framework 
for territorial teams; (2) ﬁeldwork; (3) analysis of the results with theoreti-
cal synthesis and policy recommendations. 
The most recent GREMI phase, the GREMI VI inquiry, is dedicated to 
a new empirical phenomenon: milieux and local production systems oper-
ating around natural and cultural resources (Camagni et al. 2004). This 
approach is used in urban studies, but it could also be useful for studying 
areas like the Carpathian region, which is rich in natural resources and in 
cultural heritage (Despiney/Tabaries 2008; Despiney 2011).
CASE STUDY 1: THE NEISSE EUROREGION 
In order to study the emergence of local productive systems under the 
conditions of globalization, we take up the case of the Neisse Euro region, 
situated along the Oder and Neisse rivers on the Polish-German-Czech 
border. This region is useful for studying both historical continuity and 
regional dynamics. In our work carried out for DATAR5 in 1996, the bor-
der is, in fact, presented as having a strong growth potential (Samson et al. 
1996). This work revealed the emergence of a dynamic peripheral crown 
in the western and southern part of the country along the German and 
Czech borders. This growth may be similar to European Alpine growth, 
based not only on economies of agglomeration but also on industrial and 
tertiary activities linked to tourism in the Sudety Mountains. 
Situated between the Spree-Neisse-Bober and the Glacensis Euroregions, 
the Neisse Euroregion was created in December 1991 and encompasses six 
districts of the German federal state of Saxony (Bautzen, Kamenz, Lö-
bau-Zittau, Oberlausitz, Görlitz and Hoyerswerda), 44 communities (gmi-
nas) of the Lower Silesia Voivodship, four gminas of the Lubuskie Voivod-
5 | DATAR: French regional planning authority.
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ship, and the Czech administrative units of Liberec, Jablonec, Semily, and 
Ceska Lipa as well as the Sluknov region. Initially a ﬂourishing economic 
region, the area unites Lower Silesia, Northern Bohemia, and Upper Lu-
sace and includes nearly 725,800 residents in Germany 1.5 million alto-
gether. The Neisse Euroregion, one of four created along the Oder-Neisse 
border, is considered a model for other initiatives of this type. It is some-
times used, for example, for purposes of statistical inference. The Polish 
part of the Euroregion is part of a data collection project, entitled “PL-14 
Euroregions,” conducted by the Jelenia Gora Statistics Oﬃce. 
Regional Trajector y
Territorial dynamics, judged in terms of individual social interactions 
and institutional ties, can only be observed over the long-term. In the 
context of our hypothesis concerning the possible revival of LPS in the 
Neisse Euroregion, we ﬁnd ourselves faced with the heritage of historic 
and regional continuity (Despiney 1995). Silesia’s economic development 
made it a remarkably advanced region in spite of its feudal structures. 
Central Europe’s integration with the international economic system was 
achieved mainly through German channels. The economic and cultural 
links between Saxony, Polish Silesia, and Czech Bohemia are the legacy of 
the shared history of these neighboring countries. This history was inﬂu-
enced by the longstanding, strong German presence (Jeannin 1991). The 
textile industry experienced a period of development in the 16th century 
that was initiated by German merchants. Silesia, Saxony, and Bohemia 
sold inexpensive wool fabrics until the middle of the 17th century. From 
the beginning of the 17th century, villages began textile production and 
by the 18th century entire families were involved in the work of weaving 
and spinning. The impetus came from urban centers such as Hirschberg 
(Jelenia Gora), which were unusual because of their wealthy entrepre-
neurs. The positive eﬀects created by rural industry – job creation, the 
stimulation of demographic growth, the activation of the domestic food 
market – were reinforced by the fact that the manufacturing of fabrics 
took place within a region rich in a variety of industries. Economic de-
velopment in Silesia made this province remarkably advanced in spite of 
its feudal social infrastructure (Henderson 1954). These fabric producers 
even reached international importance, rivaling the French on Spanish 
and American markets. The structural crisis in the old mining economy 
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that took place in the 16th century encouraged the appearance of dye pro-
ducers in Silesia, who brought the seeds of the future chemical industry. 
The existence of advanced industrial settlement here, with a long histo-
ry of linkages between science and technology, had a huge inﬂuence on 
the economic development of central European countries. At this time, 
European industrial geography was characterized by the dispersion of its 
industries, with pockets of industry sunk into the rural landscape (Veltz 
1996). 
The Socialist Period 1945-1989
Silesia was an industrial district in the Marshallian sense before the sec-
ond world war. A large proportion of the industrial workforce was employed 
east of the Oder and Neisse, which, at that time, was part of Germany. 
This included 43 percent of the hemp industry workforce, 49 percent of 
the spinning workforce, and 48 percent of the linen industry (Lepesant 
1997). Border changes in 1945 and the expulsion of German residents put 
an end to the homogeneity of the local productive system in Saxony, Low-
er Silesia, and Bohemia. During the communist period, the Oder-Neisse 
line was “split” or “cut,” as Claude Courlet wrote, cutting also the industri-
al district’s developmental trajectory (Courlet 1988). On both sides of the 
Oder-Neisse border, the massive population migrations that took place after 
the Second World War meant that many people had diﬃculty identifying 
with these border regions. It was to this area that a number of ethnic Ger-
man communities from Central Europe were transplanted (Bafoil 1995). 
Indeed, the surge of refugees from the East and the migrations following 
the war modiﬁed the population structure on both sides of the Oder-Neis-
se, blocking the growth of a common economic culture and squelching 
the practice of regional traditions. These German regions were made up 
of the lands of the former Junkers, expropriated following the agrarian re-
form of 1945 and joined into large collective holdings (Lacquement 1993). 
On the Polish side, too, these lands were conﬁscated and collectivized (De-
spiney-Zochowska 1995). The workers who came from Polish lands in the 
East had no industrial tradition and their integration created a number of 
problems for the authorities throughout the communist period. Between 
1945 and 1989, the East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak authorities pur-
sued a common development policy in the border lands only brieﬂy in the 
1970s. In industry, few new industries were created, although coal mining 
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increased in both Lusatia in East Germany and in the Turoszow region in 
Poland. During the Communist period, there was a strong development 
in the textile industry, but this took place in isolation in each of the three 
bordering countries (Bafoil 1995). These border regions are fragile in large 
part due to an all-too similar industrial structure on either side of the Od-
er-Neisse border. In Germany, the old administrative districts soon dis-
appeared, replaced by smaller ones that could do nothing but implement 
decisions made at the central level. In Poland, the party leadership under 
Edward Gierek carried did the opposite in 1975, liquidating the powiat – the 
intermediate administrative level – and introducing 49 Voïvodhips. 
Transition and Globalization 
The Euroregion is a legacy of the logic of communist economics. In Po-
land, textiles are among the branches of the Polish economy that suﬀered 
most from the shock therapy introduced by Leszek Balcerowicz in 1990 
(Lipowski/Despiney 1991). In eastern Germany, the European RETEX pro-
gram was supposed to bring massive aid to the textile industry beginning 
in 1994. The restructuring of textiles and clothing was part of a program 
of the complete overhaul of Saxony’s economic structure (ATLAS), but 
it never sought to rethink the region’s industrial identity. The economic 
development strategy for the Polish border, called “The chain of pearls 
along the Neisse,” was a concerted development policy scheme planned 
for Upper Lusatia. Yet, the transition process depended on massive ﬁnan-
cial transfers from the German central state. This example of industrial 
restructuring is highly instructive. It enabled the regions to preserve their 
industrial centers as German textile ﬁrms subcontracted to improve in-
ternational competitiveness. German enterprises have adopted a strategy 
based on outward-processing trade (OPT) with Polish and Czech part-
ners. A star-shaped relationship links ﬁrms who work with each other on 
a paired basis (Courlet/Pecqueur 1991). This type of relationship can often 
create a form of dependence for small and medium-sized companies. This 
brings a danger for the local productive system: the increasing depen-
dence of smaller companies as they become transformed into subcontract-
ing entities for larger ﬁrms needing technical know-how, cheap labor, and 
a pre-existing client network. Nonetheless, subcontracting reinforced the 
competitive nature of the Polish and Czech textile industry, particularly 
in the clothing sector. Not only did made-to-order contracts help a num-
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ber a producers exploit their production capacities, but Polish companies 
also beneﬁted from technology transfers from German companies (DREE 
1998). Nevertheless, subcontracting did have some disadvantages. For in-
stance, it further closed German markets for Polish and Czech products. 
To cope with the competition of central European countries, this sector 
has been protected by signiﬁcant trade barriers. Poland, the Czech Re-
public, and Hungary were the ﬁrsts German partners in Central Europe 
in the ﬁeld of subcontracting from 1990 to 1995, but since 1996 re-exports 
produced in the OPT is decreasing. The situation began changing in 1995, 
when growth in subcontracting fell considerably. In 1997, for the ﬁrst time 
since 1993, OPT is being redirected to countries with even lower wages, 
including Rumania and Ukraine (Boudier-Bensebaa 2002). 
Euro Textile Region
To help small and medium-sized enterprises in the three parts of the Eurore-
gion, the “Euro Textile Region” initiative was launched on the Polish-Ger-
man-Czech border in late 2000. The Euro Textile Region unites textile and 
apparel manufacturers in the German federal states of Brandenburg and 
Saxony and in border areas within Poland and the Czech Republic. It is 
thus larger than the Neisse Euroregion and extends across Plauen-Guben 
in the west and Liberec-Zielona Gora and Wroclaw in the east (Figure 2). 
The Euro Textile Region includes 1,460 companies with 71,000 employees 
(448 companies in Saxony, 54 in Brandenburg, 344 in Lower Silesia, 150 
in Lubuskie, and 473 in the Czech Republic). Its ﬁrst common decision 
was to organize three associations of producers in the textile and clothing 
industries to counter Asian competition. The region will specialize in in-
telligent textiles and automobile components. Today, some manufacturers 
are expanding into markets in the former Soviet Union. 
It might be hoped that cross-border cooperation could make economies 
of scale possible, cutting production costs, and perhaps compensating for 
the disintegration of eastern markets (Andreﬀ 1994). Indeed, according 
to Krugman, regional export hubs whose cohesion is based on external 
Marshallian economies are more likely to form in areas where the econo-
my is well integrated (Krugman 1993). One thing is certain – the joint ter-
ritorialization of private and public sectors helps encourage institutional 
cooperation and stabilizes conditions of production, both of which should 
help companies accumulate know-how in technology. The major accom-
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plishments of the Eurozone were the creation of a common strategy for 
light industry, common initiatives in making credit more available, and 
the provision of more accurate market information. 
This Euro Textile Region is a regional knowledge cluster rooted in 
partnerships between universities and business. It shows that local pro-
ductive systems can also facilitate the kinds of connections between small 
business and educational institutions that are vital for improving market-
ing and technology transfer. 
CASE STUDY 2: THE “CARPATHIAN” EUROREGION
Many contemporary authors argue that the emergence of innovative clus-
ters is to be expected primarily in urban economies because clusters de-
pend on diverse, high-quality infrastructure. However, the agricultural 
zones of the traditionally underdeveloped “eastern belt” of Europe have 
been the target of public sector economic development eﬀorts motivated 
by the hope of encouraging such clusters in rural areas. How might the 
experience of the Neisse Euroregion help us understand regional develop-
ment in the EU periphery? Could growth here follow the European Alpine 
model and become based not only in economies of agglomeration but also 
on industrial and tertiary activities linked to tourism in the Carpathian 
mountains? To answer these questions, we turn now to an observation of 
the evolution of cross border cooperation in the Carpathian Euroregion 
(Despiney 2011).
As the second Euroregion established in central Europe, the Carpathi-
an Euroregion is situated on the southeastern part of the new eastern bor-
der of the EU (Figure 1). This Euroregion is composed of regions in Poland, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania. It encompasses nearly 10 mil-
lion inhabitants. Not all of the countries have common borders, making 
this region a special case of regional cooperation (Slim 1998). Created in 
1993, the Euroregion includes one Polish voïvodship (Lower Carpathians), 
ﬁve Hungarian regions (Borsod-Abaùj-Zemplén, Hajdù-Bihar, Heves, Jasz-
Nagykun-Szolnok, Szabolc-Szatmar-Bereg), four Ukrainian regions (Lviv, 
Uzhorod, Ivano-Frankivsk, Cernevici), two Slovakian regions (Preszow 
and Koszice), and seven Romanian regions (Bihor, Botosani, Maramures, 
Suceava, Satu Mare, Zilah, and Harghita). All of them are underdevel-
oped regions, depressed by transition, dominated by agriculture, with no 
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important urban centers except for a few medium-sized cities that have 
just started to emerge (Despiney 2012). Considering the rural character of 
those regions, the experience of agro-food, agro-tourist, and cultural clus-
ters could be applied here. The concept of “local agro-food systems” (Sys-
tème Agroalimentaire Local – SYAL) focuses attention on the emergence of 
agro-food development models based on local resources including region-
al products, knowledge, specialized skills, businesses, and institutions. 
SYAL stands for the organization of a local development process based on a 
concentration of agro-food businesses (farms, input suppliers, processing 
outlets, marketing units, service, catering businesses etc.) in relative prox-
imity, structured around common activities (Despiney/Szymoniuk 2001; 
Szymoniuk/Walukiewicz 2004; Despiney 2005).
Agro-tourist clusters have common objectives that justify common 
action such as joint marketing projects, supervision of the quality of 
services, joint lobbying, and applications for subsidies. Their interests 
include the design of tourism products with a speciﬁcally local charac-
ter based around folk art, rituals, local cuisine, and cultural and natural 
monuments. They also include the development of local infrastructure, 
regional promotion, and the provision of tourist services such as sports 
equipment rental, camping sites, ski-lifts, bicycle paths, scenic views, 
pharmacies, post oﬃces, and internet access. 
The move to tourism and agriculture-tourism would appear to be a 
good solution for some eastern European regions. It may be their only 
chance to prevent further economic deterioration. If this does not hap-
pen, the national economy risks a fall in wealth creation particularly at the 
regional level. This is all the more urgent now that tourism is becoming 
a more important strategic means of territorial development (Bensahel/
Donsimoni 1997). In certain regions, tourism can be seen as a means of 
ﬁnancing regional development because of its stimulating eﬀects on the 
overall economy and its interaction with other sectors, especially agricul-
ture. A vital territorial potential still exists in these regions within the 
agriculture-tourism combination, shown by the rate of employment in the 
service sector, especially in tourism (Samson et al. 1996). On the EU’s 
eastern border there are several examples, including the lakes of Mazuria, 
the forests of Bialowieza and Bieszczady, and the Puszta in Hajdu-Bihar, 
which are part of UNESCO’s World Humanity Heritage. The prospects for 
establishing the Bilateral Biosphere Reserve of Bialowieza Wilderness are 
being studied by Polish and Belarus authorities.
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In the case of the Carpathian Euroregion, the biodiversity of the Car-
pathian Mountains is recognized through its inclusion in the UNESCO 
biodiversity reserves network Transboundary Biosphere Reserve “East Car-
pathian” (UNESCO 2009). More than classic tourism regions, those ru-
ral voïvodships are dependent on the agriculture-tourism combination. 
Agro-tourism has a long tradition in the region, especially in Poland. Col-
loquially, they were called “vacations under the pear tree.” In Poland, as 
in other Eastern European countries, agro-tourism will continue to grow. 
There is a trend now for vacationers to turn away from large tourist cen-
ters and resorts. Short weekend trips to the country are becoming popular 
because of the natural, quiet environment and low prices that agro-tour-
ism farms oﬀer. There about 5,000 agro-tourist farms in Poland alone, 
approximately 2,000 of which are members of the Polish Federation of 
Agro-Tourism “Hospitable Farms.” The federation is made up of local as-
sociations that represent cores of agro-tourism clusters. Member farms, 
although in competition with each other, are willing to cooperate in coor-
dinating forms of specialization, investment, and mutual assistance. The 
cluster is also connected, informally, with other bodies such as neighbor-
ing farms that provide local produce and additional services, museums, 
the Regional Center for Agricultural Consultancy, and church organiza-
tions. The essential feature of agro-tourist farms and associations is their 
potential for providing income opportunities for rural women of all ages 
and educational levels. The traditional skills of the region’s women, in-
cluding household management, cooking traditional dishes, handicrafts, 
and knowledge of folklore, are in demand. 
Important is the establishment of clear ownership and local identi-
ty. The local agricultural system needs to be closely identiﬁed with the 
locality’s geography, history, and knowledge. Of importance, too, are pro-
ducer-consumer relationships in the process of establishing this identity, 
notions of quality and safety, links with tourism, and cultural dynamics. 
In the “Carpathian” Euro region, we can imagine in the near future the 
emergence of a cultural cluster based on the common historical heritage 
of all these countries. There are, for example, religious monuments that 
could be utilized for culture-driven development processes (Despiney 
2011). This region has its own speciﬁc forms of know-how that are inimita-
ble and deeply anchored in the territory, such as speciﬁc artisan know-how 
in wood working. This cultural heritage could be utilized to develop local 
tourism and sport activities like bicycle races, marathons etc. 
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The role of associations is important in the Carpathian Euroregion 
for promoting the activities around the wooden churches and natural re-
sources belonging to UNESCO World Heritage. One of them, the French 
association “Bois debut en Pologne” initiated some cultural activities in 
Poland and the Ukraine. The ﬁrst successful Polish-Ukrainian initiative 
was an exhibition at UNESCO’s headquarters in Paris in 2008, dedicat-
ed to wood churches from both countries. Two of the region’s countries 
prepared the common bid to put some of these structures in UNESCO’s 
World Heritage Program. 
The emergence of a cultural cluster could be added to other economic 
activities important for the emergence of a localized productive system 
in the Carpathian Euroregion (Garafoli 1996). In fact, new growth in 
craft industries is taking place in “Aviation Valley” created in 2003 by 18 
enterprises and research and development institutions (Despiney 2012). 
The Aviation Valley Association currently represents 30 companies and 
institutions, among them Snecma Poland, Goodrich, Pratt & Whitney, 
and AvioPolska. The two major objectives of the association are organiza-
tion and development of a low-cost supply chain and creation of favorable 
conditions for the development of the aerospace industry in the region. 
This industry started in the 1920s with the construction of the ﬁrst Pol-
ish aircraft company, which was further developed during the communist 
period for Soviet aviation and is now continuing in the form of a cluster. 
The Special Economic Zone (SEZ) created in 1995 in the city of Mielec is 
a partner of “Aviation Valley.” This has improved Mielec’s ranking among 
medium-sized cities in terms of investment attractiveness. Together with 
the city of Puławy, Mielec is performing better than other medium-sized 
cities in the Lower Carpathians voïvodship. In this region, the connec-
tions between trade schools and universities with corporate businesses 
are weak, causing barriers to the establishment of clusters. In the case 
of “Aviation Valley,” the situation seems better. Six technical universities 
cooperate with the association. EU support is given to this new economic 
activity trough INTERREG III C ADEP, a project executed with partners 
from northern Finland and northwestern Ireland. The goal of the project 
is to share best practice within the ﬁeld of industrial cluster development 
as well as to tighten cooperation between partner regions.
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Territorial Cohesion and Border Areas
Roswitha Ruidisch
INTRODUCTION 
Border areas are often described as “laboratories” for European cohesion, 
as places where European policymakers can experiment (KEG 2009: 15; 
Rippl et al. 2009). Sometimes they are also called “petites Europes,” where 
processes of change common to all of Europe can be seen taking place on a 
smaller scale (Luschny 2009: 28). Problems of cohesion, too, are more ev-
ident on a scale smaller than that of the European Union or nation-states, 
so border areas and other sub-national levels would seem the appropriate 
level to direct our observations. Border areas that straddle the old border 
dividing western and eastern Europe are especially interesting places, for 
here disparities are stark and easily seen. Diﬀerences and disparities of-
fer opportunities for action in politics, economics, culture, environment, 
and social welfare. Concerning the interests of politics, border areas are 
crucial test areas for the instruments of European Regional Policy. One of 
the central aims of Regional Policy is to reduce disparities and contribute 
to cohesion in the EU. Cohesion, in the understanding of the European 
Union, focuses mainly on regional development. Given that European Re-
gional Policy received the second largest share of the EU budget between 
2007 and 2013, one might expect that EU Regional Policy exerted great 
deal of inﬂuence on cohesion in the European Union.
Cohesion may be interpreted as economic, social, or territorial cohe-
sion. Territorial cohesion is the least well deﬁned of the three. As it is 
the most recently added goal of Europe’s cohesion policy, there is no clear 
understanding of what territorial cohesion will mean and no common un-
derstanding of which policies best promote it and what eﬀects they have. 
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In this paper I will therefore analyze the concepts of “territorial cohesion” 
and “territorial capital,” and I will show how these apply to border areas 
using the example of the Czech-German border area.
TERRITORIAL COHESION: ORIGINS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
“Territorial cohesion” is a relatively new term, coined in the context of 
European Regional Policy. There has been little time for interpreting the 
new term and its meaning relative to its two component words “territory” 
and “cohesion.” Not surprisingly, the term has been interpreted in many 
diﬀerent ways. Below, some of the main interpretations are reviewed.
Origins 
The term “territorial cohesion” was used in an oﬃcial document ﬁrst in 
the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. At that time, territorial cohesion was associat-
ed with services of general economic interest. Territorial cohesion within 
this context was supposed to counteract the liberalization of public services 
and therefore contribute to the maintenance of standards of living and help 
keep less populous regions competitive (Faludi 2009). The term has been 
used often in European political debates since the early 2000s. The Second 
Report on economic and social cohesion in 2001, for example, devoted an 
entire chapter to territorial cohesion. It included a statement supporting 
balanced development and described the development problems of speciﬁc 
regions. Border regions and their speciﬁc development situation were also 
mentioned. In 2004, the Third Report on economic and social cohesion 
noted for the ﬁrst time that there is no clear deﬁnition of “territorial cohe-
sion.” Territorial cohesion was torn at that time between the two opposing 
goals of European Regional Policy, competitiveness and balanced develop-
ment. The issue of territorial cohesion and how to interpret it as an objec-
tive and as a concept had been discussed long before it was anchored in the 
Treaty of Lisbon (2009) as an objective equal in priority to economic and 
social cohesion (Article 3 [3], TEU). In 2005, the planners Wil Zonneveld 
and Bas Waterhout, for example, suggested that territorial cohesion “will 
feed into existing EU policies by adding a territorial dimension to them, 
thereby making them more eﬀective and eﬃcient” (Zonneveld/Waterhout 
2005: 18). But being nothing more than a “territorial dimension” was for 
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many interested parties not enough. After territorial cohesion was added 
to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, it became a buzzword for politicians and 
researchers involved in European Regional Policy. During the preparation 
of the European constitution, territorial cohesion was the subject of intense 
lobbying (Robert 2007) and it gained supporters with a variety of interests 
and views (Böhme 2005; Faludi 2006; Finka 2007; Schön 2005).
The controversial discussion about the term covers a wide range of 
concerns, further contributing to a lack of precision in its deﬁnition (Fa-
ludi 2005b: 3; David 2007: 10). The explanation of the planner Jacques 
Roberts for this problem is that “[…] a deﬁnition cannot be derived from 
current or past practice, because territorial cohesion has so far hardly been 
applied concretely as an operational policy concept” (Robert 2007: 23). An-
other outcome of the discussion that territorial cohesion has taken on a 
normative coloring, being associated with ideals like equity (Faludi 2005b: 
5; Böhme et al. 2008: 1), solidarity (Böhme et al. 2008: 1-3), social welfare, 
or harmonious development (Battis/Kersten 2009: 10; CEC 2008). Terri-
torial cohesion also has been linked to questions concerning the quality of 
the territorial structure within the European Union. Achieving territorial 
cohesion requires accounting for spatial needs like accessibility, gover-
nance, sustainability, balanced development, services of general economic 
interest, or spatial planning (Böhme et al. 2008:3; David 2007: 5ﬀ.). The 
planner Philippe Doucet is quite disenchanted with the term “territorial 
cohesion”: “As for those outside this inner circle of specialized planning 
experts and oﬃcials, we can probably assume that they care little about 
territorial cohesion […] Territorial cohesion is probably an unimportant 
esoteric ideal to many ordinary EU citizens” (Doucet 2006: 1475). 
The Commission reacted to the critics in 2008 with a Green Paper on 
territorial cohesion entitled “Turning territorial diversity into strength.” 
This paper launched a public discussion, inviting interested parties to 
comment on a set of questions in order to arrive at a deﬁnition of territo-
rial cohesion. The eﬀort produced no clear deﬁnition, but three narratives 
associated with “territorial cohesion” dominated this and other discus-
sions: balanced development, competitiveness, and sustainability.
Narratives of Territorial Cohesion 
Territorial cohesion has various meanings. However, the basic idea of ter-
ritorial cohesion is very similar to the basic principles of regional policy: 
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balance, stability, competition, and sustainability. As territorial cohesion 
is an aim of the European Regional Policy, it is heading in a similar di-
rection: “[T]he concept of territorial cohesion builds bridges between eco-
nomic eﬀectiveness, social cohesion and ecological balance” (CEC 2008). 
Below, the aspects of balanced development, competitiveness, and sustain-
ability are analyzed with respect to their meaning for territorial cohesion.
Territorial Cohesion and the Aim of Balanced Development
Regional diﬀerences in living standards increased with every enlargement 
of the European Union. Therefore, one of the main aims of European Re-
gional Policy is to balance regional disparities. Balanced development is 
measured in per capita GDP. Another central goal is that citizens and 
economic stakeholders have equal access to “services of general econom-
ic interest” (GD Regionalpolitik 2004: 3), regardless of where they live. 
The planner Kai Böhme and others state this goal more precisely: “A vital 
precondition for balanced development is access to a minimum standard 
of infrastructures and services” (Böhme 2008: 3). The challenge of terri-
torial cohesion is to improve the development of disadvantaged regions, 
to promote an eﬀective use of the instruments of regional policy, and to 
enhance territorial capital. All this is intended to contribute to a balanced 
development and regional cohesion.
Territorial Cohesion and the Aim of  
Competitiveness and Growth
Since the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, EU Regional Policy has 
focused strongly on competitiveness and growth. Competitiveness as an as-
pect of territorial cohesion is relatively new. For years, the focus was rather on 
equity: “the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels 
of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-fa-
vored regions […]” (Article 130a, TEU). Today the most competitive area of 
the European Union is the “Pentagon” area framed by the cities of London, 
Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg. Although this core area has diﬀerent 
potentials for future development, the challenge for territorial cohesion is to 
increase the global competitiveness of Europe as a whole as well as the com-
petitiveness of individual regions outside the Pentagon (Faludi 2006: 43). In 
order to generate competitive advantages, the territorial capital of all areas 
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should be used. Therefore the ball is in the court of the regions themselves: 
the focus is on regions and their unique, endogenous territorial capital. This 
contrasts with earlier assumptions in regional policy, whereby cities were 
seen as the only motors of the economy and of regional development. 
Territorial Cohesion and Sustainabilit y 
In response to the strongly business-oriented Lisbon Strategy, the Gothen-
burg Strategy followed in 2001. This strategy is dedicated to sustainable de-
velopment and takes the European environmental discourse into account. 
If the idea of sustainable development is transferred to territorial cohesion, 
it is then often linked to spatial planning. Some authors, like the planner 
Carl-Heinz David (David 2007: 12), even ascribe to territorial cohesion the 
role of a new European Spatial Development Policy. Sustainable territorial 
cohesion promotes the protection of nature and cultural heritage as well 
as polycentricity. The protection of ecologically sensitive areas in dense-
ly populated Europe is thought to be necessary because these areas are 
often threatened by urban development. To reduce urban sprawl and to 
enhance sustainable economic development, polycentric spatial structures 
are thought essential by planners (Battis/Kersten 2009: 11). The task of ter-
ritorial cohesion is, in this sense, to create good development opportunities 
for urban areas, small and medium-sized cities, and rural areas. It should 
contribute to balanced, sustainable development (Faludi 2005a: 107). Poly-
centric spatial structures are supported by appropriate infrastructure (Da-
vid 2007: 11) and make use of the territorial capital of the regions.
As the analysis of the diﬀerent interpretations of territorial cohesion 
shows, there is a wide range of contents but a clear deﬁnition is missing.
The related problem is easy to grasp: as there is no clear target, it is 
not possible to put target-oriented measures, and it is also impossible to 
accurately evaluate the measures taken and to improve them. There is a 
curtain drawn over this problem as the European Union creates its own 
criteria for evaluation and thus purports itself sovereignty over the inter-
pretation of success and failure of its policy for themselves. Good exam-
ples for this procedure are the ‘Reports of Economic and Social Cohesion’ 
which have been published since 1996. 
Every interpretation of territorial cohesion described above stresses 
the link of territorial capital to successful regional development. But what 
is territorial capital and how can it be exploited?
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THE CEMENT OF TERRITORIAL COHESION:  
TERRITORIAL CAPITAL
The term “territorial capital” was introduced in conjunction with the term 
“territorial cohesion.” Very roughly, territorial capital comprises the as-
sets and limits of a territory. As Europe’s territories have very diﬀerent 
characters, territorial capital also is associated with “European territorial 
diversity” (Böhme et al. 2008: 1). This kind of diversity is an important 
asset, which policy makers wish to transform into strength. This was one 
of the main points of the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion in 2008: 
“Increasingly, competitiveness and prosperity depend on the capacity of 
the people and businesses located there to make the best use of all territo-
rial assets” (CEC 2008).
What is Territorial Capital? 
Territorial capital is the territorial potential of an area: “Each area has a 
speciﬁc capital – its ‘territorial capital’ – that is distinct from that of other 
areas[…]” (OECD 2001: 15). Therefore territorial fragilities are not seen as po-
tentials at ﬁrst sight. In a more economic sense, territorial capital might also 
be described as its “comparative advantage” (Böhme et al. 2008: 3), as territo-
rial capital can make investments in one region more eﬀective than in other 
regions. Territorial capital is thus the basis for endogenous growth in cities 
and regions. Economic growth is generated from an area’s potential, and a 
region’s welfare depends crucially on its ability to make use of its unique 
regional development potentials. The distinct set of territorial potentials that 
contribute to territorial capital can be factors such as natural and cultural 
values. Other factors are an area’s ability to integrate and connect to other ar-
eas (David 2007: 10), which implies accessibility and infrastructure. The Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has divided these 
factors into numerous types, all of which are referred to as territorial capital: 
These factors may include the area’s geographical location, size, factor of pro-
duction endowment, climate, traditions, natural resources, quality of life or the 
agglomeration economies provided by its cities, but may also include its busi-
ness incubators and industrial districts or other business networks that reduce 
transaction costs. Other factors may be “untraded interdependencies” such as 
understandings, customs and informal rules that enable economic actors to work 
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together under conditions of uncertainty, or the solidarity, mutual assistance and 
co-opting of ideas that often develop in clusters of small and medium-sized enter-
prises working in the same sector (social capital). Lastly, according to Marshall, 
there is an intangible factor, “something in the air”, called the “environment” and 
which is the outcome of a combination of institutions, rules, practices, producers, 
researchers and policy-makers, that make a certain creativity and innovation pos-
sible (OECD 2001: 15).
Territorial capital is useless without people and businesses that use it lo-
cally. It is they who have the best knowledge of their territories, and they 
who best know how to make the most of its inherent features (Böhme et 
al. 2008: 2; CEC 2008). In order to get local and regional actors involved, 
a new approach called “stakeholder policy” has been introduced (David 
2007: 8). This approach is, in fact, necessary because the European Union 
has no legal competence for European Regional Policy and therefore no 
competence to promote territorial cohesion. The EU gives ﬁnancial incen-
tives to addressees with the intention of persuading them to voluntarily 
implement EU territorial cohesion policies.
Measures for Actualizing Territorial Capital 
Territorial cohesion lays the groundwork for the political regulation of 
space. Policy interventions to support regional development do so by “re-
specting its fragilities” and using its “unrecognized or underexploited po-
tentials” (Böhme et al. 2008: 2). Because European territories possess a 
great variety of territorial capital, one-size-ﬁts-all development strategies 
will unlikely achieve territorial cohesion. In order to make the most of 
their inherent potential, tailor-made measures are necessary.
Political documents of the EU, like the Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion, discuss measures thought to contribute to territorial cohesion 
such as cooperation, governance, and networks. These measures are 
supposed to activate territorial capital, but in order to make the most of 
territorial capital, transportation infrastructure that improves access is 
crucial (Commission of the European Communities 2008). Better infra-
structure reduces travel costs and guarantees access to markets for con-
sumers, workers, and businesses. Therefore, infrastructure development 
is more popular than ever. As a one-size-ﬁts-all instrument, it seems to ﬁt 
the goal of territorial cohesion, too. But this idea is not new. Studies (see 
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for example Biehl 1986) have shown that infrastructure is crucial for the 
development of regional potentials such as labor. Employment does cor-
relate with better infrastructure, hence Biehl argues that regions cannot 
achieve their highest potential without infrastructure. Unemployed capital 
could therefore become employed by the “catalyst power” of infrastructure 
(Kaufmann 1983: 420). The planner Andreas Faludi (2006: 42) also illus-
trates in the 1999 document, European Spatial Development Perspective 
(ESDP), that infrastructure was a decisive instrument of “spatial cohesion.” 
Recent studies show that infrastructure can promote the development of 
regional potential, but not automatically (Schaﬀer/Siegele 2008: 130). The 
European Union thus declared that “a good transport system in itself is 
not suﬃcient to ensure regional development. The eﬀect of investment in 
transport […] infrastructure on economic performance also depends on the 
region’s capacity to use it eﬃciently […].” (Europäische Kommission 2010: 
55). So what is “the region’s capacity,” then? The economist Roberto Ca-
magni (2006: 62) argues for “new models of territorial governance” that 
integrate various levels of territorial management and control. Territori-
al governance should involve the public as much as possible in decisions 
regarding territorial changes. Local bodies and municipal authorities are 
therefore important institutions because they are in direct contact with the 
inhabitants of a territory and their needs. The most important element, of-
ten neglected, is individual citizen participation (Camagni 2006: 63). The 
inhabitants of a territory, not infrastructure, represent the region’s true 
potential because only they can actualize territorial capital. This way of 
thinking goes beyond classic, distributive Regional Policy.
What has also becomes evident is the advent of a set of measures like 
new infrastructure within classic, distributive Regional Policy. The new 
aspect that is added to conventional strategies is the goal of increasing 
competitiveness, endogenous development, sustainability, and good gov-
ernance (Faludi 2006: 43). These ambitious aims in the context of territo-
rial cohesion are useless without taking people into consideration. Areas 
that are aﬀected by transport infrastructures need local players who make 
use of both transport infrastructure and territorial capital. As infrastruc-
ture connections between eastern and western Europe were cut after the 
Second World War, border areas had only nationally oriented infrastruc-
ture for decades. The European integration process has resulted in a re-
building of cross-border infrastructure connections, making border areas 
interesting laboratories for territorial cohesion.
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BORDER ARE AS AS L ABOR ATORIES FOR  
TERRITORIAL COHESION
European integration and the establishment of the Single European Mar-
ket have made national borders more permeable. The functions and de-
velopment perspectives of national border areas have changed as a conse-
quence, as they are no longer at the edges of their respective nation-states. 
National state borders were constructed as an instrument of political pow-
er, and as the borders vanish, old strengths of the border areas become 
fragile and new potentials emerge. Border areas between western and 
eastern Europe are particularly interesting to study because very diﬀerent 
levels of wealth meet in a relatively small neighborhood. The instruments 
of European Regional Policy intended to overcome regional disparities are 
especially challenged in this “laboratory”. Territorial cohesion is under 
scrutiny especially in the border areas where western and eastern Europe 
were once divided. The most commonly used instruments in border areas 
to promote cohesion include the development and expansion of transport 
infrastructure and business investment subsidies. 
The Czech-German Border Area as a Policy Laborator y
The border between Saxony and Bavaria in Germany and Bohemia is one of 
the oldest in Europe. For decades, people living on both sides of this border 
used German as their common language. Settlements and infrastructure 
on both sides of the border were connected. Until 1918, Bohemia was part 
of the Austrian monarchy and the area was inhabited by persons of many 
diﬀerent nationalities. Certain parts of the Czech border area, where many 
German settlers lived, were known as “Sudetenland.” The Second World 
War changed the situation in this border area completely. At the end of the 
war, the German speaking population had to leave Sudetenland and the iron 
curtain was lowered. This process cut the roots of people and settlements 
in the border area, and road and railway connections were severed. Where-
as the Czech border area of the former Sudetenland was substantially dis-
rupted, there were few changes of population and settlement structures in 
the Saxonian and the Bavarian border areas. The iron curtain was a strong 
political dividing line between eastern and western Europe, a circumstance 
that meant that these border areas took diﬀerent paths of development over 
the decades. After the fall of the iron curtain, the territorial diversity of the 
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Czech-German border areas became visible. This diversity can be regarded 
as a challenge or as an opportunity (Ahner/Fuechtner 2010: 543). 
The iron curtain cut infrastructure connections in the Czech-German 
border area, including the former transportation links between Nurem-
berg and Prague. There were motorways from Nuremberg to other points 
in Germany and from Prague to other points in the Czech Republic, but 
no connector between the countries. Given the EU’s interest in cohesion, 
Eurocorridors become an important instrument linking big cities in east-
ern and western Europe. Corridors are bundles of railway lines, motor-
ways, and other kinds of infrastructure. Eurocorridor IV connects Nurem-
berg and Prague and includes the motorway A6 in Germany and D5 in the 
Czech Republic. The gap in this motorway between Amberg (Germany) 
and Plzeň (Czech Republic) was closed in 2008, which improved the ac-
cessibility of the German-Czech border area signiﬁcantly.
The Economy as a Subject of Investigation 
The main recipients of regional policy measures are private companies. 
They initiate investments and create jobs in the region and thus have a 
decisive inﬂuence on regional development. They operate under various 
conditions. They are supported by Regional Policy measures, but they also 
face the challenges of the global economy. Companies are embedded in 
the region and its local socio-institutional structures. The speciﬁc forms 
of territorial capital such as labor, infrastructure, resources, and other 
factors are used by companies to increase their competitiveness (Bathelt/
Glückler 2002: 162). In addition, companies beneﬁt from local relation-
ships, conventions, norms, routines, attitudes, and objectives of regional 
actors (Storper 1997).
Many entrepreneurs have taken advantage of the particular situation 
of the German-Czech border area. The economy of the region of Plzeň 
is dominated by the largest manufacturer in the Czech Republic, Ško-
da Plzeň. At the end of 1989, more than 33,000 workers were employed 
there (Toušek 2005: 71). Restructuring and privatization led to thousands 
of job losses. After 1989, the Plzeň region became attractive for foreign 
investors due to its location and its labor force. The majority of FDI went 
into electronics. Panasonic, for example, began the production of televi-
sions, and Alcoa began producing electrical wiring for the car industry. 
The situation in the German border region Upper Palatinate was slightly 
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diﬀerent. During the Cold War, Upper Palatinate was a marginal loca-
tion in Germany. Companies investing there received ﬁnancial subsidies 
(Zonenrandförderung). The region was known as “the poor house of Bavar-
ia,” as the economy was dominated by agriculture and glass and porcelain 
manufacturing. Although the region suﬀered from structural changes in 
the 1980s and 1990s, some family businesses prospered. Quite a few of 
them have become hidden champions and some of them are world market 
leaders today. The study, “Zukunft Deutschland 2020” now calls Upper 
Palatinate a “high-ﬂyer region” (Invest in Bavaria 2008).
Not the region or the border area is the addressee of infrastructure in-
vestments, but companies. Thus, it is vital to know who these companies 
are. Diﬀerent branches draw on diﬀerent territorial resources. Today, we 
have little knowledge about the structure of economic sectors in the Ger-
man-Czech border area. To generate an overview of the companies located 
along the new motorway A6-D5, I have mapped the industrial areas at a 
distance of up to 20 kilometers from the exits. The area I investigated lies 
between Amberg and Plzeň, the two cities that frame the Czech-German 
border. I have divided this stretch into six sectors. In the far west is the 
“Region Amberg-Sulzbach,” which is close to the city of Amberg. The “Re-
gion Naabtal’ is characterized by the intersection of the motorways A6 and 
A93. Next to it is the “Region Grenzland,” adjacent to “Region Böhmer-
wald” across the border in the Czech Republic. This area belonged to the 
“Sudetenland” areas mentioned above. During the Cold War, it was main-
ly occupied by Russian military. The “Region Stribro” is dominated by the 
city of Stribro, and the “Region Plzeň” is the area next to the city of Plzeň. 
Roughly speaking, there is a great diﬀerence in the age of companies in 
both countries. In Bavaria, family businesses have been in the region for 
years. Some of them have expanded their production locations and built 
new sites close to the new motorway. There has been nearly no FDI. In the 
Plzeň region there exist many new companies that came from outside the 
region. Most of them have settled in locations close to the new motorway 
and were ﬁnanced by foreign capital.
Apart from Region Stribro, all sectors are dominated by logistics (yel-
low). The second biggest branch apart from Region Böhmerwald is the 
metal processing industry (light blue). Region Böhmerwalds’ second big-
gest branch is plastics processing (dark green), which is also dominant in 
the neighboring German sector Region Naabtal. Even more companies in 
Region Naabtal belong to the glass processing industry (grey). 
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Industrial Structure in the Czech-German Border Area
Source: Mapping by Roswitha Ruidisch, 2008-2010 
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In sum, it is interesting that all regions are dominated by more or less the 
same economic sectors. One reason for this phenomenon is cross-border 
investment by a few German, family-owned businesses. In the plastics 
processing industry the companies Gerresheimer or Inotech for example 
have their headquarters in Germany’s Upper Palatinate but have built pro-
duction sites just across the border in the Plzen region. They use the terri-
torial potential of easy access to use resources, especially low-wage labor. 
Logistics is a relatively new branch on both sides of the border. Logistics 
companies also use the locational advantages of easy access to bigger cities 
like Nuremberg or Prague.
CONCLUSION 
As stated at the beginning of the article, border areas are quite often de-
scribed as “laboratories” of European cohesion. But “the region” or the 
“border area” is not the addressee of European Regional Politics and their 
infrastructure investments. Therefore, discussions among EU actors re-
garding “regions” or “areas” are misleading. As the addressees are compa-
nies interested in making proﬁt from resources associated with territory, 
the discussion about territorial cohesion must take them into account. 
Companies are very much interested in proﬁting from infrastructure in-
vestments, but they are not necessarily interested in territorial cohesion. 
Yet, the success of subsidies depends on how they are used by companies. 
Whether transport infrastructure helps to overcome regional disparities 
in border areas is questionable. Transport infrastructure is used diﬀerent-
ly by diﬀerent companies. Companies choose the location of investment 
for various reasons, motivated in the end by the goal of proﬁt. Regional 
disparities may therefore be useful for companies, for example in holding 
down wages. Territorial cohesion as such is a construction of EU politi-
cians. Therefore the term has been used by diﬀerent lobbyists to follow a 
range of interests. Planners want territorial cohesion to signify support for 
their interest in European spatial planning. Economists want territorial 
cohesion to signify support for competitiveness. Private ﬁrms want terri-
torial cohesion measures to subsidize their production processes. 
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Identities and Stereotypes in  
Cross-Border Regions 
Antje Schönwald
INTRODUCTION
Identities are socially constructed and dynamic. Some see in this a poten-
tial problem, leading in some cases to problems of individual orientation 
or even to identity crises. This contribution is an examination of identity 
in what is called the “Greater Region,” a large cross-border region that 
encompasses Saarland, Lorraine, Rhineland-Palatinate, the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg, and both the French-speaking and German-Speaking 
communities of Wallonia in Belgium. New, multidimensional forms of 
identity have emerged in this region.
The meaning and relevance of space is changing. Not only territory 
but also economics, culture, and politics determine space (Krämer/König 
2002: 280). Geographic distances can be crossed faster than ever, and 
personal mobility has increased. Nation states especially seem to be los-
ing more and more functions, and their power of establishing identity is 
diminishing. In their place, regions are advancing to become “a projection 
surface of fundamental identity claims”1 (Buß 2002: 12). Borders, too, are 
changing in meaning as their barrier function becomes less important. 
Europe presents itself increasingly as an entity without internal borders, 
but individual regions, as well as nations, keep their unique characteris-
tics and distinctiveness. Recent research recognizes a connection between 
globalization and localization much in keeping with Robertson’s glocal-
ization thesis: that local and global processes are reciprocally dependent 
and inﬂuential (cf. Robertson 1995, 1998). Thus, a new perspective of the 
1 | All quotations translated by the author. 
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local is possible as global consciousness reinvents the local (Ahrens 2001: 
137). 
In spite of the fact that identities are constructed, they are able to “have 
suddenly obvious eﬀects as social facts” (Reese-Schäfer 1999: 7). Because 
the social world “is made up of actions in concrete interaction situations” 
(Werlen 1992: 11f.), an inﬂuence of identities on action can be assumed. 
Another impact on action exists through stereotypes, as identities are al-
ways inﬂuenced by extraneous ascriptions and outward self-presentation. 
Stereotypes are thus part of every identity and it is necessary to analyze 
both phenomena simultaneously. Due to increasing tendencies towards 
individualization and the possibility of self-determination in almost all 
areas of life, identities are characterized by a continuous dynamic. This 
“pluralization of possibilities of identity constructions” (Reckinger/Wille 
2010: 15) leads to a recurring challenge and checking of existing identities. 
In the context of the opening of identities and acceptance of plural identi-
ties, critics perceive a potential loss of identity due to a lack of orientation. 
As the nation-state loses its centrality for orienting individual identities, 
the signiﬁcance of other territorial units for this function is perceptible. 
Europe, for example, presents itself as a “Europe of the regions.” This re-
ﬂects the intention of promoting a third level of identity, in addition to 
the nation and Europe, in bottom-up Europeanization. The nomination of 
Luxemburg and the Greater Region as European Capital of Culture 2007 
can be described as such an attempt. 
The example of the “Greater Region”, analyzed below, shows that such 
spaces oﬀer new possibilities for the emergence of new forms of multidi-
mensional identity. It harbors also threats to identity and stereotypes.
In October 1998, the “Charter of Cultural Cooperation in the Region 
Saar-Lor-Lux-Trier/Westpfalz” was signed. Its declared primary goal was 
formulated as follows: “As Europe grows together, the partners strive to 
raise awareness of cultural unity among the population, which is to be 
deepened by arrangements in the ﬁeld of the common cultural and histor-
ical heritage that create identity” (Charter of Cultural Cooperation in the 
Region Saar-Lor-Lux-Trier/Westpfalz, 1998). More than ten years later, the 
question now presents itself of whether any such awareness of common 
cultural heritage has arisen. If so, what factors have been inﬂuential in 
creating identity and how does any Greater Region identity or identities 
eﬀect social action, if at all? The study below is based mostly on qualitative 
interviews with Greater Region stakeholders from various sectors (edu-
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cation, economy, culture, politics, work, and environment), conducted in 
2009 and 2010.2 
The analysis begins with a brief description of the Greater Region, af-
ter which the formation and inﬂuence of social categories and stereotypes 
are outlined. Subsequently, the components that contribute to identity and 
the eﬀects of identifying with the Greater Region are discussed. The arti-
cle ends with a typology of Greater Region identities.
THE CROSS-BORDER ARE A “GRE ATER REGION”
The Greater Region, as deﬁned today, extends over an area of 65,401 
square kilometers and has more than eleven million inhabitants. It is 
Europe’s largest cross-border region. In everyday use, the term “Saar-Lor-
Lux” is more frequent than “Greater Region.” It owes its prominence to 
its long tradition, being ﬁrst used in 1969. At that time, the executive 
of the Saar-Bergwerke introduced the term for the region to emphasize 
the importance of the cooperation of the three regions Saarland, Lorraine, 
and Luxembourg in the coal and steel industry (Glöckner 2001). Later, 
the Greater Region expanded, and its name changed frequently to reﬂect 
these territorial modiﬁcations. The Saar-Lor-Lux region thus became Saar-
Lor-Lux-Trier/Westpfalz and then Saar-Lor-Lux-Rheinland-Pfalz-Wallonie 
or “Greater Region.”
CATEGORIZ ATION AS A BASIS FOR STEREOT YPING AND AS 
PART OF THE CONCEP T OF THE SELF
Social identity theory (SIT) in social-psychology, developed by Tajfel, ap-
plies to inter-group processes and conﬂicts. Its main focus lies on the indi-
vidual’s behavior in groups (cf. Zick 2002). An individual’s social identity 
is based on group membership. Before the formation of groups, categori-
2 | The research was developed within the MORO-project “Überregionale Part-
nerschaften in grenzüberschreitenden Verflechtungsräumen” (Super-Regional 
Partnerships in Cross-Border Regions) of the Federal Institute for Research on 
Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development and the Saarland Ministry of the 
Environment.
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zations are made that allow individuals to deﬁne themselves in relation to 
social context (Hastedt 1998: 6). They serve as orientation systems (Tajfel 
1982: 103). The categories become part of the self-concept (Turner 1982: 
16). Due to the division of the social environment into categories and 
groups (ingroup and outgroups), whenever social identity overrides the 
salience of personal identity individuals often act not as individuals but 
as group members. Acting as group members, individuals tend to per-
ceive groups as homogenous, overlooking internal diﬀerentiation to focus 
on diﬀerences between groups. This categorizing impact of perception is 
interesting because the “way we perceive others will inﬂuence indirectly 
how we act towards them” (Turner 1982: 29). Thus, social categorization 
supports stereotypes and aﬀects our behavior towards stereotyped per-
sons. Tajfel’s experiments demonstrated that a trivial categorization into 
two groups “can suﬃce to initiate discriminatory behavior towards an out-
group” (Petersen/Blank 2008: 203).
There are four categorization bases of vital importance among stake-
holders: political borders and nationality, language boundaries, geograph-
ical distance to the national border, and legal competencies. These cate-
gorization bases, as shown by interviews, often cause an interviewee to 
perceive another person “in the light of his belonging to a social category” 
(Mielke 1999: 5). Evaluating a person based on a categorization is called 
stereotyping (cf. Mielke 1999: 5). Perception is not passive, it is a matter 
of “information research” rather than “information processing” (Briesen 
1994: 41).
Serving as an example for a stereotype that developed from several 
categorization bases, the stereotype of the diﬀerent working methods of 
Germans and French may be mentioned. According to this stereotype, the 
work styles of Germans (some interviewees expand this to include “Ger-
man speaking”) and French (or ‘French speaking’) vary in terms of or-
ganization and eﬀectiveness. The German work style is seen, depending 
on one’s point of view, as either over-organized and thus inﬂexible or as 
well organized and thus eﬃcient. French and French-speaking persons by 
analogy are perceived as less organized and less eﬃcient or less ﬁxed and 
more ﬂexible. This is a good example of how inner-group heterogeneity is 
ignored and how groups and their individual members become subject to 
categorical ascription.
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STEREOT YPES AND THEIR IMPACT ON  
CROSS-BORDER COOPER ATION
Originating in typography, the term “stereotype” is composed of “the two 
Greek words stereos (ﬁxed, hard, ﬁrm) and typos (concept, ﬁxed form, char-
acteristic imprint)” (Petersen/Six 2008: 21). Stereotypes are opinions and 
probability judgments (Ganter 1997: 6). They can be positive or negative 
(cf. Hahn/Hahn 2002: 20), correct or incorrect (Filipp and Mayer 2005: 
26). They tap into “socially shared structures of knowledge” (Klauer 2008: 
23) and can be dangerous, particularly because they are used to justify 
behavior towards members of other groups (Tajfel 1982: 44). 
Stereotypes are characterized by durability. If a stereotype is attribut-
ed to a category, in most cases it won’t change even when the stereotype 
contradicts reality. Before a stereotype is called into question, individuals 
are more likely to cancel out their intellectual knowledge “on an emotional 
basis” (Hahn/Hahn 2002: 27). 
Interviews with stakeholders in the Greater Region veriﬁed that ste-
reotypes can have both positive and negative consequences for cross-bor-
der cooperation. As an option for individual orientation, stereotypes have 
a mainly positive function: “The essential cognitive function of stereo-
typing is thus to systematize and simplify information from the social 
environment in order to make sense of a world that would otherwise be 
too complex and chaotic for eﬀective action” (Tajfel 1981: 148). Stereotypes 
facilitate dealing with a culture that has been foreign. In the best case, 
this stimulates interest in learning more about the unknown group and 
to question the stereotype. One interviewee, Ms. “O.L.,” experienced the 
lack of stereotypes as obstructive for cross-border identity construction 
because stereotypes are needed to create an image of other people. She 
prefers having an image, even if it’s probably a false one.
Apart from the positive functions of orientation, stereotypes have two 
other possible positive functions: positive discrimination and the stabi-
lization of social identity. Luxembourg provides an example of positive 
discrimination: “Luxembourgers” are often attributed with above-average 
openness. The interviewee Mrs. R.I., for example, was of the opinion that 
they have “always” had a Greater regional identity. Positive discrimination 
exists when groups are attributed with positive characteristics or are more 
readily trusted: “discrimination is when a person treats another person 
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due to his group membership better or worse than a member of another 
group” (Förster 2007: 33).
Even when preferences have positive eﬀects, they must still be consid-
ered an “inadmissible generalization” because the positively stereotyped 
person is thereby “confronted with excessive peer pressure and his indi-
viduality and singularity is denied” (Filipp/Mayer 2005: 30). Stereotyp-
ing comparison groups can strengthen one’s own social identity if the 
ingroup is judged to be better than the outgroup (Roth 2005; Tajfel 1981, 
1982). Stereotyping an outgroup can serve as a defensive mechanism if a 
negative stereotype about one’s own ingroup is threatening: “stigmatized 
groups turn the negative attributions into positive qualities” (Keupp et 
al. 1999: 180). The reciprocal stereotyping of German and French work 
styles demonstrates this. Indeed, stereotypes often arise from reactions to 
attributions from outside. The dependence between auto-stereotypes and 
hetero-stereotypes is evident in this example. “Almost every time, when 
using a negative hetero-stereotype, the positive auto-stereotype is in mind 
at the same time” (Hahn/Hahn 2002: 31).
The interviews revealed three negative eﬀects of stereotypes: justi-
ﬁcation of the status quo; social discrimination and avoidance; and the 
perception of threat or the weakening of social identity. Justiﬁcation of 
the status quo is present in the stereotyping of regions situated at the geo-
graphical edges of the Greater Region. Some interviewees are convinced 
that the inhabitants in those areas are less interested in cooperation and 
do not identify with the Greater Region. Obviously, the category “inhab-
itant at the edge” is itself a stereotype. That stereotypes can lead to so-
cial discrimination is also obvious in the Greater Region: the idea of the 
“Greater Region with two speeds” was a common theme. Mummendey 
and Wenzel see in this a common form of social discrimination: when 
two categories exist as subcategories of the same overarching category, 
whereby one is portrayed as the better prototype of the superior category, 
necessarily deprecating the other (Waldzus/Wenzel 2008).
Luxembourg’s special position in the Greater Region can lead to the 
perception of threat or a weakening of social identity. Luxembourg is the 
strongest economic region in the Greater Region. It also has the greatest 
number of in-coming commuters. It is the only nation-state completely 
contained within the Greater Region and thus has greater legal competen-
cies than the other subregions. This is not regarded positively by all stake-
holders. Mrs. H.S., for example, feels that Luxembourg exploits the sur-
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rounding areas because it beneﬁts from commuters with skills but does 
not honor social obligations to the outlying areas such as contributing to 
the maintenance of education systems. The positive stereotype of Luxem-
bourg as “Greater Region’s stimulation” may be evaluated negatively when 
other subregions feel their social identities threatened.
IDENTIT Y-CRE ATING FACTORS 
Diﬀerent factors create identity: territory, language, symbols, history, con-
tact, functional relations, mutual interest, and education. The manifesta-
tion of each in the Greater Region is discussed below.
Starting with territory, recent approaches in the sociology of space pro-
ceed from the assumption that “social and historically relevant space is the 
result of human actions and perceptions” (Mein 2008: 33). Nonetheless, 
space remains important because of relationships to a speciﬁc geograph-
ic location, especially in the postmodern era when, as Giddens argues, 
people desire to re-embed themselves in reaction to the dislocation and 
detachment caused by globalization (Kühne 2006: 112ﬀ.). Although the 
enormous size of the Greater Region is criticized by many stakeholders, 
few demand a rearrangement. The stakeholders are conscious of the mal-
leability of frontiers and of their arbitrariness, yet, they accept the demar-
cation as it stands. The fact that all regions are located at a national border 
is seen as common ground by stakeholders.
That language plays an important role in creating identity was empha-
sized repeatedly by interviewees. One stakeholder saw in the bilingualism 
of colleagues a point of shared identity. Additionally, language is described 
as something that enables contact and provides material for conversations, 
for example about the same television programs. And language itself is 
described as an important cultural force, whereby language boundaries 
are considered to be cultural boundaries. High linguistic competence is 
said to express openness and interest, a language boundary on the other 
hand can serve as means of exclusion.
Symbols, both spatial symbols and space-related symbols, are import-
ant. Furthermore, the name “Greater Region” itself has a symbolic charac-
ter. The name Greater Region is well known to all stakeholders and is also 
used as a term for the cooperation area. But most criticize its arbitrariness, 
its lack of signiﬁcance, its ambiguity, and, ﬁnally, its interchangeability, 
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especially for persons outside the Greater Region. The term plays no role 
in creating identity. Natural geographic symbols, for example the Moselle 
or the Eifel, are better for establishing connections. Borders are of special 
importance for spatial symbolism. The opening of borders is a symbol of 
putting away a warlike past. The border area symbolizes values like peace 
and liberty and thereby an openness between cultures. Spatial symbols 
oﬀer the possibility of establishing categories that are less exclusive than 
categories based on linguistic area, nation, or subregion. So far, there exist 
few space-related symbols in the Greater Region.
Memories evoked by symbols are much more important than their 
actual meanings. Many cross-border areas emphasize the historical 
commonalities of the several subregions. In general, a common history 
is thought to create common identity. “Memory, on the individual level, 
has the function of attributing consistency and meaning to […] existence. 
One’s own past, thereby, always serves the validation of the present” 
(Flender 1994: 109). Some argue that a common history should legitimate 
political goals or serve generally to demarcate spaces in the Greater Re-
gion, although others argue that there “can be no question of a historically 
grown Greater Region or a ‘natural’ growing together of the population in 
the Greater Region” (Pauly 2009: 29). Few interviewees expressed belief 
in a common historical legacy within the Greater Region. The border’s de-
lineation is widely held to be arbitrary. The commonality of being located 
on a national border seems to be more important than any historical com-
monality. Thus, for creating a common identity, common history is not 
useful, although some do mention it. Nonetheless, it does have meaning 
as a connecting factor for some common projects. The goal of breaking 
with the warlike past and preserving peace is more important than histor-
ical unity for current identity constructions. 
Both personal contact across borders and informational exchange can 
arouse interest and reduce fears. If contact is lacking, interest is more like-
ly to be lacking as well. The mainly positive attitude of the interviewees 
towards the Greater Region is probably attributable to a previous job-relat-
ed interaction with the Greater Region. There is a positive correlation be-
tween information and interest. Pierre Bourdieu calls attention to persons 
in relations of propinquity: “They meet more often, they get into contact, 
sometimes in conﬂict, but this is also a kind of relationship […]. Knowing 
each other personally becomes easier the closer you are, physically” (Bour-
dieu 2005: 36). But in Bourdieu’s opinion, it is also quite clear that propin-
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quity does not suﬃce to promote exchange. For contact, social space is at 
least as important as physical space.
Functional relations in common institutions play an important role 
in creating identity. Functional interdependence promotes consciousness 
of the meaning of the Greater Region in everyday life. Yet, stakeholders 
noted that border commuters, who are aﬀected most by functional inter-
dependency, do not necessarily identify more closely with the Greater Re-
gion. Local public transport, which is insuﬃciently developed, is consid-
ered to be a barrier for creating a regional identity. 
Many interviewees were of the opinion that shared identity can be in-
creased by an awareness of common goals and of the mutual proﬁt that co-
operation can bring. Lack of motivation and lack of interest in cross-border 
questions or in language acquisition is often considered to be the result of 
a lack of awareness of these advantages. Cross-border cooperation is not 
only a matter of philanthropy with the goal of “building of areas of solidar-
ity,” it is also a “material, lucrative goal” (Gaunard 1999: 119). 
Finally, lack of knowledge of other educational systems has negative 
eﬀects on intercultural communication. Learning about and understand-
ing other educational systems increases sympathy, tolerance, and cooper-
ation even if diﬀerences persist. In the Greater Region, there are at present 
several cross-border schools including the Schengen-Lyzeum in Perl or 
the Deutsch-Französisches Gymnasium in Saarbrücken. Furthermore, 
young people have the possibility to attend cross-border programs of study 
at the University of the Greater Region.
TYPOLOGY AND CONCLUSION
Multidimensional subidentities or patchwork-identities are gaining in 
importance. This postmodern trend is recognizable in the Greater Re-
gion. National identities are still clearly fundamental for most ingroup 
and outgroup categorizations, but diﬀerent identities can be activated and 
are relevant to action in several contexts. A Greater Regional identity, if 
it emerges, is going to be composed of many patchwork identities. This 
would possibly reduce group conﬂicts if “either-or” identities become 
weaker and if “as well as” identities become more predominant (cf. Beck 
2004). There are rudiments of a regional awareness or a regional identity 
in stakeholders’ minds. Which identity is activated at any particular time 
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depends on the group with which individuals identify themselves at the 
moment. The “Greater Region” category is rarely salient; other categories 
such as language or nationality are more fundamental.
The Greater Region’s stakeholders can have multidimensional iden-
tities. It might seem like a patchwork-like coexistence at ﬁrst glance, but 
it is in fact a patchwork-like cooperation because, even when there is no 
hybridization of identities, mutual interaction takes place. The borders 
within the Greater Region have a constitutive eﬀect for Greater Regional 
identities. Diversity is considered to be characteristic of the region, and 
heterogeneity is expressly desired. So borders continue to be important 
to identity, but they become more permeable. As described in postmod-
ern thought, residents think of themselves as belonging to several groups, 
and these groups are not always mutually exclusive. Clear delineations are 
hardly possible today. The Greater Region shows that delineation does not 
require exclusion. Borders continue to be important, especially symboli-
cally, but a there is no demand for clear contrast. 
The study suggests a typology of identities, all of which can exist in 
combination with the others. The ﬁrst type, Territorial Greater Region iden-
tity, is very similar to national identity. This identity form has yet to arise, 
and it can be assumed that it never will due to the diversity of national and 
Greater Regional or cross-border identities. Cross-border identities are not 
comparable to national identities. There are intended to be non-exclusive. 
Greater Regional identities cannot be described with national terminol-
ogy, thus, nation-like symbols and identities do not and will not exist. 
“But Europe is still considered national as an ‘uncompleted nation,’ an 
‘uncompleted federal state,’ and it is treated as if it must be both – nation 
and state. Not least, it is this inability to comprehend and understand this 
historically innovative reality of Europeanization that causes the Europe-
an malaise. And this is an essential reason why EU-institutions, which 
should help people, are considered unreal and even threatening to the 
population” (Beck 2005: 7). Beck’s idea is transferable to the Greater Re-
gion. It is impossible, either from the inside or the outside, to sense the 
Greater Regional reality. 
One can talk of advantage-identity in the Greater Region because the 
promise of advantage through cooperation motivates many stakeholders 
to contribute to the success of the Greater Region. Some justify their group 
membership in terms of the advantage it brings. The form of advantage 
need not be clearly deﬁned. 
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The type sub-identity of European identity is characterized by the idea 
that the Greater Region is a model for Europe. It lacks a unique value and 
serves only as a model. This type is very similar to value-identity because 
general European values are very important for both. It seems to be obvi-
ous that the progress of cross-border identities requires strong European 
identities. 
For cross-border identity, borders themselves play an important role. 
Experiences of borders in everyday life, together with the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with them in the past and present, create a feel-
ing of togetherness.
Cultural identity with cultural commonalities, focused on feelings of 
togetherness, is as common as value-identity, which is characterized by 
common general values like peace, tolerance, or liberty. Cultural-identity 
and value-identity are often closely tied to language and are thus not com-
pletely inclusive. 
The two ﬁnal types, transnational identity and cosmopolitan identi-
ty require closer examination because they have a special meaning in 
cross-border regions.
Transnationalism is characterized by long-term, pluri-local, structured 
relations across national borders (Pries 2008). The importance of national 
identities is maintained. According to Ludger Pries, a transnational social 
world is a world characterized by cross-border phenomena that are every-
where identical (Pries 2008). Transnationalism may be more pronounced 
in cross-border regions than in the midlands. Many interviewees men-
tioned personal transnational networks in addition to professional link-
ages. The continuing signiﬁcance of space and the nation-states stands, 
according to Pries, in no contradiction to transnationalization. 
Cosmopolitanization “is a non-linear, dialectical process, where the 
universal and the contextual, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous, 
the global and the local aren’t cultural dualisms, but connected, interacting 
principles” (Beck 2004: 113). Contrary to nation states, where the foreign is 
delimited, “the cosmopolitan era is based on a dialogue-based imagination 
of the internalized others” (Beck 2004: 122). Rudimentary indications of 
the idea of the equality of all and of interdependence was observable in the 
content of the interviews, although diﬀerences were not abolished. The 
stakeholders feel enriched by “others.” Ingroups and outgroups inﬂuence 
each other and appreciate this mutual inﬂuence. In spite of this, there is 
no uniﬁcation and no desire for standardized culture. Outgroups have a 
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constitutive eﬀect on ingroup identity. In the case of the Greater Region, 
this means that every subregion continues to be a unique area for culture 
and identity, but each is inﬂuenced by the other, even as subregional and 
national identities continue to be important. The inﬂuence of subregions 
will not be liquidated in a uniﬁed identity. Rather, neighboring subregions 
will become integrated into subregional identities as the signiﬁcance of 
relations to the “other” is recognized.
Identities in the Greater Regional community are far from an ideal 
cosmopolitanism where “the acknowledgement of otherness becomes a 
maxim of thought, common life, and action [and where] diﬀerences aren’t 
considered hierarchical nor are they liquidated, but they are accepted and 
considered positive” (Beck 2006). But even if stakeholders emphasize the 
positive features of diversity and do not seek to abolish them, a hierarchi-
cal order can be noticed. The best illustration of this might be the com-
monly used phrase of the “Greater Region of two speeds.” Even if social 
cosmopolitanism does not exist in its pure form yet, the interviews leave 
the impression that cross-border regions may be taking on a pioneering 
role. “Unity in diversity” is the one idea that enjoys the greatest consensus 
among the stakeholders. This is no completely hybridized society but a so-
ciety that allows diﬀerences without ordering them hierarchically and that 
enables sub-identities (national, local, cultural etc.) to continue to exist.
The interviews show that postmodern concepts of identity need not 
lead to rootlessness and instability. All respondents give the impression 
that a patchwork of plural identities is possible. Their social identities are 
strong enough to allow other sub-identities in addition to the “classic” iden-
tities. But it should be remembered that the interviewees are not represen-
tative of the Greater Region’s general population. The postmodern patch-
work-identity, which recognizes the search for identity as a creative process 
of self-organization, where the self “is to be recreated continuously in a 
process of self-reﬂection and self-stylization” (Eickelpasch/Rademacher 
2010: 22), does not aﬀect everyone equally. Individuals need “suﬃcient ma-
terial security, relationship skills, communication skills, negotiation skills, 
and creative structural competence” (Eickelpasch/Rademacher 2010: 29) 
to take advantage of a ﬂexible identity. Social, economic, and cultural cap-
ital (Bourdieu 1987) is, in certain ways, a prerequisite for the formation of 
Greater Regional identities. The identity-types demonstrated here are more 
permeable than, for example, national identities, but resource inequality 
limits many individuals’ access to these new identities. 
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Between Borders 
France, Germany, and Poland in the Debate on 
Demarcation and Frontier Crossing in the Context of the 
Schengen Agreement
Angela Siebold
INTRODUCTION
The events of 1989 changed Europe. Protests and regime changes in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, including the fall of the Berlin wall and the result-
ing end of the cold war, marked the beginning of a process that brought a 
fundamental reconﬁguration of European social, political, economic, and 
cultural spaces. During this process, the nations of Europe negotiated new 
national and European identities within the broader culture of a newly 
uniﬁed Europe that was itself undergoing major revision. 
The transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, including the former 
East Germany, were particularly intense. The simultaneous transitions of 
both political and economic systems meant that virtually every aspect of 
everyday life was changed for most individuals. One might argue that these 
institutional changes were the short-term result of the political transforma-
tion of 1989. Historical research, however, highlights that while the trans-
formation may have come to a head in 1989, it was the result of convergence 
of a variety of long-term factors that were not restricted geographically to 
the countries directly participating in the social upheavals of 1989. Bearing 
in mind the experience and viewpoints of eastern and western Europe, we 
can analyze the meaning of the 1989 transformation in a broader context, 
taking into account not only institutional transitions but also the transition 
of patterns and structures of cultural communication and of mentalities. 
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These include changes that have yet to reach completion and forms of con-
tinuity that still persist today. This contribution elaborates the argument 
that such forms of long-term continuity lasting well after the transforma-
tive year of 1989 can best be explained from historical perspective. 
Useful for discussing the meaning of the 1989 transformation in his-
torical context is one debate that is highly symbolic for the present con-
struction of Europe: the laws regulating cross-border movement within 
the context of the Schengen Agreement. This debate allows us to discuss 
the many forms of collective identity in Europe and to talk about what a 
national “boundary means to people, or, more precisely, about the mean-
ings they give to it.” (Cohen 1985: 12) Reports on the implementation of the 
Schengen Agreement in 1995 and its eastward expansion in 2007 appear-
ing in the French, Polish, and German print media are analyzed below 
using articles from six major daily newspapers.1
WESTERN PL ANS FOR A BORDERLESS EUROPE AND THE FALL 
OF THE “IRON CURTAIN”
After a long period of rigid boundaries in Cold War Europe, two processes 
fueled a heated debate about borders and demarcations beginning in the 
1980s: the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in the context of 
European integration and the political and economic transformations of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Schengen Agreement had its origins 
in Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand’s decision in 1984 to create a 
border-free zone in what would become the Schengen area. One year lat-
er, the Schengen Agreement was signed by the governments of France, 
West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It was con-
sidered to be the next logical step toward a single European market. The 
agreement’s implementation procedure took ten years, much longer than 
planned, and ﬁnally came into eﬀect in early 1995. By 1997 the additional 
signatories of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Austria were also on board. The 
Schengen area currently encompasses 26 countries.
1 | The newspapers are: Le Monde (LM) and Le Figaro (LF), the Süddeutsche Zei-
tung (SZ) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Gazeta Wyborcza (GW) 
and Rzeczpospolita (RZ). All cited passages have been translated by the author.
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The fall of the “Iron Curtain” fundamentally changed the precondi-
tions upon which the elimination of border controls in Western Europe 
was founded. Within a very short time span, Europe’s eastern border was 
no longer clearly deﬁned, leading both to hopes for a uniﬁed “Europe with-
out borders” and to concerns about future migration patterns and lowered 
security. German uniﬁcation had opened up the eminent possibility that a 
future Europe would comprise both western and eastern European space. 
Karl Schlögel referred to the year 1989 as a spatial revolution (“Raumrev-
olution”) (Schlögel 2006: 25).
This notable historic constellation raises the question of what hap-
pened when the long-term plans regarding the implementation of a “bor-
derless” (Western) Europe within a single European market and a political 
union coincided with the unexpected fall of the “Iron Curtain.” What hap-
pened when the transformation processes of Central and Eastern Europe 
became relevant for Western European integration, which had until then 
not considered the issue of eastward expansion?
DEBATES ON THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT IN 1995
The “Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Re-
public on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders” was 
signed in 1985. It formulated the plan to establish an unrestricted travel 
zone in the member states of the European Community. The Agreement 
was meant to send a signal for the then static process of European In-
tegration. Its economic crisis, then often referred to as “Eurosclerosis,” 
was supposed to be broken with the implementation of the Single Eu-
ropean Act in 1986. In 1990, the member states added the “Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement.” In the process leading up to 
this convention, the new challenges presented by the fall of the Berlin wall 
had already become apparent. In December 1989, the government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany delayed signing the treaty, wishing to see a 
resolution of the question of whether East Germany would automatically 
become part of the Schengen area after the German reuniﬁcation.2 
2 | Cf. “Kabinett verschiebt Entscheidung über Schengen”, FAZ 15.12.1989: 1.
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Abolishing Internal Border Controls 
On March 26th, 1995, the Schengen Agreement oﬃcially came into force. 
In France, the plan to abolish border controls attracted much harsher criti-
cism than in Germany. Facing the upcoming presidential elections, many 
French politicians publicly opposed the opening of the borders or argued 
for delays.3 Their opposition coincided with a general concern regarding 
further immigration to France across the common borders of the Schen-
gen area. The government was afraid of losing sovereignty and control. 
Opponents were criticized, however, on the grounds that by not entering 
the Schengen Agreement, France would risk losing inﬂuence over Euro-
pean politics.4 
While newspapers in Poland and Germany had already heralded the 
opening of common borders (Stabenow 1995: 1; Pomianowski 1995a), 
French newspapers referred to the date as the beginning of a progressive 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement in a “probationary phase.”5 
As a reaction to bomb attacks in Paris in 1995, among other factors, the 
French government waited another year to open its borders entirely to the 
members of the Schengen Treaty (Prantl 1995a: 4).
New “countervailing measures” were also part of the European dis-
course, especially in German newspapers. Articles focused on conﬂicts 
over the right of national police oﬃcers to cross borders in “hot pursuit” of 
crime suspects (Münster 1995: 8). A possible increase in drug traﬃcking 
from the Netherlands was also a matter of debate especially in France.6
Constructing a Common E xternal Border
Member states were concerned about the new common external borders 
of the Schengen area. France in particular considered the borders in 
the Mediterranean regions of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece to be a 
3 | E.g. Philippe de Villiers (“A l’extrême droite et à l’extrême gauche, les limites 
du consensus”, LM 22.03.1995); Jacques Chirac (“Chirac et les accords de Schen-
gen”, LF 07.04.1995: 7); Jean-Marie le Pen (“Le Pen: ‘Contrat pour la France’”, LF 
05.04.1995: 7).
4 | Cf. “Rückzug von Europa?”, FAZ 01.7.1995: 2. 
5 | “Schengen, une convention en marche”, LF 24.03.1995: 10; Bresson (1995).
6 | Cf. “Coke en stock aux Pays-Bas”, LF 05.05.1995: 12-C.
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long-term security threat for Schengen-area citizens.7 For many French 
and German politicians such as Jacques Chirac or Manfred Kanther, the 
main common goal was to prevent “illegal immigrants” from entering the 
Schengen area.8
Most concerns regarding irregular immigration and increasing crime 
rates focused on security along the eastern border of united Germany. 
Erich Inciyan, in Le Monde, referred to this as the “most sensitive external 
border of this new Schengen area” (Inciyan 1995) because it represented 
the new common border to Eastern Europe. “Sleep well, brave Europeans! 
German policemen will watch over your security at the borders,” wrote 
Philippe Bernard (1995) in Le Monde. 
The Schengen Agreement was often criticized on the grounds that 
the new European situation diﬀered radically from the conditions under 
which the Agreement had been signed in 1985. 
The Schengen Agreement, initiated in 1985 when the Iron Curtain demarcated the 
eastern border of Europe, was implemented in the completely dif ferent context 
of heavy migratory pressure from Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Turkey (ibid.).
The German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung commented on 
this French concern: “Some people still dream of the old deﬁnite bound-
aries, at least in the east” (Wenz 1995: 8). Although German newspapers 
generally emphasized high standards of security at the eastern border of 
Germany (ibid.), the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung expected “between 5 
and 15 million immigrants,” especially from Eastern Europe (Zimmermann 
1995: 13). For the Süddeutsche Zeitung, these fears contributed to delays in 
the implementation of the Schengen Agreement.
The fact that it took almost ten years to forge the first model of a core Europe is 
not only attributable to normal European infighting but also to the fall of the Berlin 
wall, which stoked fears of millions of westward-moving immigrants moving out of 
7 | E.g. “Les exclus de la libre circulation”, LM 25.03.1995; “Espace Schengen: 
l’auberge espagnole”, LF 03.05.1995: 16-D; “Espace Schengen: le trou noir alba-
nais”, LF 27.04.1995: 12.
8 | Cf. “Justizministerin verspricht verständlichere Gesetze”, SZ 30.03.1995: 2; 
“Chirac: Abkommen eventuell neu aushandeln”, SZ 07.04.1995: 7.
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a shaken-up Eastern Europe. These fears remain, most especially in Germany, and 
have resulted in a lack of confidence in “Schengen” (Münster 1995: 8). 
According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the need for a stricter 
surveillance of the German-Polish border resulted from the collapse of 
the Warsaw Pact and from subsequent changes in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It would have been necessary to tighten border controls for Ger-
many’s Eastern neighbors with or without Schengen, but now that the 
German-Polish border was the common external border of the Schengen 
area, stricter controls were even more important (Bannas 1995a: 2).
In its attempt to explain fears concerning the controls at the Ger-
man-Polish border, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung emphasized that 
“the poor and the rich part of Europe” meet at this border (Bannas 1995b: 
3). The equating of the former “Iron Curtain” with a “prosperity border” 
was also apparent in French newspapers: 
Until 1989, this border was of interest to no one. It only served to separate two 
socialist states. Today, its rough terrain is a convenient door for our poor cousins 
from Eastern Europe who are drawn to the West and its plenty (Bernard 1995).
Polish newspapers discussed the new border situation in terms of border 
traﬃc issues and delays at border crossing points (Pomianowski 1995a; Al-
terman et al. 1995: 2). In view of the general signiﬁcance of the Schengen 
Agreement, the Rzeczpospolita explained that Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states were being kept outside the common space that “was reserved 
for the members of the European Union.”9 The newspaper also argued 
that the fear of chaotic situations at border crossing points was accom-
panied by “xenophobia and negative stereotypes” regarding the citizens 
of the neighboring states (Pomianowski 1995b). Indeed, Polish citizens 
no longer needed a visa to enter the Schengen area as a tourist, but some 
Poles still complained about having to wait in the line of “non-EU citizens” 
while crossing the German-Polish border (Lentowicz/Sadowska 1995). 
The Rzeczpospolita quoted Poles who felt “discriminated against because 
they were treated as potential thieves” (Pomianowski 1995a.) or who “ﬁrst 
had to prove they were not criminals” (ibid.).
9 | “Schengen zamknięte dla Polski”, RZ 29.04.1995.
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French and German newspapers reported on the Polish reaction to 
new restrictions at the German-Polish border similarly. “Poland oﬀend-
ed”10 was the headline of an article in Le Monde, and the Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung associated the Polish situation with the time before 1989 
with a headline “Grumbling Behind the Curtain” (Rüb 1995: 6). Accord-
ing to these two newspapers, Poles felt like they were being treated as 
“second-class citizens”11 because, as non-EU citizens, they had to pass the 
border in waiting lines separate from those for Schengen citizens, possi-
bly being subject to stricter controls. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
argued that the Poles felt “humiliated because when entering Germany in 
Görlitz, Poles are not treated like Germans or French but like Russians” 
(Bannas 1995b: 3). The Süddeutsche Zeitung quoted Janusz Tycner, a jour-
nalist of the Polish newspaper Prawo i Życie: “For Germany,” he com-
plained, “the Poles are much like Turks. The Germans treat the French 
much more respectfully” (Heims/Flottau 1995: 3). 
The Symbolic Value of the Schengen Agreement:  
A Stor y of Failure?
In an interview with the German radio station Deutschlandfunk in 1995, 
Manfred Kanther, then Minister of the Interior, pointed out the oﬃcial 
position of the German government: “The Schengen Agreement was 
‘an agreement on freedom of movement within Western Europe and an 
agreement on external security.”12 Print media reports about the abolition 
of passport controls at the Western European borders in 1995 were ambiv-
alent. On the one hand, German newspapers in particular expressed hope 
that the Schengen Agreement would serve as a model for the future of a 
uniﬁed Europe (Stabenow 1995:1). The opening of the internal borders 
was a “notable achievement” (Münster 1995: 8.) for the European inte-
gration process.13 On the other hand, newspapers criticized the removal 
of border controls for several reasons. First, in the eyes of German and 
French journalists, it had taken too long to open the borders. Le Monde 
called this process “ten years of hesitancy” (Bresson 1995). The delay of the 
10 | “La Pologne s’offusque”, LF 27.03.1995: 2.
11 | “La Pologne s’offusque” 1995: 2; Rüb (1995: 6).
12 | “Schengen star tet ohne Chaos”, SZ 27.03.1995: 6.
13 | See also: “L’espace Schengen a des ratés”, LF 27.03.1995: 2.
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agreement’s implementation symbolized the inability or the unwilling-
ness of national governments to advance the goal of European uniﬁcation: 
This could have been an historical moment, but all ef for ts are being made to en-
sure that it does not become one. There will be no ribbon-cutting. The preoccupa-
tion with security and the mistrust of national authorities have run the dynamics 
into the ground and have spoiled the festivities (ibid.). 
Heribert Prantl, writing for the Süddeutsche Zeitung, even called the 
Schengen Agreement a “lie”: “No European promise has been broken 
more often than the promise of a borderless Europe” (Prantl 1995b: 4). He 
supported his case by stressing that this “borderless Europe” only existed 
for some European citizens and therefore had created “a ﬁrst-class and a 
second-class Europe” (ibid.). He was not referring to Central and Eastern 
Europe but rather to those EU member countries who were not part of 
the Schengen Agreement. Furthermore, he criticized stricter controls at 
the external borders as the construction of a “Fortress Europe.” Mean-
while, internal border controls still existed in the form of “mobile con-
trols” (ibid.). Prantl stated that the Schengen Agreement exposed the un-
democratic nature of decision-making in the European Union. Moreover, 
the Schengen Information System was criticized for collecting the personal 
data of EU citizens and distributing this data among several countries. In 
an article in Le Monde, Philippe Bernard pointed out that the promise of 
free movement inside the Schengen area had a negative “corollary: closed 
external borders and tighter immigration controls.” In addition, Schengen 
had served as a “justiﬁcation” for a more restrictive policy towards foreign-
ers and asylum seekers (Bernard 1995).
Le Monde commented on the border opening as follows: “The moment 
has been historical but it reminds us of historical events that frighten 
us.”14 Adopting a Central and Eastern European perspective, German 
newspapers wondered whether Schengen’s eastern border had created 
“new division of Europe” (Rüb 1995: 6). 
14 | “La peur de Schengen”, LM 28.03.1995.
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1989 ALL OVER AGAIN? THE ABOLITION OF THE E ASTERN 
BORDER CONTROLS IN 2007
As we have seen, prejudices as well as worries about immigration and 
rising insecurity – especially with regard to the Eastern borders – found 
expression in the print media during the implementation of the Schen-
gen Agreement in Western Europe in 1995. In 2007, when Poland and 
other Central and Eastern European countries joined the Schengen area, 
similar patterns of argumentation regarding the security of the East-
ern European border were apparent.15 From the longer-term perspective 
of today, we see that Western stereotypes and the idea of a divided Eu-
rope still persist. At the same time, the discourse is Poland reﬂected its 
dilemma of maintaining its orientation to the West and the European 
Union while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with its eastern 
neighbors. 
The Symbolic Value of the Schengen Enlargement 2007
In 1995, the Schengen Agreement was signed by Secretaries of State in the 
little town of Schengen in Luxembourg (Ruber 2007:2), but on December 
21st, 2007, high level European politicians gathered to hail the opening of 
the Eastern borders. The Polish and the Czech Prime Ministers, Donald 
Tusk and Mirek Topolanek, the President of the Council of the European 
Union, José Sócrates, as well as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and her Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, commemorated the 
date at the border crossing point between the German Zittau and the 
Polish Porajów.16 At the Austrian-Slovakian, the German-Czech, the Pol-
ish-Czech and the Polish-Lithuanian borders, barriers were symbolically 
removed or even sawn through.17 José Manuel Barroso, President of the 
European Commission, referred to the expansion of the Schengen area 
as “the highlight of a process that had started with the fall of the Berlin 
15 | “Wie einst im November ‘89”, SZ 21.12.2007: 6.
16 | “Europa, einig Schengenland”, FAZ 22.12.2007: 2.
17 | “Tag der Symbole”, SZ Bayern 21.12.2007: 33; “Europa, einig Schengen-
land”, FAZ:.2; Więcko.2007.
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wall” (Ruber 2007: 2) “Today is a truly historic moment,”18 declared An-
gela Merkel on December 21st, and Donald Tusk associated this date with 
a “triumph of freedom, which is a fundamental European value” (Kokot/
Harłukowicz 2007). “For us, it is the return to Europe,” explained the 
Polish Minister of the Interior, Grzegorz Schetyna.19 “Today, the boundar-
ies have disappeared. Poland has become a free country again” (Celińska 
2007). For Władysław Bartoszewski, the implementation of the Schengen 
Agreement was also “the natural outcome of the policy pursued by Poland 
since 1994 to join the Union” (Chauﬀour 2007: 10).
The print media also commemorated the 2007 events. On Decem-
ber 21st, the Süddeutsche Zeitung proclaimed that the “last remains of the 
Iron Curtain” had vanished.20 The entry of Central and Eastern European 
states into the EU was considered highly symbolic of an enhancement of 
the core values of freedom and equality in uniﬁed Europe.21 Finally, Polish 
citizens were given the same freedom of movement granted to East Ger-
man citizens in 1990 (Veser 2007: 12). Indeed, western states were told 
to be pleased at the sight of their cheering neighbors (Bacia 2007: 1), who 
“had been deprived for decades.”22 Western Europeans, it was said, would 
always remember the importance of open borders for those whose char-
acters “were shaped by the oppressive thought of potentially being locked 
behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ forever” (Bacia 2007:1).
The New Internal Border Between Germany and Poland
German and French newspapers foresaw problems arising from the new 
freedom of movement. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung declared, for 
example, that the accession of Central and Eastern European countries 
to the Schengen Agreement was an “historical event” (ibid.), but that “in 
the old member states, joy is limited.”23 The new Schengen members had 
18 | REGIERUNGonline: “Freie Fahrt durch 24 Länder”, URL: www.bundesre-
gierung.de/nn_914476/Content/DE/Archiv16/Ar tikel/2007/12/2007-12-21-
schengenerweiterung.html, 26.07.2011. 
19 | “Offene Schlagbäume”, SZ 20.12.2007: 5.
20 | “Freie Fahrt für Europa”, SZ 22.12.2007: 5.
21 | E.g.: “Le déﬁ de Schengen”, LM 21.12.2007; Chauffour (2007: 10).
22 | “Un espace unique pour 400 millions d’Européens”, LM 21.12.2007.
23 | “Seid umschlungen, Millionen!”, FAZ 20.12.2007: 1.
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beneﬁted from a “leap of faith,” and further controls were necessary (Bacia 
2007: 1). Le Figaro expected “the accession of Poland to accelerate Western 
migration,” including potentially illegal immigration (Thedrel 2007). 
According to Wolfgang Schäuble, new mobile border controls at Ger-
many’s eastern border were more “intelligent” than old border controls.24 
From now on, life for criminals would become more diﬃcult, “because 
they do not know where the police are.”25 Nonetheless, fears of increasing 
criminality – often illustrated by the stereotype of the Eastern European 
car thief26 – were expressed in demands to slow down implementation of 
full freedom of movement across the Eastern borders so as to create time 
to “install a few additional alarm systems,” as Joachim Herrmann, the 
Bavarian Minister of the Interior, suggested.27
The old image of the “prosperity border” experienced a revival at this 
time, too, with a new focus on Poland’s eastern neighbors (Ruber 2007:2). 
Inside the Schengen area, as Le Figaro noted, it was expected that sala-
ry diﬀerentials would cause increased migration ﬂows from east to west 
(Thedrel 2007) A well-known result was the decision to delay freedom 
of movement for Central and Eastern European workers in France until 
2008 and in Germany until May 2011.
Polish newspapers were sensitive to German concerns. They claimed 
that most Germans feared things would “get dangerous because the Poles 
will come and steal” (Kokot/Harłukowicz 2007). The Polish press also 
raised its own concerns about the border opening. While it was described 
as “an epochal event” (Magierowski.2007: A-002), the Rzeczpospolita 
asked whether Poland would experience a loss of national identity or sov-
ereignty (Ibid.; Brill 2007:3). Drug traﬃcking from the Netherlands to 
Poland also appeared on the list of possible future problems.28
24 | “Wie einst im November ‘89” SZ 2007: 6.
25 | “Europa, einig Schengenland” SZ 2007: 2.
26 | Cf. Burger (2007: 3); “Seid umschlungen, Millionen!” FAZ 2007.
27 | “Tag der Symbole” SZ Bayern 2007: 33.
28 | “Zniknę ły granice, pozostał przemyt”, GW 23.12.2007.
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A BORDERLESS EUROPE OR A NE W “IRON CURTAIN”?  
THE E X TERNAL BORDER OF THE ENL ARGED SCHENGEN ARE A
In 2007, as a consequence of the enlarged Schengen area, Poland took over 
responsibility for controls along a large portion of the new external border. In 
order to support Poland in this task, a high-tech infrastructure funded by the 
EU and Germany was established. While the Süddeutsche Zeitung headlined 
“Thousands Celebrate the End of the German External Border,”29 Grzegorz 
Schetyna warned the EU of isolating itself from its Eastern neighbors. The 
new external border should be tight, “but it must not become a new Iron Cur-
tain.”30 In 2009, an article in the Gazeta Wyborcza also predicted Schengen 
would become “for Poland’s Eastern neighbors a symbol of the EU’s grow-
ing isolation from the post-Soviet countries.” (Wojciechowski 2009) In fact, 
Poland had waited until the last possible moment in 2003 to tighten visa 
restrictions for Ukrainians entering Polish territory. In 2007, the Gazeta Wy-
borcza regarded these stringent conditions as “Schengen’s drawback (Wo-
jciechowski 2007). The newspaper demanded that the Polish government 
stand up for visa-free travel for Poland’s eastern neighbors (ibid.).
On the other hand, Poles considered the Schengen Agreement an 
important step toward full membership in the European Union. It also 
strengthened the Polish state, in particular with regard to “illegal immi-
gration.”31 This argument raises the question of whether Polish concerns 
about increased “illegal immigration” had been adopted from discussions 
in Western Europe. Although Poland is currently attracting more and more 
migration ﬂows, the number of foreign nationals living in Poland is still 
extremely low and is estimated to range between 0.1 and 1.9 percent of the 
population.
Simultaneously, German newspapers transferred worries about “ille-
gal immigration” from the old to the new external border. In Germany, the 
main political parties as well as the German Police Trade Union stressed 
that gangs of human traﬃckers in the Ukraine and Belarus posed a threat 
29 | “Wie einst im November ‘89” SZ 2007: 6.
30 | “Offene Schlagbäume” SZ 2007: 5; this Polish fear of a “new Iron Curtain” 
was also discussed in the French and German media: Veser (2007:12); Chauffour 
(2007: 10); Thedrel (2007).
31 | “Biernacki: wejście do Schengen zwiększa bezpieczeństwo naszego kraju”, 
RZ online, 21.12.2007.
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to Europe.32 Le Figaro also announced in December 2007: “Our borders 
are open for 75 million Eastern Europeans.”33 The “pressure of migration,” 
especially in Southern and Eastern Europe, would not decline (Fauvet-My-
cia 2007). Ikka Leitinen, Head of the Warsaw-based EU agency Frontex, 
added to these concerns by stating that in the future more immigrants 
would be able to enter the European Union secretly from the east.34 
However, in the opinion of Christine Fauvet-Mycia (Le Figaro), the 
Schengen Agreement is best seen as a concept, drawn up before the fall 
of the “Iron Curtain,” that has managed to survive over the years (Fau-
vet-Mycia 2007). This is “a great challenge” for uniﬁed Europe (Kovacs 
2007). Frédéric Fritscher made a plea in Le Figaro not to be afraid of a new 
“massive wave of ‘Polish Plumbers’” or of “illegal immigrants” (Fritscher 
2007: 14). He explained the importance of the new “borderless Europe” as 
follows: “Schengen, in this sense, is a ﬁrst step proving that we are able to 
live in this freedom, an unexpected gift of the fall 1989” (ibid.).
CONCLUSION
The historical break of 1989/90 contributed decisively to a change in the 
meaning of the Schengen process. Starting in 1985 as a technocratic pro-
cess mainly ignored by the public, it kicked oﬀ a passionate discussion 
about identity, belonging, diﬀerentiation, and security. 
With regard to concerns about border crossing, French and German 
newspapers were inﬂuenced by general fears of increased migration to 
the European Union. The French discussion was more intense in 1995, 
when France had to open its own borders, than in 2007, when border 
controls in Eastern Europe were abolished. Polish newspapers focused on 
the perception that Poland had ﬁnally achieved equal rights within Eu-
rope in 2007. The border opening illustrated the highly symbolic value 
of borders in Poland. At the same time, however, worries about a loss of 
national sovereignty, recently achieved, appeared in Polish debates. With 
reference to the new external borders of 2007, newspapers made use of 
the image of a “new Iron Curtain.” By citing fears of a divided Europe, the 
32 | “Offene Schlagbäume” SZ 2007: 5.
33 | “Nos frontières s’ouvrent à 75 millions d’Européens de l’Est”, LF 20.12.2007.
34 | “Offene Schlagbäume” SZ 2007: 5.
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reports revealed that the problem of geographic borders in a uniﬁed Eu-
rope had reanimated old thought patterns. In this context, negative stereo-
types were again exposed and seem to have only slightly changed during 
the past twenty years. When the German-Polish border opened in 2007, 
Wolfgang Schäuble noted that the concerns of an increasing crime rate in 
Western Europe were “fully understandable,” but that these concerns had 
“also existed when the border controls between Germany and France were 
abolished.”35 As we have seen, these fears of 1995 had also been focused on 
Europe’s eastern borders and those who live behind them.
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Cultural Distinction and the Example of the 
“Third East German Generation”
Jaqueline Flack
“Central Europe is hardly a geographical notion… 
The ways of feeling and thinking of inhabitants 
must thus suffice for drawing mental lines which 
seem to be more durable than the borders of the 
states” (Czesław Miłosz, 1986)
When in 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed, both East and West Germans ex-
perienced an existential shock as those walls, which once seemed so per-
manent, very suddenly became permeable and changeable. Today, despite 
the fact that all Germans experienced this change together, Germany is 
still divided. The division has outlived the wall.
The biographies and daily lives of West Germans did not change much 
after 1989, but East Germans saw the coordinates of their lives change 
dramatically as they faced the new challenge of crossing the invisible 
border that remained. We know today that this border was more durable 
than the political border that once separated the two Germanys. From the 
moment the Berlin Wall fell, East Germans were enveloped by a new and 
diﬀerent social, economic, and cultural system to which they had to adapt. 
However, neither East nor West Germans realized then just how durable, 
subtle, and deep the diﬀerences between the two societies had become 
during the years of separation.
East-west diﬀerences in cultural, social and communication practices, 
values, and norms quickly became a standard subject for German maga-
zines, newspapers, and research grant proposals. They have been widely 
analyzed in the last twenty years by many researchers from diﬀerent ﬁelds 
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as well as by writers, journalists, and politicians. Despite the fact that the 
uniﬁcation process has become one of the most studied phenomena in 
German history, it still makes sense to inquire into its continuing prog-
ress, even over twenty years later, because the transformation has aﬀected 
each generation diﬀerently and this inﬂuence sometimes becomes clear 
only decades later. 
THE “THIRD E AST GERMAN GENER ATION”
In the course of the last few months, a new voice has strengthened in the din 
of public discourse: the voice of the “Third East German Generation”, a group 
that includes Germans born between 1975 and 1985 in the GDR1. These in-
dividuals experienced the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall during child-
hood or adolescence. We do not need much knowledge in developmental psy-
chology to understand how deep the social and psychological impact of this 
historic moment must have been on individuals at such an important period 
in personal development. The questions they pose for themselves about this 
impact and the answers they provide are important, and they diﬀer from the 
questions and answers of their parents and grandparents. 
We are all familiar with the social and economic particulars of this 
change, but we know very little about the individual circumstances and 
experiences of this important generation. 
1 | The term “Third East German Generation” is inspired by the concept of “third-
generation migrant,” which is used in the migration literature in discussions of 
how the grandchildren of immigrants live between two dif ferent cultures. The term 
is used metaphorically to liken the shared experiences of the last generation of 
adult East Germans to the experiences of third-generation immigrants. Hence it is 
set in quotation marks. The sociological research on East Germany uses dif ferent 
terms to describe the same group, such as the “Fourth Generation” or the “Un-
advised Generation,” while the journalist Jana Simon talks in an essay about the 
“Generation Zero” (Lindner 2003; Simon 1998). According to the Mannheimian 
generation concept, which defines a generation as the result of shared histori-
cal events by individuals of a similar age who develop a collective and distinctive 
consciousness, the effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the sweeping 
social changes that ensued on East German adolescents demarcates the main 
generation-building event defining the “Third East German Generation.” 
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What did it mean to grow up in social and economic instability and un-
certainty, with family members who lost their jobs, and with parents and 
teachers who themselves were disoriented in the new social and econom-
ic system, often unable to give advice about important school and career 
choices? Who explained the world to this generation after the established 
social knowledge of the older generation appeared to have been made ob-
solete? 
Further, what lasting inﬂuence did these experiences have? In what man-
ner did their experiences shape the way they see the world and act in it today? 
The members of the “Third East German Generation” ask themselves 
these questions and some have publicly articulated their speciﬁc experi-
ences. This contribution analyzes the experiences of this generation as 
discussed in two sets of interviews published in Der Spiegel (Hollersen/
Gutsch 2009; Kastner 2011). In these interviews, ten East Germans dis-
cussed their individual experiences in East Germany during the social 
transformation process and its impact on their present lives. These texts of 
the East German transformation experience are analyzed as border-cross-
ing experiences, focusing on their relevance to the lives of members of the 
“Third Generation” today. I will therefore characterize these East Germans’ 
speciﬁc transformation experience since 1989 as a border experience. 
Important to the analysis is the concept of cultural distinction, deﬁned 
as cultural practices that draw a cultural borderline. This act is realized either 
consciously or unconsciously by a person or group who makes a distinction 
between other persons or other groups. Acting distinctively characterizes 
an important aspect of constructing personal and cultural identity. 
The question of “who we are” is also the question of what makes us 
distinctive from others. We can ﬁnd out the answer to this question by ex-
periencing actual or constructed diﬀerences in how people act and think 
in other cultures or societies. The construction of a post-uniﬁcation east-
ern German identity began with the confrontation with the “diﬀerent oth-
er,” in this case deﬁned by the norms, roles, values, and social practices of 
West German society. Although Germans from the east and from the west 
are both “German” and share a common ongoing history that has lasted 
much longer than the forty years of post-war national separation, many 
observers underestimated the intensity of the diﬀerences forged in those 
forty years. Expectations and reality diﬀered greatly. 
As a result of the confrontation with the “other Germany” after 1989, 
western Germans began to construct an image of the eastern German that 
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reproduced many of the already existing prejudices about the citizens of 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). These images were projected 
through the media and became very dominant in the public discourse (cf. 
Ahbe et al. 2009; Pates/Schochow 2013). 
Of course, eastern Germans constructed an image of western German 
at the same time, and these were often based on prejudices too. Easterners’ 
image of westerners, however, was not reinforced through the mass media 
as were western German perceptions of eastern Germans. The media con-
struction of eastern Germans began soon after the Wall fell and anchored 
itself securely in the public discourse on both sides of the old border. In 
contrast, eastern German perceptions of westerners circulated for the 
most part only in the east. Although the self-perception of eastern and 
western Germans was for both mostly positive, westerners’ perceptions of 
easterners in the media tended to be negative and undiﬀerentiated. 
Many more eastern Germans migrated to the west than vice-versa, 
so easterners’ opinions about “the other Germany” were often based on 
personal experience and was thus subject to modiﬁcation and diﬀerenti-
ation. Eastern German migrants in western Germany were confronted 
with negative public ascriptions on a daily basis, but many fewer western-
ers were aﬀected similarly. Accordingly, those born in the east have been 
forced to reﬂect and cope with what were mostly negative stereotypes and, 
as a result, many more easterners have undergone a process of personal 
redeﬁnition within the context of negative perceptions. 
One gets the sense from the interviews below that young eastern Ger-
mans have acquired a self-conﬁdence not very widespread among their 
elders. Public forms of reﬂection on the questions of “who we are” and 
“where we come from” represent an expression of this new self-conﬁdence 
and indicate a desire among young eastern Germans to understand and 
reﬂect upon their origins. 
As mentioned, the western German media not only inﬂuenced the 
self-perception of eastern Germans after uniﬁcation but also the way that 
eastern German identity is constructed by others. For outsiders, eastern 
German identity is often reduced to the product of socialization during 
the GDR period, while the experiences of uniﬁcation and transformation 
after 1989 are largely ignored. 
With regard to the formation of a speciﬁc eastern German identity, 
however, the transformation years are just as important as life before 
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1989. The interviewee C., for example – an eastern German woman born 
in 1983, explains the meaning of this period as follows: 
I have only recently come to realize just how big an influence the transformation 
period after 1989 had on me – as suddenly all the adults around me, including 
parents and teachers, had to reorient themselves (Kastner 2011). 
M., born in 1979, discusses the diﬃculties then faced by the adults who 
were close to him, as parents and teachers tried to adapt to new and diﬀer-
ent social structures and had to reorient themselves entirely. He describes 
his ﬁrst impressions after the reuniﬁcation as a culture shock: 
The west was not totally new for me, in East Berlin we had bananas and could watch 
West German TV. After the collapse of the government, West German products were 
suddenly everywhere on the shelves and that was the first culture shock […]. The 
second culture shock was seeing homeless people and junkies. I have no idea what 
they did with them in East Germany, but you never saw anything like that (ibid.). 
The essential point here is that he was experiencing culture shock without 
having moved from where he grew up. Culture shock is generally described 
in ethnology as a typical reaction of individuals to a foreign culture or a 
diﬀerent country. For most East Germans, however, the deﬁning experi-
ence after 1989 took place at home, where ordinary things like groceries or 
the educational system changed “overnight.” M. also describes how social 
instability and insecurity in East German society increased tremendously. 
Before 1989, homelessness and drug abuse had been virtually unknown. 
Radical social, cultural, and economic change as well as the awareness 
of opportunities for a new beginning are characteristic experiences of the 
“Third Generation” during the transformation process. “Anxiety about 
the future,” “uncertainty,” and “disorientation” are commonly mentioned 
as negative aspects of the transformation process. Yet some individuals 
claim to have been “crisis-proofed,” “liberated,” or left “without fear of 
their own future” and have assumed personal responsibility for their own 
lives. A., born in 1978, expresses herself as follows: 
We survived a complete transformation. At that time, our parents did not know 
what to expect or how the new system works. So you learn that it is possible to 
adapt to new circumstances (Hollersen/Gutsch 2009: 66). 
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D., born in 1973, noted: 
For me it was a feeling of great liberation…, that in the future, everything will de-
pend on me and on what I can do, not on the system (ibid.).
Confronted with mainly negative public images constructed by the media, 
eastern Germans started to reﬂect upon and criticize them. Young people 
today still struggle with unsophisticated generalizations and stereotypes. 
D. summarizes these stereotypes: “Easterners of all ages are on the dole, 
complain, are not willing to work, vote for the The Left party, and are athe-
ists…” (ibid.: 67). A. and D. express themselves similarly: 
A : “They always say that easterners complain too much and too loudly. But I have 
seen the same thing with West Germans who have rigid, pre-formed expectations 
about their own future, and when these are not fulfilled, they get scared” (ibid.: 
66).
D : “It happens constantly to me. Nine times out of ten, people assume I am a 
westerner. They just can’t fathom how the young attorney in front of them could 
possibly come from the east” (ibid.: 69).
S., born in 1982, remarks that the public often associates East Germany 
with “Nazis” (Cf. Kastner 2011). In contrast to ascriptions made by the 
media, interviewees formed a self-image distinct from the public image 
of eastern Germans in their personal processes of contemplating the ex-
istence of a speciﬁc East German identity. In this context, D. emphasizes 
the importance of integrating East German history into the whole of Ger-
man history instead of erasing it: 
“During all the media coverage of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, what I noticed and what makes me so angry is that they 
always only report the history of the Federal Republic: the end of the war, the eco-
nomic recovery, the new Ostpolitik, the 1968 generation, the R.A.F. The GDR is 
covered only in passing with the construction and fall of the Wall. What happened 
in this country during all those years is not covered. The GDR is treated as a foreign 
country…. You’ll never get a westerner to think of GDR history as a part of his own 
history. But they expect us easterners to adapt the history of the Federal Republic 
before 1989 as our own” (Hollersen/Gutsch 2009: 69).
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East German history is seen as an essential part of eastern German identity. 
To have grown up in the GDR, having experienced the fall of the Berlin Wall 
as well as the impact of the transformation process – all of these aspects are 
understood as essential to the development of what they call Ostprägung 
or Ostidentität (eastern coloration or eastern identity). Those experiences 
shape a feeling of being diﬀerent from western Germans of the same age, as 
reﬂected in the following exchanges between D. (1973) and C. (1978):
Der Spiegel: “How long do you think your eastern coloration will last?”
D.: “It will always be there. I was 16 when the Wall fell, that was my youth” (ibid. 66).
Der Spiegel: “Do those younger than you have this eastern identity, too? That feel-
ing of being dif ferent from westerners in the same age group?” 
C.: “Theirs is a dif fuse eastern identity, a kind of distinction… It will continue to be 
passed along for a long time…” (ibid.:67).
Even if the eastern Germans who were interviewed were not able to de-
scribe what Ostidentität exactly means, they feel it still exists:
Der Spiegel: “Sometimes it is argued that there are no dif ferences any longer 
among eastern and western Germans in our generation.” 
C.: “That argument is made all the time. You star t a conversation with someone 
your age from the west and everybody star ts out saying, ‘there are no dif ferences 
anymore.’ But in the course of the conversation the consensus grows between 
east and west that these actually do still exist” (ibid.: 68).
Members of the “Third East German Generation” claim now to have found 
their own voice, now articulating their own experiences instead of allowing 
themselves to be characterized and stereotyped by others. In the rise of 
Angela Merkel, an eastern German, to the position of Federal Chancellor, 
D. once saw a potential end to prejudice against eastern Germans:
“When Merkel was elected I thought that the east-west discussion would be over 
after one legislative period. Now that an eastern German is Federal Chancellor, 
then every westerner [should] know that eastern Germans can do every other 
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damn job in Germany.” But D. noted that this hope remained unfulfilled due to 
the fact that Angela Merkel is “completely unrecognizable as an East German.” At 
the same time, he argues: “If Angela Merkel takes a long time to formulate a clear 
opinion, some call that typical of eastern Germans. They say she learned that in 
the GDR. It makes me want to scream” (ibid.: 69).
CULTUR AL DISTINCTIONS
Individuals of the “Third East German Generation” have begun to discov-
er a self-conﬁdence about their East German origins. Being East German 
and having “this diﬀerent, exciting past” (ibid.: 67). C. describes as “trendy” 
(ibid.). When the younger generation wears T-shirts with the logo of East Ber-
lin, it can be considered an act of expressing East German distinctiveness. 
At the same time, East German identity is described as a “diﬀuse” 
(ibid.) feeling, objectiﬁed, for example, through an emotional aﬃnity to 
other eastern Germans. 
C.: “My university was in Baden Württemberg. The strange thing was that east-
erners hung out together there. Now a lot of alumni are moving to Berlin, but both 
westerners and easterners keep to themselves” (ibid.: 68).
Der Spiegel: “How did you recognize each other?” (ibid.).
C.: “It may be that I felt more protected among my own crowd, so to speak. Or that 
I simply thought I can trust them more. I have the feeling that you can talk about 
weaknesses and dif ficulties more openly among easterners” (ibid.).
A.: “I also have the feeling that easterners are more direct and open” (ibid.).
Based on his work as a clinical psychologist, Hans-Joachim Maaz con-
ﬁrms this impression: “West Germans keep up appearances even when a 
crisis has erupted on the inside. Eastern Germans are more typically ready 
to talk about anxiety or insecurities. This creates a warmer interpersonal 
connection” (Maaz 2009).
D. objects to this generalization based on his experience of having 
close western German friends, who are “just as authentic and open and…
willing to admit that they have weaknesses” (Hollersen/Gutsch 2009: 68).
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The construction of an eastern German identity was described above 
mainly as a reaction to ascriptions made by others, especially by the mass 
media. Below, the focus switches to the distinctive socio-cultural practices 
of eastern Germans. 
The wish to keep souvenirs of the GDR, to sing old songs, and to tell 
family stories appear to be important social practices used by individuals 
of the “Third Generation” to deal with their own history. These activities 
indicate a wish to understand and conserve their own cultural and histor-
ical roots, despite the fact that these activities are sometimes perceived as 
ambivalent or shameful:
C.: “On my 25th bir thday somebody took up a guitar and we star ted singing old 
songs. That was pretty borderline, and the westerners were thinking ‘we’ve never 
seen that before.’ It was ‘interesting’ for them” (ibid.: 67).
When C. uses the term “borderline” to evaluate the described situation, 
he instinctively realizes what is going on with regard to culture at that mo-
ment. While eastern Germans are drawing a cultural borderline by sing-
ing “old songs,” thereby excluding those who do not know them, western 
Germans see the border as something unfamiliar. In addition, the term 
“borderline” in the original German also carries an undertone of ethical 
critique of the distinction thus drawn. 
K., born in 1975, mentions another way of preserving personal mem-
ories: taking pictures of speciﬁc East German subjects such as old shop 
signs or collecting old GDR product packages. This practice she describes 
as an act of Ostalgie, a neologism that combines the German words for 
“nostalgia” and “east”: “I’ve preserved a bit of Ostalgie in me. I take photos 
of old shop signs from GDR times in eastern German cities and I collect 
old GDR product packages: gelatin, pudding, soap” (Kastner 2011).
An example of how identity is narratively constructed can be seen in 
the experience of having to tell the “Wall story” over and over again, which 
is described as being typical for young East Germans. It demonstrates 
how the narrative construction of an East German identity by themselves 
and others takes place. C. states that there is a “need for those stories as 
well as for young people telling them” (Hollersen/Gutsch 2009: 67).
D. and A. similarly explain: “We constantly have to retell the Wall story. Where 
were you?”
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All: (laughing) “Yes! Where were you!” (ibid.).
A.: “I spent some time in England and sometimes I had to tell the Wall story to the 
same person three times in the same week. Oh please, tell me again. I was shown 
all around: an East German! They kept offering me food, I guess because they 
thought I grew up hungry” (ibid.).
The importance of the act of story-telling for cultural self-placement, es-
pecially for young eastern Germans, becomes clear in the following quo-
tation from C., born in 1983: 
“I don’t have any personal memories. I never even went to the Pioneers [a par-
ty youth organization]. I was in kindergarten when Germany unified. I can tell a 
couple of stories, but they are the stories of my parents or my big brother. I only 
remember the three-cornered bags that milk used to come in” (Kastner 2011).
Hence, telling and being told these stories by family members became an 
important cultural practice that allowed eastern Germans to pass down 
speciﬁc eastern German experiences to the younger generation. Fur-
thermore, these stories help to reproduce East German socio-cultural 
speciﬁcs. Above all, comprehending these social practices helps us to un-
derstand why very young people still consider themselves to be “eastern 
German” even without having experienced the GDR.
D.: “Some young people who never experienced the GDR use that country or the 
east as a basis for their identity” (Hollersen/Gutsch 2009: 67).
A.: “When I am in Thuringia [a new federal state], the kids down there don’t say 
“I’m a Thuringian.” They say: I’m an easterner. There’s this feeling that we are 
something special” (ibid.).
In addition, these individuals emphasize the fact that the period after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the process of social transformation, is just as im-
portant for the development of an eastern German identity – especially 
to the younger generation – as having experienced the GDR ﬁrst hand. 
In contrast, C., born in 1983, tells that she feels “much more European 
than German or even eastern German” (Kastner 2011). Furthermore, she 
emphasizes her distinctive interest in traveling and considers herself cos-
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mopolitan and open-minded. She notes that until graduating from high 
school she lived in a small suburban village. She then moved to the nearby 
city to study social work, “but not necessarily in order to stay in the east; 
it was simply the most convenient place” (ibid.). After that, she went to 
South Africa for six months and then moved to a large city in western 
Germany. She says that she travels a lot and does not feel that the world 
ends at the eastern German or European borders (Cf. ibid.). 
Despite the collective experiences they described, the interviewees 
have diﬀerent concepts of life and personal values as well. Reﬂecting on 
what they consider to be the “right way” to provide for themselves in the 
future, D. and C. remark: 
D.: “I have some stocks.” 
C.: “Investments don’t interest me, and I don’t want to own real estate” (Hollers-
en/Gutsch 2009: 66).
As we can see, members of the “Third East German Generation” describe 
distinctive identity-establishing cultural practices, but they are not all 
alike. They reﬂect also on observed transformations and diﬀerences in the 
mentality of young East Germans born after 1989. 
C.: “It will interesting to see how the next generation turns out, those who were one 
or two during unification… there were many young eastern Germans… They talked 
about how their résumés define their lives… I had the impression that they’ve com-
pletely internalized the mechanisms that are necessary for success.”
A.: “I notice that too… The haste and ambition they have to improve their résumés. 
Everything has to fit just right” (ibid.: 66).
However, in drawing comparisons to young west Germans, the interview-
ees explain these changes as a product of ﬁnancial insecurity.
C.: “People in the west at my age or even younger have a dif ferent level of security. 
They get money, even the 32-year-olds, even if they don’t finish college right away, 
sometimes quite a lot of money. In the east, you know that you have to do every-
thing on your own. There’s no safety net” (ibid.: 67).
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CONCLUSION
Eastern German identity has been discussed as a product of a reaction 
against negative ascription and socio-cultural practices. The construction 
of an eastern German identity, I suggest, should be seen as a complex 
interaction between both. The ascriptions made by the media are an ex-
ternally drawn distinction. And although many heterogeneous practices 
among individual easterners and westerners can be observed, many social 
practices are unique to young easterners and these create a line of cultural 
distinction from the inside. Both mechanisms are a substantial part of the 
construction and reproduction of an eastern German identity. 
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Views on the History of  
Polish-German Border Regions

Anthropology of Borders and Frontiers 
The Case of the Polish-German Borderland (1945-1980)
Agata Ładykowska and Paweł Ładykowski
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we illustrate social processes, practices, and views that his-
torically preceded the most recent formation of Polish-German border-
land. With the enlargement of the European Union, scholarly attention 
has turned to new conﬁgurations of political community and economic 
cooperation at and across its borders. The claim has been made that there 
is an increasing need to reconceptualize the meanings and functions of 
state and national borders and frontiers (e.g. Wilson/Donnan 2005). How-
ever, in so doing, we believe that an exploration of the history of those 
regions that experience political reconﬁgurations is essential as well, as 
it helps clarify the ambiguous relationship between the concepts of “fron-
tiers” and “borders” as analytical categories. At the end of World War II, 
the new international arrangement meant that the former East Prussian 
regions of Silesia, Lubuskie, Pomerania, Warmia and Masuria were sub-
sumed under the Polish state. This entailed the forced expulsion of the 
large populations of Germans living in those areas. The territory became 
inhabited by Polish settlers arriving in waves that included mainly those 
who had been living in the so-called eastern borderland of the Second 
Republic of Poland, which was lost by Poland as a result of the Yalta agree-
ment. In this paper, we demonstrate how the politically demarcated bor-
derline, which formally separated Poland and the German Democratic 
Republic after 1945 quite sharply, was in fact relatively porous. It was grad-
ually appropriated by incoming inhabitants from the eastern border re-
gion, who, under special state regulations that changed over time, worked 
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out the conditions and, indeed, even the area of their settlement, and thus 
negotiated the border “from below.” We provide the account of how those 
Poles who were forced westward experienced their migration and later 
narrated those experiences, and how the emigration experience shaped 
emigrants’ perception of geography as expressed in their attitudes about 
their new places of residence. Also, we demonstrate how in the three pe-
riods between the end of World War II and 1947, the 1960s, and between 
the 1st of January, 1972 and the 20th of October, 1980 the borderline was in 
fact permeable and created a situation conducive to intercultural contact 
beyond state control .
THE CURRENT SE T TING:  
THE POLISH-GERMAN BORDERL AND NE AR SZCZECIN
In what follows, this contribution inquires into the history of a new “bor-
derland” that emerged near Szczecin. This area that is not an historical 
“border region.”1 After Poland joined the EU in 2004, and especially after 
Poland’s ratiﬁcation of the Schengen Treaty in December 2007, there has 
been greater economic, social, and cultural interaction involving move-
ments of goods and jobs and permanent cross-border resettlement. The 
opening of the German labor market for Poles in April, 2011 and the de-
pressed condition of the real estate market on the German side of the 
border have created new incentives for Polish settlement in Germany, and, 
consequently, for the ethnic recomposition of the borderland region. In 
particular, three east German border counties – Uecker-Randow2, Ostvor-
pommern, and Uckermark – have become an attractive destination for 
1 | This section is based on Pawel Ładykowski’s project. The fieldwork was con-
ducted jointly by Paweł Ładykowski (Polish Academy of Science), and Łukasz Kac-
zmarek (Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the University of 
Szczecin) within the project entitled “The Resurgence of the German-Polish Bor-
derland,” launched in 2008. Some of the conclusions included here are also de-
scribed in Ładykowski (2011).
2 | Recently, in September 2011, due to administrative reforms, the county was 
merged into the Vorpommern-Greifswald district and ceased to exist as an inde-
pendent administrative unit.
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Poles looking for new housing.3 This mobility has been accompanied by 
the emergence of a trans-border market characterized by the principles 
of border economies: for unemployed Germans, it has become less com-
plicated and demanding to search for legal jobs in Poland in construc-
tion, services, local branches of EU institutions. And for the better-oﬀ in 
Germany, Poland oﬀers specialized services at a relatively low price, e.g. 
private medical care (in vitro fertilization, dental surgery etc.). Imbalances 
in price and perceived quality have stimulated economic and cultural ex-
change and new developments on the real estate market, in education, in 
medical care, in services, and in many other areas.4
Since 2004 at least, the act of crossing the Polish-German border has 
been increasingly perceived as a “private” matter, not very diﬀerent from 
crossing an internal administrative border (Wedel 2009). Although the 
3 | In the year 2003, 2,140 Poles were legally registered residents of the fed-
eral state (Bundesland) of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. By 2007, there number had 
grown to 3,637 and to 4,500 in 2011 (Segeš Frelak and Kriszan 2012: 38). The 
Uecker-Randow district has the highest population of Poles, with 1,258 registered 
Polish citizens in 2010 (ibid.). In 2009, 83 % of the migrant Polish population lived 
in the two towns of this district, namely Löknitz and Penkun. In Löknitz 10 % of the 
population (242 persons in 2008) is of Polish origin (Barthel 2010). The trend 
these numbers show is significant when seen against the backdrop of popula-
tion decline in eastern Germany. For example, the district of Uecker-Randow had 
96,043 inhabitants in 1990; 85,086 in 2000, 77,152 in 2005, and 72,137 in 
2010 (Statistisches Amt Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 2010; Segeš Frelak/Kriszan 
2012: 37). In 2009, Poles formed 12-17 percent of the local population in the 
settlements of Grambow, Ramin, and Nadrensee. The latter statistical data were 
accessed in 2009 from the website of the district authorities, www.lkuer.de, be-
fore the district was merged into the Vorpommern-Greifswald district. The site is 
currently unavailable. Interestingly, the website of the Uckermark district (www.
uckermark.de) lacks current statistical data that feature the inhabitants nation-
ality, which might be interpreted as an expression of the new policy adopted in 
response to NPD activity in the region (personal communication with one of the 
commune’s officers).
4 | This fact has attracted the attention of the regional authorities and led them 
to develop high levels of cross-border cooperation. For instance, there are consid-
erable attempts to establish political institutions of supra-local importance, such 
as the Polnisch-Deutsche Geselllschaft “Pomeraniak e. V.”.
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border is still visible in political space, it is gradually losing relevance for 
everyday life.5 The greater Szczecin area has a strong potential to become 
a ﬁxed transnational space where political, cultural and social identities 
not only coexist but also fuse. With these facts in mind, in this contribu-
tion we inquire into the cultural mechanisms driving the development of 
a borderland. In so doing, we explore the historical particularities of the 
Polish-German border region after its creation in 1945.
The following section summarizes the social-cultural anthropology 
discussion on borders and frontiers as background knowledge for ap-
proaching narratives and practices of social, political, economic, and cul-
tural interaction. 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF BORDERS AND FRONTIERS
The anthropology of borders typically entails the study of the cultural, ter-
ritorial, and social dimensions of those borders. Boundaries are symbols 
through which localities, states, and nations deﬁne themselves: they de-
lineate at once territorial limits and socio-cultural spaces (Berdahl 1999: 
3). As borderlines that simultaneously separate and join diﬀerent entities, 
borders are ambivalent, as discussed in the classic works by Arnold van 
Gennep (1909), Victor Turner (1967; 1969), or Mary Douglas (1966). By 
the same token, borderlands as the spaces-in-between characterized by a 
cultural overlap are liminal spaces. They are simultaneously dangerous 
sites and sites of creative cultural production open to cultural play and 
experimentation as well as domination and control (Donnan 2001: 1290). 
The relevant research on borders in anthropological literature concen-
trates on two complementary trends and see borders both as social and 
symbolic and as territorial and political. The ﬁrst trend in anthropological 
theory owes much to Frederik Barth (1992 [1969]), who draws attention 
to social boundaries between ethnic groups. He points out that cultur-
al diﬀerences persist despite inter-ethnic contact and that social relations 
are organized and maintained across such boundaries. The symbolic con-
struction of community and cultural boundaries is stressed in works of 
5 | The border is obviously marked by the linguistic barrier, but these too are tend-
ing to fade as free language courses are offered. Moreover, courses in the respec-
tive neighbor’s language are part of school curricula in both Germany and Poland.
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Anthony Cohen (1985; 1986). In his view, boundaries are symbolic entities 
constructed by people in their interactions with others, from whom they 
wish symbolically to distinguish themselves. By marking out one’s social 
identity, boundaries symbolically demarcate one’s sense of similarity and 
diﬀerence.
The second line of inquiry presents borders as territorial and political 
entities and implies a fruitful conceptual link between borders, state, and 
society. State borders mark the limits of sovereignty and of state control 
over citizens and subjects. Anthropological border studies were pioneered 
at the University of Manchester in the 1960s. The “school” that emerged 
in Manchester produced several works dealing with borders, each inﬂu-
enced by Max Gluckman who was Departmental Chair at that time (Don-
nan 2001: 1291). However, they did not take up the issue of national state 
borders, and the value of localized studies for understanding how cultural 
landscapes are superimposed across social and political divides was not 
recognized until 1974, when The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in 
an Alpine Valley by John W. Cole and Eric R. Wolf appeared. This became 
the cornerstone work for subsequent anthropological research on national 
and international borders. Cole and Wolf found it interesting that in South 
Tyrol, the cultural frontier continued to manifest itself as important in 
everyday life long after the politically deﬁned state borders had shifted. 
In this focus, they shared Barth’s view of social boundaries. The major 
contribution of this study, however, was in demonstrating the usefulness 
of including both local and supra-local inﬂuences in research on this pro-
cess. The work has informed many subsequent border studies in the way 
it focused on how social relations, deﬁned in part by the state, transcend 
the territorial limits of the state and transform the structure of the state at 
home and its relations with its neighbors (Donnan 2001: 1292).
A more recent approach to national borders focuses on the states of the 
European Union and asks question of how culture inhibits and enhances 
cross-border cooperation in the context of various state and supranation-
al initiatives undertaken in order to transform the economic, political, 
and social structures of people’s everyday lives (for an overview see Wil-
son and Donnan 2005). Such an approach is best suited for the study of 
state-society relations. Instead of being ﬁxed and static, state-society rela-
tions are currently seen as dynamic, processual, and permeable (Hann/
Dunn 1996). What happens along the border can support or undermine 
national government policies, and borders are good locations for studying 
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the features of state-society relations in general (Wilson/Donnan 2005). 
The enlargement of the European Union is bringing about fundamental 
changes in the nature of European states and of their relationships with 
each other. These recent changes call for ﬁeld studies of the current bor-
ders and borderlands designed so as to contribute to the advancement of 
anthropological theory.
The changes discussed above are very relevant to our present case. 
However, we argue that focusing only on current developments would 
block the opportunity to place the emerging Polish-German borderland 
within a broader historical perspective that would enable us to better 
grasp cultural patterns and meanings that are framing current events. 
The social eﬀects of the recent dismantling of the border regime sepa-
rating Poland and Germany must be seen in relation to the eﬀects of the 
border’s construction: forced expulsions of previous German inhabitants 
of the lands merged into Poland resulting in incoming waves of Polish set-
tlers who inhabited an area emptied of people. In our further analysis, we 
employ the theoretical distinction between the notions of a “border” and 
“frontier.” In order to make this distinction visible both on the theoretical 
and ethnographic level, it is important to situate the concepts within the 
frame of existing anthropological analysis. 
For example, social anthropologist Michał Buchowski reﬂects (in Pol-
ish) on the meanings of terms employed in English such as: 
[…] limit, border, boundary, frontier. Typically boundary should be a line, while 
the border [is] the zone around this line […]. We may fur ther distinguish between 
a border line, a border, and a borderland. The first category, border line (linia 
graniczna), would be the equivalent of […] boundary, and as such would be a line 
designated in space that is in fact invisible but is made tangible by natural signs 
and symbols that give it a political significance. The notion of border (granica) 
would indicate the zone around the boundary. It spreads over the area in which 
the presence of a demarcation line has a direct impact on daily economic, so-
cial, and cultural relations of the residents living in the border areas. Borderland 
(pogranicze) would mean an area that is wider than border area, and would in-
clude the long-term phenomena characteristic for such zones, as for instance bi-
lingualism, intermingling, or interpenetration of cultures (in this case understood 
as ethnic or national cultures), or assimilation of customs (Buchowski 2004: 9).
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Indeed, there is a variety of typologies of what we call frontiers and bor-
ders.6 These chieﬂy articulate a relationship between state and local com-
munity. For example, Anthony Giddens (1987: 49) distinguishes between 
“frontiers” and “borders” borrowing from political geography, where the 
term “frontier” “means either a speciﬁc type of division between two or 
more states, or a division between settled and uninhabited areas of a sin-
gle state.” “Frontier” in his analysis refers to an area on the peripheral 
regions of a state in which the political authority of the centre is diﬀuse 
or thinly spread. Frontiers exist where a state is expanding outwards into 
territory previously either having no inhabitants or populated by tribal 
communities. Also, frontiers describe areas within one state inhabited 
sparsely, for example due to “the general inhospitality of the terrain” (Ibid: 
50)). A “border,” on the other hand, would be a known and geographically 
drawn line separating and joining two or more states. Borders are clearly 
delineated limits of a state’s sovereignty, although their nature can be ﬂu-
id as they are located on the edges of the modern state, often the sea (cf. 
Roszko 2011). Borders, in contrast to frontiers, make the presence of the 
state clearly manifest through military posts, border guards, and customs 
checkpoints.
The distinction articulated above by Giddens has not always been ob-
vious. For example, Wendl and Rösler (1999: 3) provide insights into the 
genesis of these concepts by tracing etymologies of the notions of “border” 
and “frontier”:
Both terms “frontier” and “border” are respectively of Latin and Frankish ances-
try and convey a dif ferent range of implicit meanings. Both found their way into 
English through Middle French, and both are finally rooted in the perceptual ex-
periences of the human body […]. The frontier (Latin frons or forehead) is always 
“in front of” the subject. It denotes a flat, horizontal view from an absolute, an-
thropocentric body-based standpoint […]. The border, on the other hand, derives 
from the Frankish “bord,” literally the two wooden sides of a ship, or the fringes of 
textiles (German “borte, French “bordure”). It denotes a bird’s-eye view, with the 
observer not bodily involved, but rather looking down at the outline of objects on 
the ground. In today’s English, to some extent, both terms are used interchange-
6 | For a detailed overview see Wendl and Rösler 1999; for the classical study of 
frontier society see Frederick Jackson Turner (1994 [1893]), and for a compara-
tive frontier history see Lamar and Thompson (1981).
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ably […]. It seems however, that the notion of “frontiers” is more elaborated, pop-
ularly as well as scientifically, in the American than in the British imagination. The 
reason for this […] comes from the American expansionist experience of moving 
west. While in British English the term “frontier” also refers to remote backwoods 
regions […] that dif fer significantly from areas of metropolitan refinement, it is 
used in American-English speech and thought without these negative attribu-
tions. Here, it rather has come to mean pioneerism, dynamism and advancement.
 
This semantic shift appears for the ﬁrst time in the classical study of fron-
tier society by Frederick Jackson Turner (1994 [1893]). The image used in 
his study was that of an anonymous force that swept like a slow tidal wave 
from east to west across North America, bringing with it smaller waves. 
First pioneers then settler communities (cf. Wendl/Rösler 1999: 3-4). In 
African historiography, “frontier” came to be used for description of Eu-
ropean penetration into southern Africa. A reﬁned deﬁnition of Thomp-
son and Lamar (1981:7, quoted in Wendl/Rösler 1999: 4-5), states that a 
“frontier” is a “zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct 
societies,” and this is the way it has been used often in the description of 
hybrid cultures in postcolonial studies.7 
In our analysis, we wish to explore the problematic representation of 
space embodied in the Turnerian image of the moving frontier and in 
the Giddensian sense of a remote, uninhabited peripherality into which 
a state is expanding. The new territories joined to Poland were emptied 
of people but not of buildings, factories and infrastructure. This made 
the new links forged between place and identity especially problematic 
(cf. Gupta/Ferguson 1992). The new settlers slowly appropriated the new 
territories: the advancing frontier was reterritorializing the emptied land. 
In the next sections we demonstrate the impact this had on their percep-
7 | This reductionist view of “frontiers” as “colonial intrusions” was challenged 
and fur ther dif ferentiated by Igor Kopytoff (1987). His cyclical model encompass-
es “external” frontiers that arise when metropolitan cultures expand and extend 
political hegemony (like colonial tidal waves), and “internal” frontiers found in the 
less populated fringes between two or more organized societies, where intruding 
settlers create new societies on their own; smaller groups split-off from their cit-
ies move into the interstitial zones where they continue to intermingle with other 
similar groups in an institutional vacuum until they grow to form a new city. This 
process may continue in a number of cycles (Wendl/Rösler 1999: 5).
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tion of the new space and on the social process of constructing it as “their 
place.” Also, we investigate the modalities of cultural interpenetration 
over time of the two previously expulsed communities that inhabited the 
lands divided by the border.
AF TER THE WAR: MOVING INTO THE “WILD WEST”
The Potsdam Conference of 1945 gave the Polish state control of Silesia, 
Lubusie, Pomerania, Warmia, and Masuria. The meridional line of two 
rivers, Lusatian Neisse and the Oder deﬁned the new western Polish bor-
derline. The decision to shift the Polish-German border decided the fate of 
millions of Poles and Germans who were forced to resettle from the east to 
the west. The territories previously inhabited by over 8 million Germans 
became inhabited by 4 million Poles (Eberhardt 2010).8 Most Polish emi-
8 | The drama of forced expulsions is a sensitive issue in Polish-German relation-
ships: there is an enormous literature tackling the topic from the perspective of 
political history. We do not wish to engage in this discussion. Our aim is to high-
light the scale of relocations and the problem that a region that was built for about 
8 million people was emptied and inhabited by a new population of approximately 
half that size. According to the census carried out in 1939, the territories that lat-
er became part of Poland under the Potsdam agreements had been inhabited by 
8,885,400 German citizens at that time (Eberhardt 2010:127). This number gives 
a sense of how densely this region was inhabited under normal conditions. Clearly, 
the number of people living in these areas was constantly changing during the final 
months of the war. Some approximations go as high as 12,339,400 Germans liv-
ing in 1944 (Nitschke 2000: 232-233, quoted in Eberhardt 2010: 128). All these 
numbers should be treated with caution (they use dif ferent criteria to determine 
ethnicity, for example), however, they are indicative of the scale of relocations. 
Estimates of the number of Germans who left forcibly or willingly from 1944 to 
1950 varies between between 8 and 11 million ((Eberhardt 2010: 187, 191), as 
noted in the Polish and the German sources respectively. In the three year period 
between 1945 and 1948, a total exchange of population occurred in the lands 
adjoined to Poland (Ibid.: 209). Cautious estimates are that in 1945-47 about 4 
million people settled and star ted a new life (Ibid.: 208). The waves of newcom-
ers in 1948-9 were significantly smaller, and from 1950 onward the process of 
stabilization star ted. The census carried out in 1950 confirmed that the lands 
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grants were from the so-called eastern borderland of the Second Republic 
(kresy wschodnie). Those Germans living to the east of the newly demar-
cated border were similarly forced to move west. The newly acquired ter-
ritories in the west, the Polish “Western Lands” (Ziemie Zachodnie), were 
called in Polish propaganda the “Recovered Territories” (Ziemie Odzys-
kane), which alluded to the historical presence of the ﬁrst Polish state in 
the reign of the Piast dynasty in the 10th century. This rhetorical formula 
was meant to legitimize both the presence of the Polish state in formerly 
German territories after the war and the forced resettlements. 
Constant migration, a lack of permanence, the lack of stable state con-
trol or provision of basic services, a widespread sense of insecurity expe-
rienced by newcomers – including the uncertainty about the eventuality 
of another global conﬂict – all this contributed to the settlers’ permanent 
sense of temporariness (cf. Polski 2005: 20). Their migrating was a pro-
cess requiring many years and became such a special feature of their 
lifestyle that it strongly determined their perception of space, i.e. their 
attitude toward their new place of residence. Polish immigrants’ diaries 
and oﬃcial archival government documentation of the period clearly show 
that the Western Territories were perceived as a dangerous area, subjected 
to colonization by people uncertain of their future. They considered their 
new residences in the former German villages, towns, and cities only as 
the one stop on an endless journey. Often, the situation forced them to 
share a house or an apartment with Germans who had not yet managed to 
repatriate to Germany.9 All these experiences during the ﬁrst several years 
discussed were populated by 5.6 million people or about 3 million fewer than in 
1939 (Ibid.: 213). The number rose to 7.8 million in 1960 and to 10 million in 2010 
(ibid.). These figures, of course, include those born after the 1950s.
9 | Regarding the situation in 1945, the Report on the Western Lands from 15.05. 
to 15.06.1945 (the AAN, the Government Delegate to the RP, 202/III/36, k. 151-
210, Part E – k. 205-210) stated that in the belt between the West and the Silesia 
voivodeship the population consisted of 30 % Poles and 70 % Germans, in the 
belt from the Baltic to the Poznań voivodeship the population consisted of 20 % of 
Poles and 80 % Germans and in the Silesian belt the population consisted of 15 % 
Poles and 85 % Germans. In various cities on the basis of rough data : in Szczecin 
40,000 Germans and 1,500 Poles; in Gorzów (Landsberg) 20,000 Germans and 
3,000 Poles; in Skwierzyn (Schwerin) 2,000 Germans and 1,500 Poles; in Leg-
nica, 10,000 Germans and 2,000 Poles; in Wrocław 25,000 Germans and 1,800 
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after the war strongly inﬂuenced the attitudes of newly settled residents. A 
temporary state was the ordinary state of life, and this left a strong imprint 
on the Polish settlers and the ﬁrst generations born in the lands adjoined 
to Poland. 
This constant movement was accompanied by the lack of clear idea of 
the exact location of the border delineating the new acquisitions. This was 
well captured by two journalists from Cracow, Maciej Malicki and Tadeusz 
Żychiewicz, who went on a tour of the Western Lands in 1957. It resulted 
in three articles written in a form of a diary published by the newspaper 
Tygodnik Powszechny. Malicki and Żychiewicz’s (1957) described their dis-
orientation regarding the area they were required to portray, the Western 
Territories. Asked to write material from the “Zgorzelec – Szczecin line” 
that would provide an account on the situation “as close to the border as 
possible” they wrote: 
Our assumption is that we need a material from the “Zgorzelec – Szczecin line, as 
near the border as possible,” but the assumption is also that this area will pro-
vide us with conclusions that can be generalized to the whole Western Territories. 
Therefore, we cannot travel [from Cracow] to Zgorzelec with our eyes closed. From 
the west it is clear, the state border demarcates the boundary. But from the east? 
For instance, today no one would think of classifying Gliwice, Bytom, or Zabrze as 
part of the Western Lands. Similarly, for an average Pole, Wrocław and Szczecin 
represent some kind of special enclave, of “equal importance and rank” to the 
other voivodeship cities. However Opole, Jelenia Góra, Koszalin are […] somewhat 
dif ferent. There is one idea of the Western Lands adjacent to our former Polish 
border and another idea among those situated by the Oder River (ibid.). 
Since it was not clear for the Cracovian intellectuals where the Western 
Territories begin, it would not have been clear for the average Polish citi-
zen either. This certain lack of familiarity with the new territorial acquisi-
tions and toponymy in the social imagination, observed twelve years after 
the war, went on to last for decades. The process of gradual integration of 
all the lands into a coherent body became part of the experience of several 
generations of settlers. The Western Lands area was perceived as quite 
diﬀerent than the rest of the Polish state. The recollections of the settlers 
Poles; in Świebodzin 2,000 Germans and 800 Poles; in Gryfino 1,500 Germans 
and 400 Poles; in Zagórze 1,800 Germans and 600 Poles (Pietrowicz 2005: 125). 
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contain accounts of a shocking confrontation with completely diﬀerent 
aesthetics, the cities’ skylines, the churches, completely diﬀerent infra-
structure, as well as a diﬀerent principle of administrative jurisdiction. 
The newcomers noted the ubiquitous ex-German factories and ex-Ger-
man cemeteries, contributing to the overwhelming feeling of “not being 
at home” (see e.g. Polski 2005: 21). 
The inhabitants of the Western Territories were in constant motion as 
millions of people continuously sought for new places to settle. A sense 
of uprootedness and a devastation of the goods entrusted to these indi-
viduals were the consequence; many made a living by “looting.” Polish 
administrators could not fully control these phenomena, and in popular 
diction the term “Regained Land” quickly gave way to “The Wild West.” 
This expression denoted both individual freedom and impunity to law as 
experienced there. Sparsely populated territories in the west suﬀered from 
demographic collapse, which in turn prevented the normal inclusion in 
the economic system of the country unifying after the turmoil of war. 
The proverbial “wild(er)ness” reﬂected the nature of the new relationship 
between identity and place, as well as the emotions evoked among people 
migrating there. “The Wild West” was a place where “civilization,” un-
derstood as government and the rule of law, was established only against 
the resistance of the inhabitants. The main factors that hindered the es-
tablishment of an orderly government in the area directly after 1945 were 
constant population movement, which involved also movement ﬁrst to 
the Western Territories and then to central Poland; “looting” (szaber); the 
large numbers of Germans still residing in the area; and the way the new 
Polish-German border was drawn, which later would have signiﬁcant re-
percussions.
THE ODER AND NEISSE BORDER LINE IN 1945-1949:  
A MAT TER OF NEGOTIATION 
The radically diﬀerent expectations of each nation made the process of 
forming a new Polish-German border diﬃcult and caused many misun-
derstandings. While the German side still hoped that the unfavourable 
loss of the lands East of the Oder River and Lusatian Neisse would be 
reversed (Kochanowski 2008: 31f.), the Poles demanded that the line be 
moved even farther to the West (Ibid.: 35), arguing that not only Szczecin 
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but also the island of Rügen are necessary for national defence purposes 
(Ibid.: 34). Even after the Potsdam conference ended, the Polish Foreign 
Ministry tried to negotiate a new demarcation of the border line so that the 
Szczecin Lagoon as a whole would came into Polish possession, demand-
ing that the whole of the Oder River “must be in the hands of one state, 
Poland, with all three delta beds” (Ibid.: 36). Poland also endeavoured to 
articulate its expectations to global public opinion in the directives re-
ceived by Polish delegation at the mid-November 1946 session of the UN 
in New York; Poland argued that “[n]ot leaving the Oder River in one hand 
[…] will spark constant disputes and border conﬂicts in Europe” (Ibid.: 38). 
It was contended that an eﬀective military defence of the Oder–Neisse line 
could be only provided by the expansion of Polish territory beyond the area 
of Świnoujscie, Szczecin, Frankfurt, Görlitz, and Gubin. Poland argued 
that such an attempt would contribute to the re-uniﬁcation of the divided 
cities, this time within the Republic of Poland. Pragmatic and economic 
arguments were presented: industry and the most important components 
of urban infrastructure remained on the German side under the Potsdam 
agreement, which should be rectiﬁed (Ibid.: 38f.). The Polish political goal 
of uniting both sides of the Oder remained a sensitive issue in relations 
with the USSR and East Germany long thereafter.
However, despite Polish demands, the border was ﬁnally set at the Lu-
satian Neisse and Oder.10 Ironically, despite the fact that the border was set 
on waterways and thus sharply divided the two nations, it became –con-
trary to the probable intentions of its creators – a space of German-Polish 
relations. Polish concerns that the suburbs of cities remaining in Poland 
on the east bank of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse (like Guben, Frankfurt, 
Görlitz) would be cut oﬀ from necessary infrastructure – proved to be 
warranted. These less urbanized and poorer eastern parts of Polish cit-
ies almost lost their practical viability almost altogether. To remedy this 
problem, people began spontaneously establishing relationships with res-
idents on the other side of the river. The interest turned out to be mutual, 
as part of the urban infrastructure essential for city functions on the Ger-
man side was in fact located in Poland.
10 | Excluding the area of Szczecin, Szczecin Lagoon, and the Western outskir ts 
of Świnoujscie on the Usedom island.
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The atmosphere of suspense and uncertainty accompanied the people 
on both sides of the border river.11 Despite devastation, unemployment, 
housing shortages, and a terrible supply situation, a signiﬁcant proportion 
of expatriated persons wished to remain as close as possible to the new 
border, believing – as reported in February 1946 from Guben – that “one 
ﬁne day they will cross the Neisse again” (Ibid.: 31). By the end of 1947, 
however, German expatriates had gradually begun to lose hope for return. 
In Guben, in January 1948, rumours spread that the Poles would take over 
the railway station; this caused many German families to leave the border 
region (Ibid.: 34). 
Overcrowding and unemployment on the German side of the river was 
as permanent as underpopulation and chronic lack of manpower on the 
Polish side.12 Running the industries located on the eastern side of the 
Oder required qualiﬁed and skilled workers able to competently manage 
and operate the infrastructure. Power plants, sewage treatment plants, 
drinking water supply pumps, and other equipment similarly required 
the skills of specialists. These were possessed only among the German 
11 | The expatriates were considered a serious problem for the Soviet Occupation 
Zone (SBZ) and later the German Democratic Republic. In the years 1949-1950 in 
the SBZ/GDR area there were about 4.5 million expellees while in the much larger 
Western Germany there were just under 8 million. The concept of “expellees” also 
implied that these people were had been wronged and might hope to return to 
their homes. Thus, in official diction, expellees were deliberately renamed the 
“displaced” and later also “new citizens” (Neubürger), to shatter any hope for a 
return to the former eastern territories of Germany. This, however, did not resolve 
the problem of integrating this group in their new places of residence. The final 
decision to resettle exiles in the young GDR was cemented by actions like signing 
the border treaty in Görlitz in 1950, the land reform granting new property to many 
expellees, and the pacification of the uprising of 17 June 1953, during which the 
issue of revision of the eastern border of Germany also had been raised (Urban 
2009: 43). 
12 | As already mentioned, the population of borderland districts on the Polish 
side for many years constituted only a fraction of what it had been, and this had 
a direct impact on infrastructure maintenance in the cities. For example, “about 
3,500 people lived in Gubin in December 1945, 4,940 in March 1948, and just 
over 5,000 in August 1949 (one fif th of the city’s capacity)” (Kochanowski 2008: 
42-3). 
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population, either those still living in Poland or commuters from the other 
side of the border.13 The restoration of normal life in the cities across the 
river became the main concern of the people, all the more that the border 
turned out to be penetrable. Although it was accoutred with signs of the 
new Polish authority, in itself it did not present an impassable barrier. It 
could be crossed without major problems. Germans seeking any kind of 
job beneﬁted from this fact.14 The consequence of overcrowding on the 
German side was a rapid growth of unemployment and the gradual im-
poverishment of the already aﬄicted German refugees, even raising the 
spectre of starvation. The main factor that contributed to the exchange of 
jobs and manpower, then, was asymmetry in the demographic situation, 
infrastructure, and food supply. The latter was signiﬁcantly better on the 
Polish side. Shortage of workers on the Polish side and the relatively stable 
food supply were pulling factors for Germans. Many Germans, however, 
were still migrating to the west, which caused the Polish authorities to un-
dertake an initial attempt of issuing administrative regulations in order to 
prevent professionals needed to maintain industry from leaving.15 
Historical materials conﬁrm that this was an important moment that 
initiated a new type of cooperation within border areas based on constant 
motion. The border had to be crossed on a daily basis, sometimes a few 
times a day so that both communities could function normally. The itiner-
ant model of functioning in close proximity to the border necessitated the 
establishment of numerous inter-ethnic interactions. It should not be for-
gotten that this border line was diﬀerent from what had been known and 
represented previously in the imagery of the common Polish-German her-
itage; the post-war reality was radically diﬀerent. The entire situation was 
13 | In early June 1945, it was officially proposed that qualified German workers 
settle in Zgorzelec (Kochanowski 2008f.).
14 | For example, as late as 1947, “half of the total number of over 1,000 of min-
ers in the coal mine Turow would come from Germany every day” (Kochanowski 
2008: 43).
15 | Of particular importance here was a decision “to keep or turn back, where it is 
possible, the number of circa 250 German experts necessary for the functioning of 
industrial plants.” The Germans, however, were afraid to dwell on the Polish side, 
which at the beginning of July 1945, forced the Polish authorities of Zgorzelec to 
assist groups of workers on their daily commute over the border bridge to the plant 
(Kochanowski 2008: 42). 
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laden with strong mutual resentment, prejudice, and fear. As it turned 
out, however, this did not constitute a suﬃciently strong barrier to social-
ization. On both sides, the communities were formed by exiles. The Polish 
exiles understand Germans who had to leave, as they too had been forced 
to leave and had nowhere else to go (Ibid.: 14). The period between 1945-49 
is the ﬁrst moment of establishing Polish-German cross-border relation-
ships, both formal and informal, even though they were maintained out 
of convenience, not out of love.
In 1949 the German Democratic Republic was founded and encom-
passed the former Soviet Occupation Zone. The signing of border treaty 
with the GDR resulted the “dismantling” of this spontaneous borderland.
1950-1972: “BRIDGES OF FRIENDSHIP” AND THE 
CLOSING OF THE BORDER
From the 1950s the border was closed and the border rivers became natu-
ral barriers, constituting a “border wall” in the collective imagination. On 
the occasion of the state or party celebrations the contact was “artiﬁcially” 
restored. Because there was no agreement on local cross-border traﬃc, 
delegations of the local party, youth, or union organizations were forced to 
meet in the middle of the border bridges (Kochanowski 2008: 48). 
The absence of the circulation and exchange of goods and services, as 
in the years 1945-1948/50, led to the collapse of the socio-economic infra-
structure on the Polish side of the border. The image of overwhelming 
emptiness of these lands, contrasting with the problems of overcrowding 
in the central parts of the country was thoroughly documented16 in the 
newspaper Tygodnik Powszechny in 1957. The authors, Malicki and Ży-
chiewicz (1957), note that on the German side, the space had been sys-
tematically renewed so as to quickly rebuild or cover up the consequences 
of the war, whereas on the Polish side, there was no desire, no concept, 
and no motivation to take similar action. The post-war space of the Wild 
16 | Here is how the Cracow reporters traversing the Western Lands in 1957 pre-
sented the situation: “Where there is work there is no housing. And where there is 
housing there is no work.” […].We have seen on the way a lot of empty, unoccupied 
houses. And we remember a hopeless crowd in the Cracow employment office” 
(Malicki and Żychiewicz 1957).
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West still remained void. The state of constant instability and uncertainty 
regarding the future accompanied all the Polish newcomers to these lands 
from after the war until the mid-1970s, despite the state propaganda of the 
success of the uniﬁcation of all the authentic “Polish Piast dynasty” lands 
within the People’s Republic of Poland and a friendship with the new 
western neighbour, the GDR. This image was epitomized in the “bridg-
es of friendship” across the border river, mentioned above. However, the 
image of friendship drawn in the oﬃcial discourse was confronted by the 
reality disclosed in Malicki and Żychiewicz’s reports. In their words:
Zgorzelec became famous for practicing Polish-German friendship […].The central 
object in Zgorzelec […] is this famous bridge over the Lusatian Neisse, honored 
so many times with the visits of all sor ts of personages, from prime ministers to 
cyclists of the “Peace Race.” The sight of the bridge completely surprised us. From 
the main street a very short, steep descent to the lef t and […] that’s it. We leave 
the car behind the corner and approach the border. Funny to admit – despite our 
identity cards and full legitimacy, we feel a little uncomfortable. “Taboo-ish” re-
spect for the border zone, for years so carefully instilled, apparently has lef t its 
imprint. A WOP [Border Defence Army] soldier on duty stops us by raising his hand. 
We present him with our letter of identity and ask for permission to walk to the 
other side. When called, the second guard appears, a sergeant. He rigorously ex-
amines our documents, and then moves away to seek information in headquarters 
on the telephone before giving us the answer. We look at the opposite bank of the 
river. We see on the horizon a green city park, a wide panorama along the banks, 
the majestic cathedral dominates the city […].Is the bridge sometimes used for 
unofficial purposes, such as tourism or family visits? No. Is it allowed to take pic-
tures? No, of course, not. The sentinel puts us off with monosyllables to answer 
out questions. The German guard moves away from his end of the bridge and slow-
ly, mechanically approaches us. At one third of the distance he returns, and just 
as slowly he recedes. The middle part of the bridge, here the “no man’s land,” is 
violated by a human foot only on the occasion of the official celebrations. What 
are Polish-German relations today? This question is in front of us, when we look at 
the border (Malicki/Żychiewicz 1957).
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1972-1980: NAVIGATING BE T WEEN POLISH AND E ASTERN 
GERMAN PL ANNED ECONOMIES 
In 1972, local border traﬃc on the basis of an ID card (i.e., visa-free and 
passport-free) was restored for the citizens of both neighboring republics. 
As a result, from 1972 to 1979 over 100 million citizens of the People’s 
Republic of Poland and Eastern Germany engaged in tourist exchange. 
Most trips were undertaken in the border regions and towns of the neigh-
boring country on short-term stays (Osękowski 2009: 148). For the ﬁrst 
time since 1950, former German residents of these lands could meet Pol-
ish settlers and begin to establish a dialogue.17 The possibility of private 
and purely personal relationships was, however, fraught with tensions and 
resentment.18 
17 | As Opiłowska (2009: 167) writes, the opening of the border was a great op-
portunity for the borderland, as it opened up the possibility of direct contacts 
and breaking barriers. Also at this time the residents of the German borderland 
decided to make visits to their places of origin. Striking was that in all those years 
the residents of the Western Lands had apparently not settled them. Opiłowska’s 
German respondents “highlighted that the Poles living in their homes were asking 
them each time with fear in their voice if they wanted to return. The houses were 
mostly unkempt, dir ty, and – what surprised them most – unchanged for many 
years. Germans could find there not only the same furniture, but also cups stand-
ing in the same cupboard or reference books on the same shelves” (ibid.). The 
contacts, after initial uncertainty with regard to the motives of the Germans’ visit, 
became friendly. The German respondents highlight Polish hospitality, of ten ac-
companied with excessive alcohol consumption (ibid.).
18 | In addition to Opiłowska’s account, Osękowski writes that not only Poles 
were afraid of the previous inhabitants. He writes that also the Germans who 
travelled to the villages where their family homes and apartments had been were 
very bitter about what they saw. During these so-called sentimental journeys, 
they “visited the cemeteries where they buried their loved ones. What they saw, 
in most of them caused sorrow and bitterness. Their former homes were generally 
unkempt and largely devastated, and the cemeteries overgrown with bushes and 
weeds. This situation negatively affected the relationship between the Poles and 
Germans, and fostered new prejudices. During the mid-70s, the Polish authorities 
had decided to liquidate German cemeteries, which caused even greater resent-
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The tourist border traﬃc of Germans engaging in what was referred 
to as “sentimental journeys” and Poles desiring to see the neighboring 
country very quickly turned into a project of purely economic nature, re-
sponding to demands created by speciﬁc shortages in local markets. The 
situation began to resemble that of the immediate post-war years: niche 
markets in the supply of goods and services were identiﬁed and result-
ed in a growing grassroots cross-border import and export. The socialist 
state obviously kept control over the systemic regulation of employment 
but failed to control the local cross-border trade and movement of goods. 
While travelling, the people were able to see and estimate the scale of the 
existing imbalances in the supply of goods. Through purchases people 
were complementing the deﬁciencies in the domestic market, but in so 
doing they were also introducing the new goods onto the market. The state 
did not have any control over the distribution and price of these goods. 
Since in the planned economy system, the quantity of goods in the market 
is supposedly shaped not by demand but rather by the calculation of tech-
nocrats, this meant that “tourist traﬃc” was clearly damaging neighbor-
ing markets. “Tourist traﬃc” exposed the failure of the socialist planned 
economy and showed the true extent of the consumption needs of the two 
neighboring communities.19 This “shopping tourism” became then a kind 
of a manifestation of the market characterized by a relatively free play of 
supply and demand. The market mechanisms developed “spontaneously, 
and the price diﬀerence between the two outlets (the famous przebitka, 
an extra proﬁt from selling the goods) was one of the main motives for 
crossing the border” (Mazurek 2010: 108-9). 
The ﬁrst and main beneﬁciaries of these new developments became 
the communities located closest to the border areas. This contributed to 
an increase in the attractiveness of the border and borderland towns and 
villages. There was an inﬂux of highly qualiﬁed workers. Cultural life, the 
economy, housing, and above all tourism ﬂourished (Osękowski 2009: 
148f.). As Mazurek (2010: 109) concludes, the border regions witnessed 
not only an increase in exchange of goods; it saw also an interpenetration 
of consumption models.
ment among the outraged former citizens of the so-called recovered territories” 
(Osękowski 2009: 150). 
19 | It is worth noting that in the years 1972-1974 about 900 business units star t-
ed collaborating in the borderland (Osękowski 2009: 156).
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Another corollary of these practices was a conﬂict of values, which 
manifested itself on several levels. First, a distribution conﬂict emerged, 
i.e. the conﬂict over the value attributed to goods on the markets, and this 
was directly attributed to the fact that the distribution of goods (always 
limited) was strictly regulated by the state. If we assume that borderland 
is not only a category of space but rather also a place of where cultur-
al models and value systems confront each other, the question arises of 
how cross-border distribution conﬂicts were diﬀerent from local distribu-
tion conﬂicts. As Mazurek notices, Poles and Germans derived diﬀerent 
meanings from the experience of shortage. An experience of shortage was 
a consequence of the constant problem of competition for access to goods. 
The spontaneous “free market” emerging across the border, implied in-
tervening in the planned economies of the two regions and deepening 
the shortages. This caused the conﬂict over distribution of limited sup-
plies, which in turn resulted in increase of xenophobic attitudes (Mazurek 
2010: 116-7). The avalanche of Poles penetrating the East German market 
brought an unanticipated eﬀect of increased hostility between the neigh-
bors.
CONCLUSION
We have brieﬂy outlined some of the historical features of the Polish-Ger-
man relations in the new border region. The speciﬁc characteristic of this 
border was that the people inhabiting the area on both sides had no experi-
ence of neighborhood with each other. There was a language barrier, there 
were no mixed marriages, and it seemed that the state project to designate 
a border line in order to separate and repel was successful. Moreover, peo-
ple living on both sides of the border were displaced persons and shared 
the traumatic experience of expulsion from their homeland. We have tried 
to show that, despite these obstacles, neighborly relations were in fact es-
tablished in diﬀerent periods. Not always friendly, however, they contrib-
uted to making the border a space of transition rather than a barrier space. 
We have attempted to show how the territorial expansion of a state 
was performed by settlers forming a speciﬁc, “tidal” frontier. The dynam-
ics of a frontier of the pioneers advancing into the newly acquired lands 
had direct impact on the way the space was imagined. The newcomers 
had lived in constant uncertainty and fear that they might lose their new 
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acquisitions. This, however, did not prevent them from negotiating the 
border and transcending post-war animosities in an attempt to establish a 
stable life in the divided cities in 1945-48. Only after this period, in 1950-
72, when the border became closed completely, did the “frontier” became 
a “border” in Giddens’ sense of the word. It divided two states understood 
as discrete, bounded, and completely sovereign entities. We have shown 
how in the later period, 1972-80, both states’ economies, understood as 
discrete and bounded systems planned by their respective centers, were 
experiencing local intrusions in cross-border trade allowing for the (un-
planned) circulation of goods between the two systems. These interpene-
trations of diﬀerent kinds have created a groundwork conducive to inter-
cultural contact beyond the perimeters of the political control of the state. 
How these developments deﬁned the qualities of the border and how they 
contributed to the current state of aﬀairs is the topic of ongoing research.
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The Dynamics of Unfamiliarity in the 
German-Polish Border Region in 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s 
Bianca Szytniewski
Unfamiliarity indicates the feeling of strangeness that results from not 
having knowledge or experience of someone or something. The term “un-
familiarity,” in a personal and spatial context, is best understood by look-
ing at the interdependent relationship between two counterparts, such 
as the familiar and the unfamiliar, the insider and the outsider, us and 
them, or the acquaintance and the stranger. Something that is familiar 
to one person might be unfamiliar to another. Moreover, in one place the 
person might be regarded as an insider or observer, whereas in another, 
unfamiliar, setting, the same person becomes an outsider or stranger, a 
person being observed. Subsequently, unfamiliarity may be experienced 
and dealt with in diﬀerent ways. Bauman (1995: 132-135) distinguishes for 
example between two possible eﬀects of strangeness in modern city life. 
On the one hand, experiences of mutual strangeness may oﬀer a feeling 
of pleasure and excitement, and are welcomed as a passing positive expe-
rience; while on the other hand, diﬀerences between the familiar and the 
unfamiliar could be emphasized to such an extent that people regard the 
stranger as a threat. Given the contextual usage of the term, unfamiliarity 
and strangeness will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
Bauman’s distinction was intended to apply to the modern city as a 
heterogeneous space with its distinct areas and diﬀerent types of inhab-
itants and strangers. The experience of strangeness is therefore likely to 
occur in situations involving mobility, which contrasts with the immo-
bility of the other as a result of ties and locality (Simmel 1950). In other 
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words, strangeness appears when people move from one place to another, 
changing their status from insider or acquaintance familiar with their 
surroundings to one of outsider or stranger, new to and unfamiliar with 
the place of destination. Although strangeness is associated with mobility, 
it must be noted that in a state of immobility, feelings of unfamiliarity can 
also develop. In this case, there is no association or activity beyond the 
local space. The notion of unfamiliarity inﬂuences the mental image and 
may well become a factor of mobility. 
Mobilities take place at diﬀerent levels: for instance, at the local level, 
in a neighborhood, a city or between a city and a village, at the regional 
level, between two or more locations in diﬀerent counties or provinces, or 
at the international level, between countries. Feelings of strangeness are 
especially intensiﬁed in cross-border regions as borders not only bring 
many diﬀerent people together, but also “reﬂect our contending desires for 
sameness and diﬀerence, for a marker between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (O’Dowd 
2003: 14-15) as result of diﬀerences in cultures, histories, political ideolo-
gies, and economic and social systems. 
In this contribution, I examine feelings of strangeness or unfamiliari-
ty in relation to cross-border contacts and activities along the German-Pol-
ish border. Given the history of the German-Polish border, a high level of 
unfamiliarity among its inhabitants of the region is to be expected. Just 
after the Second World War, the allies agreed, under the pressure of the 
Soviet Union, to move the Polish territory westwards as a compensation 
for Poland’s territorial losses to the Soviet Union. The Oder-Neisse border 
became a fact; however, the new border not only divided nations, it also 
divided cities built along the Oder and Neisse. As a result of forced mi-
grations within Poland and across the border to Germany, towns along 
the redrawn border obtained completely new inhabitants with diﬀerent 
national backgrounds. Most people had no local ties, let alone ties to the 
region and towns on the other side of the border. In addition, strict bor-
der regulations and policies prevented the new inhabitants from seeking 
cross-border contacts and becoming familiar with “the other side.” The ef-
fects of the Oder-Neisse border are perhaps most visible in Frankfurt and 
Słubice, Guben and Gubin, and Görlitz and Zgorzelec, border cities and 
towns which were previously united within Germany (Buursink 2001). 
Although East Germany and Poland were ideological partners of the 
Soviet Union for most of the period between 1945 and 1989, the Ger-
man-Polish border was characterized as a closed border with little to no 
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cross-border interaction except for a short period of cross-border (labor) 
mobility in the 1970s. From 1989 onward, the German-Polish border 
region opened up, creating opportunities for cross-border contacts and 
interaction. As a result of diﬀerent border policies, some cross-border 
contacts and activities occurred while others did not; in addition, some 
situations may have encouraged familiarization in the cross-border region 
while others discouraged familiarization. At the same time, as previously 
mentioned, unfamiliarity, which could be both felt and/or imagined, may 
also be a source of attraction, giving people an incentive to explore the 
other side of the border and causing them to interpret a closed border 
as a barrier. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to go give further 
insight into these the dynamics of (un)familiarity by discussing the diﬀer-
ent elements of this concept and placing it in the context of the diﬀerent 
historical periods characterizing the German-Polish cross-border region 
from the 1970s through the 1990s. 
UNFAMILIARIT Y, STR ANGENESS, AND OTHERNESS
Unfamiliarity, strangeness, and otherness are interrelated terms, which 
are occasionally used interchangeably or with a slightly diﬀerent mean-
ing, depending on the context. As previously mentioned, unfamiliarity 
indicates a feeling of strangeness that results from not having knowledge 
of or experience with for example a person, a place, or a situation. The 
diﬃculty in deﬁning and placing strangeness and otherness is found in 
the diﬀerent approaches to these terms. Stichweh (2004: 111) argues that a 
distinction needs to be made between the experience of strangeness and 
that of otherness. He regards otherness as a universal social experience 
that is a “precondition for my experiencing myself in contradistinction 
to the otherness of another human being.” Strangeness, however, only 
occurs when the otherness of the other becomes irritating or disturbing. 
In other words, otherness leads to strangeness through the experience of 
annoyance or disturbance. Gurevitch (1988), on the other hand, sees the 
opposite relationship, stating that the experience of strangeness reduces 
assumptions of typicality and similarity, exposing the otherness of the 
other. In addition, otherness is triggered though a process of de-familiar-
ization, of “making the other strange.” This process of making the other 
strange is the result of an intentional cognitive action, an internal mental 
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event, or an external change; it changes one’s perception of and connec-
tion to the other and even displaces people from the surroundings with 
which they were previously associated (Gurevitch 1988: 1190). Making the 
other strange: this possibility illustrates that, to a large degree, unfamil-
iarity is individually constructed. As Bauman (1995: 146) puts forward, 
the understanding and placement of the other takes place as a result of 
remembering, selecting, and processing memories of past encounters, 
contacts, exchanges, and relations with the other. In addition, assump-
tions about the other play a crucial role in people’s attitudes towards the 
other. According to Schütz (1962: 15) we assume that people are “guided 
by certain relevance structures, expressing themselves in a set of constant 
motives leading to a particular pattern of action and even co-determining 
[…] personality”. Accordingly, these assumptions inﬂuence behavior and 
attitudes when people are confronted with the other. 
Strangeness and otherness reﬂect upon a reciprocal social relationship 
between the familiar and unfamiliar, the insider and the outsider, or the 
here and there. Although a stranger is regarded as an outsider or an exter-
nal actor, he still inﬂuences the group by bringing “qualities into it that 
are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it” (Simmel 1950). Moreover, people 
not only assume their own role as a result of meeting the other, but also 
experience and perceive the other in diﬀerent ways as a result of their own 
unique biographical situation (Schütz 1962: 11, 19). These distinctions be-
tween one and the other, the here and there, may be regarded as mental 
borders (van Houtum 1999; van Houtum/Strüver 2002) which “are invis-
ible to the human eye but […] nevertheless impact strongly on our daily life 
practices” (Newman 2006: 172). 
There are diﬀerent ways to deal with strangeness. Mostly in modern 
societies, the strangeness of strangers is either reduced to a point where 
diﬀerences become irrelevant, or the diﬀerences and unfamiliarities are 
accepted to a certain extent and moved to the background in people’s daily 
interaction (Bauman 1995; Stichweh 2004). However, strangeness contin-
ues to be a constant factor in daily encounters; it is a normal everyday 
occurrence, called by Stichweh (2004) the “universalization of the strang-
er.” Even when people do not seek the experience of otherness, they may 
be confronted with it, inﬂuencing “the meanings we give to others and 
to ourselves” (Gurevitch 1988: 1196). Consequently, strangeness and oth-
erness are clearly two interlinked terms, both of which give meaning to 
ourselves and expose the otherness of the other. 
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UNFAMILIARIT Y IN CROSS-BORDER REGIONS 
Cross-border regions have considerable levels of unfamiliarity as a result of 
political, economic, social and cultural diﬀerences between the two sides 
of a border. As such, borders function as symbols of identity (O’Dowd 
2003: 27). Identity formation takes place at various levels, from local to 
national, diﬀering from region to region and from time to time. Shields 
(1991) describes this as social spatialization where people organize them-
selves territorially, allowing regionalism to become a central part of their 
identities. Paasi (2009), however, turns this concept around and introduc-
es the term spatial socialization. Instead of territoriality leading to identi-
ty formation, the socialization of actors in a territorially bounded spatial 
entity takes place by means of collective territorial identities, narratives, 
traditions, and images. A process of spatial belonging takes place whereby 
“people express and perform to belong, to create (and defend) their ‘own 
space,’ to separate, to diﬀerentiate, and to demarcate” (van Houtum/van 
der Velde 2004: 104). Furthermore, diﬀerences between people and places 
in cross-border regions may be stronger, as “borderlands, as front lines 
between states, are places of high sensitivity and self awareness, in which 
the sense of identity and belonging to a special place is heightened” (Am-
strong 2003: 165). 
The presence of diﬀerences in a cross-border region, which often lead 
to feelings of unfamiliarity, does not necessarily have a negative inﬂuence 
on the attitudes and activities of the locals. Both push and pull factors 
and keep and repel factors play a role in the degree of changes in mobility 
(Lundberg 1980; Timothy/Butler 1995; van Houtum/van der Velde 2004; 
Spierings/van der Velde 2008; van der Velde/van Naerssen 2010; Ernste 
2010). Push and pull factors inﬂuence the decision to move, in this case, 
across the border. Whereas push factors involve reasons that cause peo-
ple to want to escape daily situations that are perceived as less attractive 
than elsewhere, pull factors reﬂect the perceived opportunities and ben-
eﬁts on the other side of the border (Spierings/van der Velde 2008: 501). 
Factors that activate border crossing are job opportunities, easy access to 
and favorable prices for goods and services, recognizable social and cul-
tural contacts, and curiosity about new places and people. Keep and repel 
factors are those that reinforce the decision to stay, leading to immobility. 
Keep factors imply the feeling of comfort and satisfaction, a feeling of 
“socio-spatial belonging” (van Houtum/van der Velde 2004). People are 
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able to apply their skills and experiences professionally, have an accept-
able standard of living, and are comfortable with cultural features like lan-
guage and social norms in their daily lives. However, keep factors can also 
be strengthened as a result of external impositions such as the presence 
of a powerful nationalistic political ideology or strict border policies by one 
or the other country. Repel factors involve the attitude that “the other side” 
does not have anything additional to oﬀer. In relation to cross-border mo-
bilities, examples are to be found in the lack of opportunities and beneﬁts 
as well as in strong political, economic, or cultural dissimilarities.
The level of familiarity and unfamiliarity between locals on either side 
of the border depends of several factors. These are identiﬁed as three core 
dimensions of unfamiliarity: personal attitudes, access to and selection of 
information, and experience.
First of all, personal attitudes aﬀect feelings of (un)familiarity in the 
sense that a person might consider the other side of the border irrele-
vant as a result of indiﬀerence (Ernste 2010), indecision, unease, or lack 
of awareness. Feelings of comfort and satisfaction, i.e., a feeling of “so-
cio-spatial belonging,” also play a role (van Houtum/van der Velde 2004). 
However, people may also actively consider moving to the other side for 
functional reasons such as job opportunities or access to certain goods or 
cultural experiences; here, pull factors reﬂect the perceived opportunities 
and beneﬁts at the other side of the border (Lundberg 1980; Timothy/But-
ler 1995; van Houtum/van der Velde 2004; Spierings/van der Velde 2008; 
van der Velde/van Naerssen 2010; Ernste 2010). Furthermore, people in 
a border region may be attracted by the desire to experience something 
new and unknown and thus regard the unfamiliar area as interesting and 
exciting (Bauman 1995; MacKay/Fesenmaier 1997). 
Knowledge, in particular access to information, is identiﬁed as infor-
mational familiarity by Baloglu (2001) and Prentice (2004); it also inﬂu-
ences the level of (un)familiarity. Facts and assumptions about the other 
side of the border are often based on both direct contacts and on indirect 
information from, for example, relatives, friends, and colleagues. Other 
sources are newspapers, television, schoolbooks, and oﬃcial information. 
Depending on the openness of the border, the history of the border region 
and relations between neighboring countries, information ﬂows may be 
interfered with by the government’s use of propaganda to inﬂuence pop-
ular opinion. 
The Dynamics of Unfamiliar ity in the German-Polish Border Region 189
The third, and last, dimension of unfamiliarity refers to experiences, 
meaning past experiences, taking into account that perceived images dif-
fer between ﬁrst-time and repeat visits to a destination (Fakeye/Cromp-
ton 1991; Baloglu 2001; Lau/McKercher 2004; Prentice/Andersen 2007). 
In the context of a border region, experiences refer to active and passive 
contacts and experiences with people and places from across the border. 
These experiences can occur on either side and depend on the mobility of 
the individual or group. Furthermore, cross-border contacts could be dis-
couraged or stimulated through previous experiences, border procedures, 
national policies, historical representations, and local memories. 
Taking personal attitudes, knowledge, and experiences into account could 
yield new insight into people’s (un)familiarity with people and places lo-
cated across the border and their motives for crossing or not crossing the 
border. However, these dimensions are not deﬁnite; they are interrelated 
and inﬂuence one another. Furthermore, while familiarity may be high on 
one dimension, it may be low on another. For example, the daily cross-bor-
der commuter may work across the border but need not necessarily in-
teract with the people there. Familiarization then becomes only partial 
and takes place at the workplace, but not with the locals or the town on 
the other side of the border. Hence, the decision to cross or not to cross a 
border also aﬀects a person’s (un)familiarity; over time it could change a 
person’s attitudes, knowledge, and experience with regards to places and 
people located across the border.
PARTITIONED CITIES AT THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDER 
As previously discussed, diﬀerences between people from diﬀerent na-
tion-states are intensiﬁed in border regions. The awareness of dissimilar-
ities in policies, economic structures, traditions, and languages is likely 
to become part of everyday practices, especially for people living in the 
divided cities along the Oder and Neisse. From a historical perspective, 
cross-border contacts and practices will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Bianca Szy tniewski190
Discrepancies Between Two Neighboring Countries 
Shortly after the Second World War, Polish policy makers implemented 
policies for nationalizing the Polish territories, in particular the former 
German territories in western Poland, to enhance Polish national identity 
and create a buﬀer against potential German aggression. Politicians and 
the media in Poland insisted on the integration of Poles into a cohesive 
and homogeneous society that represented a Polish national identity. As 
a result, the former German lands were referred to as “recovered terri-
tories” and part of “historical Poland,” based on the fact that large num-
bers of Poles had lived under German rule, resisting German oppression 
while preserving their Polish identity (Kulczycki 2001: 205f.). In reality, 
the group of Poles that had lived under German rule was rather small. 
The largest group of inhabitants consisted of forced migrants from former 
eastern Poland, while other groups were Poles from central and southern 
Poland, Poles that had ﬂed westwards during the Second World War, and 
(former) military personnel (Jajeśniak-Quast/Stokłosa 2000: 46ﬀ.). At the 
same time, the Polish nationalization campaign included the expulsion 
of Germans. Subsequently, local communities on the German side of the 
border region not only had to adjust to a new state border but also had 
to cope with large migration ﬂows of many expelled Germans. The de-
mographic composition in the border regions on both sides of the border 
changed drastically.
As a result of the forced emigrations of Germans and the emphasis on 
the nationalization of Poles in these territories, diﬀerences between Ger-
mans and Poles were ampliﬁed, stressing the distinction between “us” 
and “them.” Moreover, the use of the term “autochthon” or “native” for 
Polish inhabitants by Polish authorities to draw a contrast to the German 
inhabitants in the region led to a further division between the two nation-
alities. Germans subsequently were regarded as “alien intruders,” not only 
in the border regions, but in the whole of Poland (Kulczycki 2001: 207). 
Despite the territorial changes and national politics that followed 
the war period, the German Democratic Republic and Poland had both 
become part of the Soviet Union’s sphere of inﬂuence, and this context 
dominated the two countries’ political relations. By signing the Treaty of 
Görlitz on 6 June 1950, stating that “the current, determined border is 
the irrevocable border of peace and friendship that does not separate but 
rather unites both peoples,” the German-Polish border was oﬃcially ac-
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cepted. The signing of the treaty was followed by a period of propaganda 
to promote popular acceptance of the two socialist nations. In contrast to 
the period shortly after the war, images of the other, of those across the 
border, were promoted with the intention of uniting, not dividing. News-
papers and politicians spoke of ‘brother nations,” while street names in 
the border cities were named after German and Polish socialist heroes 
(Jajeśniak-Quast/Stokłosa 2000: 65f.). 
For the most part, however, the physical border remained closed and 
cross-border activities did not develop at any other than a political lev-
el, with occasional festive meetings at the bridges in the border towns 
to celebrate for instance international Labor Day (Gazeta Zielonogórska/
Neuer Tag, 1967). As a result of this political context, direct and indirect 
cross-border experiences were limited, and knowledge and information 
ﬂows about the other side of the border were often controlled by the gov-
ernment and therefore colored and selective.
Rapprochement and Estrangement Again
In the 1970s, inhabitants of the German-Polish border region experienced 
a period of open borders that had already started in 1956 when the Sovi-
et Union handed over the control of the East German border to the East 
German government. Subsequently, many military and administrative re-
strictions were removed, contributing to a slow rapprochement between 
East Germany and Poland (Jajeśniak-Quast/Stokłosa 2000: 72). A period 
of increased cross-border activities followed in the 1970s, including the 
free exchange of goods, information, and people. Subsequently, common 
initiatives in sports, culture, and education were established between bor-
der cities like Frankfurt and Słubice, followed by cross-border labor mobil-
ity and the purchase of consumer goods. Furthermore, friendships were 
built across the border and the number of German-Polish intermarriages 
also increased (Chessa 2004: 81f.).
This ﬁrst period of openness was characterized in particular by cu-
riosity on both sides of the border. Previously, people could only see the 
river banks on the other side of the Oder or Neisse and imagine what the 
cities look like, but now they had the chance to experience the cities for 
themselves. This curiosity became an important pull factor to cross the 
border, mobilizing many people to visit the “unknown,” “imagined,” or 
“previously known” on other side of the border. As a result, cross-border 
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tourism, and especially cross-border consumption, increased signiﬁcant-
ly. Whereas Germans were interested in foodstuﬀs, Poles mainly bought 
manufactured goods and textiles. The border cities were not prepared for 
the large ﬂows of people who ventured across the border. In the case of 
Słubice, it became clear that shortages in hotels, restaurants, milk, bread, 
and butter existed or were eminent, and the only petrol station in the town 
could not meet the increase in demand. In addition, in Frankfurt, restric-
tions were put in place to prevent Poles from buying products made of 
leather and housekeeping tools made for export purposes. Consequently, 
when the German-Polish border closed again in 1980, some shopkeepers 
were relieved (Jajeśniak-Quast/Stokłosa 2000: 84, 88). It seems that at a 
certain moment, initial feelings of pleasure and excitement towards peo-
ple and places across the border were taken over by feelings of annoyance. 
The novelty of the new border situation had passed and people realized 
that this was not a passing experience without lasting responsibilities but 
was rather becoming a permanent part of daily lives in the border cities. 
As a result of the oﬃcial recognition of the Solidarity movement by 
the Polish government, the East German government wanted to prevent 
a spill-over of anti-socialist ideas and decided to close the German-Polish 
border. In contrast to the 1970s, the last decade of socialist East Germa-
ny and Poland saw little cross-border cooperation and movement (Chessa 
2004: 82).
Local Unit y in a European Entit y? 
After the fall of communism, the road toward a transnational German-Pol-
ish border region seemed open again, especially in the context of EU en-
largement. Germany was one of the main proponents of Poland’s entry 
to the European Union. In the 1990s, the German-Polish Euroregion Pro 
Europe Viadrina came into being, and the two border cities, Guben and 
Gubin, signed an agreement of cooperation, announcing the establish-
ment of the Euro city Guben/Gubin. The establishment of a German-Pol-
ish university subsequently took cross-border cooperation between Ger-
many and Poland to a higher level. Established in 1993, and formalized 
in a governmental agreement between the German state of Brandenburg 
and the Polish national government in 2002, the cross-border university 
Collegium Polonicum is a joint venture of the European University Viadri-
na in Frankfurt and the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. The Col-
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legium Polonicum does not advocate homogenization and assimilation 
but emphasizes the “acceptance of diversity and its use as a potential for 
creativity” (Fichter-Wolf/Knorr-Siedow 2009: 15, 18). 
Despite these isolated developments, the motivation to extend Europe-
an integration to the German-Polish border region has had limited reach. 
For the most part, it could be argued that the road towards EU enlarge-
ment turned out to be mainly a political project, putting institutional and 
administrative structures into place without considering cross-border in-
tegration at the level of local everyday life (Dürrschmidt 2006: 259). 
In the 1990s, both the former East Germany and Poland fell into dif-
ferent modes of economic transformation. The East German border re-
gion underwent extensive de-industrialization, resulting in the closing of 
many factories and a high unemployment rate. The Polish side, on the 
other hand, experienced a relatively stable transformation of its econom-
ic structures with a decline in industrial employment but an increase of 
jobs in the private sector generally (Krätke 1999: 633f.). Economic initia-
tives did not necessarily focus on common economic interests in the Ger-
man-Polish cross-border region. For example, Germany’s privatization 
policy included a strong orientation toward western Germany, ignoring 
the opportunities of low wages across the border. In general, only a small 
number of ﬁrms with foreign capital settled in the Polish border region 
(Krätke 1999: 634). Moreover, Matthiesen/Bürkner (2001: 45) perceive 
a “peripheralization of the immediate border zone,” implying that Ger-
man-Polish cooperation did not concentrate on the immediate border re-
gion but that new trade and service centers grew in nearby urban areas 
such as Berlin, Szczecin, Poznan, and Wroclaw. Immediate border cities 
seem to have been bypassed by regional cross-border initiatives, which 
may also have something to do with attitudes and practices of German 
and Polish locals in the cross-border region.
Although formal institutions and contacts at the level of policy-making 
were established across the border, local level social interactions and activ-
ities remained minor and generally dependent on particular individuals 
or organizations (Matthiesen/Bürkner 2001; Dürrschmidt 2002; Fich-
ter-Wolf/Knorr-Siedow 2009). Much skepticism and localism was found 
among locals in the cross-border region. In Guben for instance, revitalized 
ethnicity, economic fears of competition, and an inward-looking mentality 
led to a strong tendency of in-grouping. While skeptical attitudes were 
also found in Gubin, Poles were at the same time curious and had a more 
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positive attitude towards cross-border initiatives than the Germans in Gu-
ben (Matthiesen/Bürkner 2001: 46f.). Furthermore, both Germans and 
Poles were, and maybe still are, not entirely aware of the opportunities 
an integrated and open cross-border region could bring. Dürrschmidt 
(2006: 254f.) distinguishes two local developments. The ﬁrst develop-
ment involves the hyper-mobility of German locals, who started to take 
up temporary work elsewhere, for example in the Netherlands as bricklay-
ers, without taking into account the opportunities on the other side of the 
border. In addition to the decrease of inhabitants in the German border 
cities, people became detached from the city and region, reducing fur-
ther improvement of cross-border relations and practices. Secondly, strong 
feelings of belonging also played a role. Place became regarded as a closed 
system that does not extend beyond one’s familiar setting. Moreover, past 
images and experiences were also important factors in the decision to 
move closer to or farther away from people and places across the border. A 
low level of trust between the inhabitants of the cross-border region also 
played a role in underlining perceived diﬀerences and increasing the felt 
social distance between the two nationalities (Krätke 1999; Matthiesen/
Bürkner 2001; Stryjakiewicz 2009). 
In contrast to the 1970s, where the opening of the border led to inter-
est in familiarization with people and places located across the border, 
the opening of the border in 1991 led to less mutual interest. Except for 
local socio-economic opportunities, both Germans and Poles were mainly 
looking westward, partly due to German uniﬁcation and the prospective 
beneﬁts associated with the European Union. As a result of socio-econom-
ic interests, a level of interdependency between Poles and Germans in the 
local trade and service sector emerged, bringing people on both sides of 
the border together. In the early 1990s, diﬀerences in price and quality of 
goods and services led to the rise of a bazaar economy in the small Polish 
towns just across the border (Gazeta Zielonogórska/Neuer Tag, 1990s). In 
addition to these interactions and exchanges on the bazaars, Poles were 
also familiarizing themselves with the German language and started 
looking for labor opportunities in Germany. Germans, however, contin-
ued to have only little interest in people and places across the border above 
and beyond their interest in obtaining cheap products and services on the 
Polish side. For the most part, German locals maintained an attitude of 
indiﬀerence, standing with their backs to the Polish borderland. On the 
one hand, people on the Polish side seem more interested in the opportu-
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nities available across the border, but on the other hand one could argue 
that the exchanges between people from both sides of the border occur 
mainly within the economic context alone. Subsequently, people’s personal 
attitudes, knowledge, and experiences are framed largely within this context. 
CONCLUSION 
From an adjustment to a new and contested border, with open and closed 
periods of border crossings, towards an open border, the German-Polish 
border region has been in constant change. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, historical developments in this particular cross-border region have 
indeed led to a high level of unfamiliarity between the inhabitants as a 
result of large migration ﬂows. People were not familiar with one anoth-
er or with each other’s narratives, cultures, customs, and languages. Yet, 
they still had to live alongside each other. The physical border was closed 
for a long time, during which few cross-border contacts and exchanges 
were allowed. A latent interest in cross-border exchange, however, was 
demonstrated by the fact that the opening of the border in the 1970s led 
to immense numbers of border crossings, contacts, and exchanges. The 
second, and most likely permanent, border opening in the 1990s was ex-
perienced diﬀerently. 
Coming back to Bauman’s theory on strangeness, the border openings 
in the 1970s and the 1990s demonstrate interesting levels of unfamiliari-
ty. During the ﬁrst opening of the border, inhabitants of the border cities 
on both sides of the German-Polish border were curious about the neigh-
boring city across the border. The earlier forced immobility that resulted 
from the closed borders heightened mutual unfamiliarity but actually in-
creased people’s interest in the other side of the border. After the opening 
of the border, people were able to familiarize themselves with the other 
side of the border through personal experience and through obtaining 
information from family, friends, and neighbors who had been across the 
border. As a result, people did not have to depend on information from 
the government or media. The initial excitement, however, was soon 
overcome by feelings of annoyance, especially on the German side of the 
border, resulting from over-consumption, which, with rise of cross-border 
exchanges, might also be regarded as over-familiarity.
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Subsequently, with the opening of the borders in the 1990s, feelings 
of excitement and curiosity were only part of the picture. Whereas Poles 
continue to be interested in the other side of the border, where the unfa-
miliar, the new, and unknown, is regarded as attractive and has become 
integrated into daily routines, Germans are less inclined to look for oppor-
tunities in Poland. Perhaps the German uniﬁcation led many inhabitants 
to seek opportunities in western Germany, or perhaps the de-industrial-
ization of the region caused a German exodus, physically and mentally, 
from the border region. Assumptions of the other also play an important 
role, especially among the Germans who seem to hold negative attitudes 
towards the Poles. Feelings of belonging stress these assumptions, result-
ing in little incentive to cross the border. When the border is crossed, so-
cial contacts are not of interest; the focus is, rather, on obtaining goods 
and services. 
This initial literature review demonstrated that unfamiliarity is likely 
to trigger interest, leading to actions, in this case border crossings, where-
as familiarity, or partial familiarity, with the other side of a border seems 
to be associated with little interest and interaction. While in the 1990s, 
the opening of the borders opened many opportunities for cross-border 
cooperation, in particular in the context of EU enlargement, these oppor-
tunities may have been partly obscured by historical representations and 
mental images of the other. Diﬀerences are needed to evoke an interest 
in the other side of the border. However, becoming familiar or remaining 
unfamiliar is determined not only by circumstances and external factors, 
but also by the position of people living in the cross-border region. They 
are in charge of selecting and activating (un)familiarity and must decide 
how people and places located across the border are assessed and dealt 
with.
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Historical Culture and Territoriality 
Social Appropriation in the German-Polish Border Region  
in the 19th and 20th Centuries
Thomas Serrier
ENTANGLED HISTORICAL CULTURES AND APPROPRIATION  
OF A HYBRID TERRITORY
Border areas and regions characterized by their multicultural past, as 
exempliﬁed by Germany’s former eastern region and Poland’s western 
region today, are experimental ﬁelds for changing “territorial regimes.” 
This term refers to the individual and collective relationship to a politically 
structured territory, deﬁned here as historical territory, i.e. as a geographi-
cal system of historically evolved relations. In the following, the changing 
forms of subjective identiﬁcation of the territory situated in this area of 
tension between Germany and Poland are discussed. 
The present contribution aims to clarify the changing modes of social 
appropriation of territories, especially border territories. In other words, it 
seeks to analyze the mutually dependent relationship of territoriality and 
historical culture.1 Its focus is on German-Polish border areas. How did 
historical culture determine the geographical perception of this territo-
ry? To what extent did perception of the territory inﬂuence the historical 
culture(s) in the society on each side of the border? Obviously, signiﬁcant 
changes emerged in the way people experienced this border region in the 
interplay with its political aﬃliations. Conversely, political constellations 
that resulted in territorial changes were also produced on a symbolic level 
(see Bourdieu 2001). It follows that analysis of the diverse constructions of 
1 | For the term historical culture, see de Jong (1997: 282).
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mental mapping2 is a promising method for approaching the German-Pol-
ish border region.
It is critically important to recognize that the interwoven strands of 
“real history” are also reproduced on the terrain of recollections, cultural 
memories, and politics of history. The tense political and social relation-
ship that characterized the region’s multicultural existence is reﬂected in 
a correspondingly complex interplay and counterpoising of cultural mem-
ories and politics of history in which the actual demarcations or mental 
mapping of the territory fulﬁlled a key function.
ME THODOLOGICAL REMARKS: SOURCES AND CASE STUDIES
We shall focus on four diﬀerent cultural landscapes, moving from north 
to south: East Prussia with its strong mythical connotations (Kossert 
2005); Danzig (Gdansk), which has stood as the outstanding example of 
a city on the border between Poland and Germany since the Middle Ages 
and which has a highly distinctive local identity (Loew 2003); the region of 
Greater Poland (Wielkopolska), which consisted of the Grand Duchy (later 
Province) of Posen in the Prussian and Prussian-German eras and which 
became the central setting for struggles over national identity before 1914 
(Serrier 2002a, 2005); and ﬁnally, Silesia, which encompasses also Upper 
Silesia (Struve/Ther 2002; Struve 2003).
Of the three dimensions of historical culture deﬁned by Jörn Rüsen – 
the cognitive, the aesthetic, and the political – we shall focus on the latter 
two, giving examples from travelogues, light ﬁction, and belles lettres as 
well as architecture and urban planning.
TERRITORIAL REGIMES: FROM SE ALED TO OPEN TERRITORY?
If we now look speciﬁcally at the successive “territorial regimes” that gov-
erned the German-Polish border region over the last two centuries, we can 
draw a broad line through all the political and territorial upheavals from 
the 19th century to the post-1989 period and trace the transition from 
the desire for closure and mutual partitioning of the territory to recent 
2 | For the term mental map, see Schenk (2002).
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attempts to promote “open regionalism” (Robert Traba) or “postmodern 
regiona lism” (Kazimierz Brakoniecki) by glorifying the diversity of the 
historical legacy, giving equal weight to each position.3 In doing so, how-
ever, we have to be careful to avoid succumbing to a sentimental, idealized 
image of the present.4
This brings us to a point of principle. A disturbing eﬀect of the tragic 
chapters in the history of 20th-century German-Polish relations is that 
the contemporary, and quite spectacular, attempts observable in Germany 
and Poland to establish identity in a “postmodern” sense, whether viable 
or not, are doomed to be backward projections of destroyed multicultur-
alism. It is impossible to understand the present vision of “remixing Eu-
rope”5 without noting the bitter paradox that this imaginary process of re-
mixing is actually ﬂourishing against the backdrop of the radical schism 
that ultimately divided the Germans and the Poles geographically from 
each other during the war and the immediate postwar period.  
Some pessi mists oﬀer arguments that cannot be contemplated with-
in the bounds of political correctness: they argue that it was actually the 
ethnic-territorial homogenization of the Third Reich and the early Peo-
ple’s Republic of Poland that created the necessary conditions for today’s 
German-Polish dialogue. Proponents of this view include Stefan Chwin, 
whose novel Hanemann was published in 1995 (and appeared in English 
as Death in Danzig in 2004). Chwin’s Gdansk novel established him as 
one of the ﬁrst contemporary Polish authors to focus on the moment of ex-
pulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland as a central issue (Chwin 1999). 
Modern commentators like Chwin suggest provocatively that the Western 
Allies already mooted paciﬁcation of the German-Polish border as the re-
sult of the enforced resettlement of Germans east of the Oder and Neisse 
in the context of the Potsdam Treaty (Brandes 2001).
On the topic of expulsion, at this point we should mention the diﬀer-
ence between two types of multiculturalism, a distinction that is funda-
mental for perception of the symbolic territory. There is a multicultural-
ism of togetherness or contiguity, or even mutual opposition, which is 
typical for the regions under consideration in the period of population 
shifts. This was counterpoised after 1945 or 1989 to a “multiculturalism” 
3 | See the Borussia magazine series.
4 | For a polemic view of “reconciliation kitsch,” see Bachmann (1994: 41f.).
5 | Borrowed from the term “unmixing Europe”. See Schlögel (2001).
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of successive existence, in which in one case the national homogeneous 
society of postwar Poland replaced the earlier multicultural society, but in 
many other cases it succeeded and replaced a diﬀerent homogeneous so-
ciety, namely German society. In this context, the careful use of quotation 
marks fulﬁls a precise purpose, because this “successive multicultural-
ism” involves the idea of the palimpsest that allows us to read the present 
and the lost past simultaneously on the historical parchment of a given 
space. In the space we commingle the periods.6 
CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIE W
In the political context of the Prussian and Prussian-German state in the 
19th century, the processes of mutual social exclusion based on categories 
of national identiﬁcation were revealed in several stages. Around 1900 the 
dominant picture was of a mirrored dynamization of competing nation-
alisms. 
The territorial conﬂict was expanded and intensiﬁed with terrible cru-
elty under the auspices of the “brutalization” of political morals after the 
First World War (Mosse 1990). The plans for mutual exclusion, intended 
at the time to achieve “healthy relations” (Esch 1998) in the central European 
mosaic of nationalities, were actually implemented in the wider context of 
the Second World War (1939-1948) by resettlement policies. The Germans 
began this during the Nazi occupation of Poland. Only a few years later, 
German inhabitants ﬂed in the opposite direction to escape the advancing 
Red Army at the end of the war or and in the following months and years 
were forcibly resettled from their “adopted” homes in Silesia, Pomerania, 
and East Prussia by Poland’s new communist rulers and by “repatriated 
persons” from the territory of “Kresy” in eastern Poland.7 The current idea 
(at least in the context of the EU) of a territory that has become wide open 
again and of a shared historical legacy (Mazur 2003) blatantly contradicts 
the momentous exclusion of the mutual “other” from the national com-
munity’s imagination. Despite the new type of reconciliation paradigm, 
this still partly persists today and was a major structural factor for the 
region until the collapse of the Iron Curtain.
6 | Paraphrasing Schlögel’s title. See Schlögel (2003).
7 | For a general overview see Ther (2011).
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FLUID TR ANSITIONS: POSEN IN THE 19TH CENTURY
The collective processes of diﬀerentiation typical of the whole nation in 
the 19th century were even more intense in the province of East Prussia, 
which was very mixed in terms of language, ethnicity, and culture in that 
period. For example, the eastern border regions of Prussia, or the German 
Reich after 1871, were populated by Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, 
and several Slavic-speaking minorities of unspeciﬁed national identity. 
From a transnational perspective the Reich appears as an empire of lin-
guistic hybridity, particularly in the Prussian area of partitioned Poland 
(Serrier 2005).
The Prussian province of Posen around the year 1900 is a good ex-
ample of the relation between historical culture and territoriality. The at-
tempt by this border region with its Polish majority to identify itself with 
Germany was based on the creation of a “German” homeland conceived 
as a local metaphor for the whole nation (Coﬁno 1997). The invention of 
a German-encoded border province in the former Polish area of Greater 
Poland was largely achieved by trying to produce an adequate regional 
image. The representatives of the administration, and not least the assim-
ilated Jews, played a bigger role in this than the weak regional elites on the 
German side (Serrier 2009). 
Despite the exploitation of history in this province of eastern Prussia 
with its historically Polish character, the basically emotional relationship 
between “our own private little country” and the national fatherland im-
plied by the term “homeland” (Heimat), which was rooted in a person’s 
self-identiﬁcation with his or her surroundings (Petri 2001), proved ex-
tremely diﬃcult to maintain. The Germans, confronted by the encroach-
ment of the “Polish community in the Prussian state” (Bernhard 1907), 
were concerned about their self-image. The “Polish threat,” sometimes 
extrapolated to the whole Slav people, was a common catchphrase (Renz 
1905; Schlager 1902; Schirmacher 1908). 
The centrality of the region in Polish memory contrasted with this. 
As a result, from the German standpoint, the territory was seen ﬁrst as 
a region of ﬂuid transitions, and second as an underdeveloped, still un-
charted area – a typically colonialist view. “The east begins at the Silesian 
Railway Station in Berlin.” This remark was made shortly before the First 
World War by a reporter from the Frankfurter Zeitung newspaper on his 
way to the so-called “Ostmark” (“Eastern March”) (Frankfurter Zeitung 
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1911). His description clearly contradicted the propagandist speeches about 
the province’s successful integration since its annexation by Prussia a cen-
tury earlier.
The problematic situation described above gave rise to several simul-
taneous dilemmas for the Germans of Posen. Historical claims based on 
events that occurred before 1793 could sometimes prove extremely compli-
cated, since the “German” epoch of medieval colonization of Eastern Eu-
rope was followed by the unambiguous “Polonization” of the modern era. 
The experience of historical characterization of the territory inﬂuenced 
the perception of the space and the regional relationship to history. The 
fashion for futuristic projections was enthusiastically welcomed, as was 
the trend for erecting historicizing buildings. A prime example of this 
was the Kaiserpfalz (Imperial Palace), dedicated in 1910. At the same time, 
inventing tradition went along with exhibiting innovation. The 1911 East 
German Exhibition (Ostdeutsche Ausstellung) in Posen served to elevate 
the province to a showcase of German modernity on the eastern border. 
Even if it had not been German in the past, so the argument went, Posen 
should at least be a ﬂourishing area of Germany in the future. 
The “toponymic waltz” (Serrier 2005: 262ﬀ.) characteristic of the Po-
sen region for the entire period of the partition of Poland oﬀers a good 
introduction to the relationship between territoriality and historical cul-
ture. The historical watershed of the divisions of Poland raised the issue 
of a suitable name for former Greater Poland. The old name Wielkopol-
ska seemed appropriate as a reminder of historical continuity. Even the 
Germans used the term “Greater Poland” (Großpolen) until 1848. In the 
second half of the 19th century there were three rival proposals for iden-
tiﬁcation, which illustrates the mutual interaction of historical cultures 
as well as their mental positioning: “Wielkopolska,” “Province of Posen,” 
and “Ostmark.” All these terms were used by various social groups around 
1900; they express the historically nourished Polish resistance against the 
Prussian tabula rasa, or the current relations at that time (the term “prov-
ince”), or the future projections typical of the German mode of mental 
appropriation of territory. 
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THE TROUBLED PAST:  
DANZIG IN THE PRUSSIAN-GERMAN PERIOD 
While a symbolic landscape ﬁrst had to be created for the German side in 
Posen, the city of Danzig was a very diﬀerent case. The tense relationship 
between the perspective of the local patriots and that of the Prussians, lat-
er Prussian-Germans, inﬂuenced the city’s historical culture in the 19th 
century. Just as the Prussian takeover in 1793 led to inevitable confron-
tation between the old and new referential frameworks for the territory, 
some of the corresponding historical narratives proved incompatible. With 
the Prussianization of the geographical coordinates by the Prussian-state 
camp, those who saw themselves as city patriots recognized the opposi-
tional potential of local history as an opportunity for identiﬁcation beyond 
any state-endowed meaning. In relation to the aﬃliation of the symbolic 
territory over time, the historical interpretation models ultimately shifted 
towards a national interpretation. The project of re-establishing the na-
tion as German resulted largely in anachronistic retrograde projections of 
emerging German-Polish antagonism onto the local past.
The degree of tension between local and national identities and the 
game played with history arising from this conﬂict are well illustrated by 
the literally “moving” fate of the statue of August III in the Artushof, as 
described by Peter Oliver Loew. The Artushof, along with the town hall 
and the imposing ediﬁce of St. Mary’s Church (the Marienkirche), was a 
major landmark in the city. A renowned emblem of the social and urban 
life of the Hanseatic city, it demonstrated the revived political self-conﬁ-
dence of Danzig’s citizens to the outside world. Domestically it had always 
functioned as a special place of identiﬁcation (Serrier 2002b).
Around the turn of the 18th-19th century, it became clear that national-
ism was insidiously usurping the symbolism of the Artushof. Yet the iden-
tiﬁcation was by no means wholly German nationalist. In fact, the Dan-
zigers’ pride resided in their enduring independence from the Teutonic 
Order-State and the German Reich during the centuries of uniﬁed rule by 
the Kingdom of Poland. The marble statue of the Polish king August III 
was dedicated in the Artushof in 1755. However, commemoration of the 
Polish king, who belonged to the Saxon dynasty, was not very welcome 
in Prussian Danzig. In 1831 the statue had to be removed from its place 
in the middle of the courtyard to an unobtrusive corner. The relegation 
caused inevitable uproar, resulting in August III being restored to his for-
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mer place in 1857. In 1931, in the Free State of Danzig, then surrounded by 
Polish territory, the statue was ﬁnally retired to the city museum (Loew 
2000). 
Posen and Danzig both became Prussian at the same time, and both 
belonged to the larger German-Polish border region. Yet in some respects 
they present widely diverging pictures of historical politics and historical 
culture. This relates back to the diﬀerent forms of territoriality in the two 
cities. The enforced concentration on local factors for pragmatic reasons 
posed a challenge to the 19th-century idea of the nation state and its desire 
for unity and homogeneity. 
UPPER SILESIA AND E AST PRUSSIA AS THE “BULWARK” AND 
“POSTERN” TO THE E AST IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
The experiences of the maximum expansion of the German eastern front 
during the First World War and the subsequent defeat of the German Em-
pire and reconstitution of the Polish state, together with the restructur-
ing of Europe decided in Versailles, profoundly changed the political and 
psychological framework of territorial perception in the German-Polish 
border region (Chu 2008). Hope of assimilation of the Polish population 
was not just destroyed. In fact, the resurrection of a Polish state conﬁrmed 
the reality of the “Polish threat.” Many Germans had already lost their 
homeland in Posen, West Prussia, and parts of Upper Silesia. In the 
course of this upheaval, a fundamental change also occurred in relation 
to the border area. It was no longer a matter of assimilating a territory 
of mixed nationalities under a German government, but of defending or 
recapturing a territory that would be seen as under threat from a German 
nationalist point of view, while the Poles were the new nation-state (Dyroﬀ 
2007). Every party in the Weimar republic shared the revisionist border 
policy on the Reich’s eastern border with the sole exception of the German 
Communist Party (KPD). The denial of Poland’s right to the former Prus-
sian or German eastern regions fostered the revanchist propaganda of the 
anti-democratic right-wing in the Weimar parliament. It was only logical 
for Hitler to describe the Nazi military conquests in the Poland campaign 
of 1939 as reclaiming the seceded territories.
Nationalist resentment in Germany after 1918, after its great power 
ambitions had been quashed, opened the way for extremely rash imperial 
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concepts of territory in Central Eastern and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, 
the new German complex about the east (Koenen 2005), and the sense of 
wrongful injury to the organic integrity of the national corpus, inspired 
the exact opposite: obsessive ﬁxation on border regions. It was not only 
the physical border, but also that the new acceptance of collective brutal-
ization meant that a psychological threshold had been crossed. On the 
scale of possibilities for national dramatization, defense of the border per 
se replaced the image of a territory to be paciﬁed. 
This process is clearly illustrated by the transition from the turn-of-
the-century Ostmark literature to the borderland literature of the interwar 
years, combined with a geographical shift from Posen to Upper Silesia or 
East Prussia. “Where was Germany?” was the question in Die Geächteten 
(The Outlaws, 1930), Ernst von Salomon’s novel about the Freikorps. “Ger-
many was the place that was being fought for […] Germany was on the 
border.” The answer is so surprising because, with harsh brevity, it elides 
the identity of the whole nation with the mystique of the border. State-
ments or notions of this kind were by no means isolated occurrences in 
the Weimar period.
The cover picture of Herybert Menzel’s Nazi novel, Umstrittene Erde 
(Disputed Soil, 1930), shows shadowy Polish lancers emerging from the 
dark night and crossing a graphically demarcated border, the Reich bor-
der. Similarly, the entire perception of the German-Polish border, which 
is sometimes described as “bleeding,” became more or less “militarized.” 
By contrast, utopias of reconciliation, as in Viktor Kaluza’s novel about Up-
per Silesia, Das Buch vom Kumpel Janek (1934), were a rarity. An extreme 
example of propagandist manipulation was a novel from 1932 that actually 
caused a diplomatic incident with Poland. Its title was deliberately aggres-
sive: Achtung! Ostmarkenrundfunk! Polnische Truppen haben heute Nacht die 
ostpreußische Grenze überschritten! (Attention! Ostmark Radio! Polish Troops 
Crossed the East Prussian Border Last Night!) This unusually long title with 
its strident tone masqueraded as a genuine press report. To make it look 
like an authentic newspaper cutting, the advertising poster for the book 
omitted details about the author and publisher. A radio announcement 
triggered a panic reaction in East Prussia. The newspaper Die Weltbühne 
of 23 February 1932 explained Hitler’s lead over Hindenburg in the 1932 
presidential elections in some Masurian electoral districts with reference 
to the book’s local impact. Its author, Hans Nitram, was later employed in 
Goebbels’ propaganda ministry (Traba 2005a: 275.). 
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REMIXING MEMORIES:  
FROM DIVIDED REMEMBR ANCES TO A COMMON MEMORY? 
Given the traumatic experience of “unmixing Europe” during the Nazi 
occupation and the early postwar period, it is evident that the perception 
of territory as a key cultural meeting-place between Germany and Poland 
was initially blocked. In the second half of the 20th century, independent-
ly of all the retrogressive steps conditioned by conjoining factors, there 
was a gradual development, picking up speed after 1989, from the de-
struction and burial of the “foreign” encoding of a symbolic territory to 
the discovery of (or search for) traces of the “other” past. As numerous 
local examples show, the past is not just a legacy that cannot be repressed; 
on the contrary, increasingly large groups from the second or third gen-
eration, descendants of more recent Polish settlers in the northwestern 
Polish regions, are consciously tracking it down and bringing it to light. 
Looking at the interplay of territorial and historical consciousness, it 
is important to note that the moment of a mirror-inverted psychological 
blocking oﬀ of the “other” among the Polish and the Germans meant 
shutting out speciﬁc historical experiences and periods. German publica-
tions in expellee circles after the war sometimes gave the impression that 
the history of Danzig and Breslau had come to a standstill in 1945. Sim-
ilarly, Polish attempts at establishing Polish neighborhoods by changing 
street names, deliberate “de-Germanizing actions” (Linek 1997) and Pol-
ish re-coding of existing places in Opole, Gdansk, Szczecin, or Wrocław,8 
were caught in the same need for homogenization. 
In Poland, with the ﬂourishing of free speech since the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, there has been a great increase in literary and scholarly works 
and a growth in regional cultural and historical associations discussing 
the topic of the pluricultural past of the northwest of Poland today. After 
1945 the new political leadership in Warsaw created the image of a Po-
land that had been eternally homogeneous in order to stabilize the deep 
turmoil in the country and legitimize the Communist regime (Zaremba 
2005). Although the myth of the “reclaimed” original Polish regions was 
8 | To read how German Danzig turned into Polish Gdańsk see Loew (2003a); for 
Breslau/Wrocław see Thum (2011); about Breslau/Wrocław see also Davies/
Moorhouse (2002); for Stettin/Sczcecin see Musekamp (2010); for a general 
overview see Serrier (2007).
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increasingly questioned over time, for a long period any doubts about this 
dogma were seen as a provocation, both domestically and geopolitically. 
Jan Józef Lipski’s statement that the Poles are the “depositaries of German 
cultural heritage in Poland” was only accepted by the government and 
wide sections of society after 1989, and actually adopted as a new principle 
of action. More recently, the step from the cultural responsibility Lipski 
meant by the term “depositary” to the freedom of players to shape society 
together was taken by Robert Traba, the head of the Allenstein cultural 
association, Borussia, when he wrote in 2001, the 300th jubilee of the cor-
onation of the ﬁrst Prussian king, Frederick I: 
We are no longer only depositaries; we are becoming intellectual co-inheritors of 
the Prussian cultural heritage. For the first time, this is happening not as a result of 
attempts at national appropriation, but because of the natural desire for emotion-
al identification with the cultural landscape that has to be saved (Traba 2005b).
On the same note, after the Prussian jubilee year in 2001 Adam Krzemińs-
ki, editor-in-chief of the magazine Polityka, published an article with the 
still-provocative title, “Prussia, that’s us!” (Krzemiński 2001). It has be-
come quite common for Polish authors today to tackle controversial topics 
like the expulsion of the Germans from their cities, as Stefan Chwin did 
in his novel Death in Danzig, or Artur Daniel Liskowacki in his Szczecin 
trilogy. In this context we should mention the most spectacular and best-
known process of historical revision: Polish scholarly historical studies 
and literary works on the expulsion of the Germans from Poland. The 
four-volume edition of the Polish records of this, produced by joint Ger-
man-Polish cooperation, is a particularly important example here (Lem-
berg/Borodziej 2000-2004).
“Letting other people tell your story from their viewpoint” corresponds 
exactly to Paul Ricoeur’s recent ideas on the topic of the mourning process 
and translation between cultures. A revived image of history and a new 
relationship to the concept of “Heimat” are inseparably linked here. In 
the northwestern regions of Poland, the former “German East,” a new 
regional identity is taking root with a liberated approach to the history 
before 1945.
Writers such as Günter Grass, Horst Bienek, Siegfried Lenz and Arno 
Schmidt in West Germany, and Christa Wolf and Johannes Bobrowski 
in East Germany, alongside public ﬁgures like Countess Marion Dönhoﬀ 
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and, not least, the turn in West German policy towards East Germany 
associated with Willy Brandt, have made a signiﬁcant contribution in this 
area. All these inﬂuential ﬁgures showed their willingness to tackle the 
past by critically challenging the overly emotional attitude to the concept 
of Heimat propagated by German expellee associations, or by dissociating 
themselves from the “anti-fascist” discourse of the former East German 
regime. Their approaches were welcomed particularly eagerly in opposi-
tional circles in Poland. They served as a rebuttal of alleged “West German 
revanchism.” Through this, the representatives of a “diﬀerent” Germany 
paved the way to fundamentally question the legitimacy of the communist 
rulers in the People’s Republic of Poland with their policy of suspicion 
towards Germany. 
There is little doubt that the preparatory eﬀect of that ideological crit-
icism, particularly on the West German side, was essential for the “open 
regionalism” advocated by groups such as the Polish cultural society 
Borussia in Olsztyn, in former East Prussia. In the literary sphere this 
mutual rapprochement and recognition is reﬂected in works by authors 
such as Paweł Huelle, Olga Tokarczuk, Stefan Chwin, and Artur Daniel 
Liskowacki, who have become so important now and who are explicitly re-
valuating the intellectual heritage of the German past for their new home 
towns, Gdansk, Szczecin, and Wałbrzych. This paradigm change in the 
perception of the symbolic territory is also reﬂected on the symbolic level 
of the politics of history. For instance, in 2002 the city of Gdansk, to hon-
our its “expelled son” Günter Grass, erected a statue of his fetish ﬁgure, 
Oskar Matzerath (Serrier forthcoming).
The essay “Bresław” by the writer Andrzej Zawada from Wrocław rep-
resents this trend, which tends towards hybridization, of combining the 
German past with the Polish present. The city of “Bresław” doesn’t exist 
on any map. The name, a ﬁctitious blend of Polish and German, suggests 
there could soon be intermingling of identity and not only in historians’ 
fantasy or in writers’ imagination (Zawada 1996). It may really be the case 
that the regime of national territoriality, which relies on demarcation, is in 
the process of dissolution (at least in some people’s minds).
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CONCLUSION
We could derive the following proposition on these current events in Po-
land’s northwestern regions. Despite the discontinuity of players, the uni-
ty of place fulﬁls the decisive function in the conﬁguration of “cultural 
memory,” while the dividing moment is mainly preserved in “communi-
cative memories,” which remain unique. We still have to ask, how repre-
sentative is the change in the territorial regime and in historical culture 
at the moment? Meanwhile, the shared retrospective view of this territory, 
which was once partitioned and partly disputed, testiﬁes perhaps only to 
the constitution of a speciﬁc German-Polish “ﬁeld” that is legitimated on 
both sides by maintaining political dialogue and by the sphere of cultural 
and scholarly collaboration, but that is far from being equivalent to the 
societies as a whole. Now and then, signs of return to a traditional victim 
discourse hit the headlines on both sides of the Oder.
Whatever the case, despite their fragmentary character, which can 
hardly be denied, the individual studies outlined in the present contribu-
tion have demonstrated that the histoire croisée approach based on histori-
cal relations can prove fertile for the speciﬁc ﬁeld of research on collective 
memory. In fact, examining the interrelation of German and Polish collec-
tive memories from the aspect of their mutual interdependence is proving 
extremely productive, whether for analyzing the mutual delimitation of 
collective memories that characterized the regime of symbolic national 
territoriality, or for setting the present approaches of a German-Polish 
“memory transfer” against the historical backdrop with due caution and 
sobriety.
Translated from German by Karen Margolis
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The View of French Diplomacy on the 
German-Polish Border Shift, 1940-1950
Eloi Piet
INTRODUCTION
The Western territories gained back by Poland are Polish territories. Effor ts to de-
velop those territories made over the last eighteen months deserve all our atten-
tion. These regions have already lost their German character; the last remaining 
Germans will soon be gone. We, the French, consider the Polish borders – as es-
tablished in Potsdam – to be totally legitimate, both historically speaking and from 
the perspective of the security of Poland and the other Slavonic nations (Roger 
Garreau)1.
The demographic substitution that Poland meant to carry on along the Oder-Neis-
se border is baffling […]. Modernity – as it is understood in the Western world – has 
receded toward the center of Europe in front of [the destitution in the ex-German 
territories colonized by Poland]. That may be one of the aspects of the Oder Neisse 
issue that is of interest not only for Germany but for the whole of occidental civili-
zation, which is receding westward (Marc Popilet)2.
1 | Statement made at the Polish news agency, on September 9, 1946 in Warsaw, 
by Roger Garreau, French ambassador in Poland. AMAE (Archives du Ministère 
des Affaires étrangères), Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, minorités 
polonaises en Allemagne et question des frontières, statement of Roger Garreau, 
French ambassador in Poland, September 9, 1946 in Warsaw, in a report of the 
French Intelligence Agency of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, l’Ouest polonais et la 
nouvelle frontière polono-allemande, p. 247.
2 | Introduction and conclusion of a report regarding the Polish colonization in 
ex-German territories pronounced by the French ‘chargé d’affaire’ in Poland, Marc 
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Here are two conﬂicting examples of the way French diplomacy inter-
preted change in the location of the German-Polish border from 1940 to 
1950.3 Might a study of the way French diplomacy perceived the territori-
al shift, upon which it had a limited impact notably due to its declining 
inﬂuence in Europe, be of possible interest? At the outset of the research 
project whose results are reported in this contribution, the goal was only to 
study a description of Germans being expelled from Poland and how they 
were portrayed in French diplomatic archives in order to obtain a French 
viewpoint of the eﬀect of Flucht und Vertreibung (escape and expulsion) 
of 15 million Germans from Central and Eastern Europe after the end of 
the Second World War. This research focused on the “Pologne” archives 
in Quai d’Orsay (the Foreign Aﬀair oﬃces) and on documents issued by 
French diplomatic centers in Poland reporting on changes in the location 
of the Oder-Neisse border. These other documents are located in the War-
saw Embassy and at the consulates in Wrocław, Szczecin, and Gdańsk. 
Even though it would have been hard to expect any commiseration for 
Germans expelled out of Poland on the part of French diplomats, their 
disinterest for this issue was nevertheless striking. To them, it was only a 
small element of a bigger and much more meaningful phenomenon: the 
German enemy had just lost over 100,000 square kilometers of territory 
that had been annexed and colonized by Poland. It therefore became nec-
essary account for two other aspects of the border shift: the diplomatic 
ﬁght, led by Poland, to obtain the Allies’ full recognition of the Oder-Neis-
se line after Potsdam; and the Polish colonization of the Recovered Territo-
ries (zemie odzyskanie).
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed on August 23, 1939, set up the 
conditions for the Nazi politics of extermination and exploitation from 
1939 to 1944 and the Sovietization of the eastern border territories (Kresy 
in Polish) led by the USSR from September 1939 to August 1941. A to-
tal ethnic, political, and territorial transformation of the country then 
occurred during the post-war period (Borodziej/Lemberg 2004: 37ﬀ.). 
The weakening of Polish society as a result of large-scale ethnic cleansing 
Popilet on June 20, 1950.AMAE, Nantes, French Ambassy in Poland, folder no 25, 
Terres de l’Ouest, November 1945 – July 1948, report by Marc Popilet to the For-
eign Ministry.
3 | We studied these two examples for our MA thesis at the Institute Pierre Renou-
vin, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne with Professor Antoine Marès.
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conducted by Moscow and Berlin and the liquidation of the Polish elite 
enabled Stalin to use Poland as a communist buﬀer state at Germany’s 
expense. Moscow feared that the Allies would restore German industry 
and use it against the USSR (Soutou 2007: 121). The communist regime 
of Warsaw expelled about nine million Germans across the Oder-Neisse 
border between 1945 and 1947 and organized at the same time the set-
tlement of 5 million Polish colonists to those territories. This ethnic and 
territorial displacement, held up as a compensation for the loss of the Pol-
ish boundaries annexed to the USSR, was one of the most signiﬁcant in 
contemporary European history and was part of the larger phenomenon 
of displacement imposed upon 30 million Europeans between 1940 and 
1970 period (Ther 2001: 44).
In the post war context, French diplomacy hardly could have any im-
pact on such a major territorial shift. US assistance to rebuild France 
(Blum-Byrnes agreement, May 6, 1946) and the military alliance with 
Great Britain (Dunkirk treaty, March 4, 1946), and negotiations with Mos-
cow for the disarmament of communist militias in France were the major 
issues for French diplomacy. In comparison, the German-Polish border 
shift was of little consequence. And yet, the Quai d’Orsay’s view of the 
German-Polish border shift did touch on issues of major importance to 
liberated France, at least until 1947. Reinforced security against potential 
German aggression, access to coal reserves, and the apparently non-ideo-
logical union of Polish political parties were among these issues. French 
diplomacy consisted of a stream of information about the border shift, 
structured by the defense of French interests in Europe. Oﬃcial positions 
were mixed with conﬁdential analysis. This stream ﬂowed on three levels. 
The ﬁrst level is the French government, which made decisions regarding 
the oﬃcial recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. The second level is the 
Quai d’Orsay, which prepared an alliance with Poland from 1946-47 be-
fore improving relations with what would become the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) against Soviet wishes. The third level is represented by 
the French diplomats in Poland who reported on the colonization of for-
mer German territories. Instructions on how to represent the French view 
of a potential recognition of the Oder Neisse border and how to analyze the 
border shift came down from the ﬁrst level. French observers in Poland, 
in turn, made suggestions about how France should position itself in this 
diplomatic border conﬂict pitting the USSR and Poland against the USA, 
Britain and occupied West Germany.
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The study of French diplomacy regarding the Oder-Neisse border sup-
poses an understanding of the imagery of French diplomacy. This imag-
ery was a product of Paris observing the border shift through a perceptual 
system created by its strategic and ideological view of the international 
scene. From the 1945 German defeat to the beginning of the Korean war 
in 1950, both the border shift itself and the French perceptual system were 
transformed, resulting in a dramatic reversal of the French position. 
The following analysis proceeds in three parts. The ﬁrst part contains 
an analysis of diplomatic opinion on the shift during the war (1940-45). In 
1942, French diplomats welcomed the annexation plans by the Polish gov-
ernment in London exile. Later, in the last months of 1944 they tightened 
their relations with the communist counterpart of the Polish Government 
in London exile, the Polish Committee for National Liberation (Pkwn), 
which was being supported by the Red Army in Warsaw. In both cases, 
the diplomatic gestures were intended help the allies encircle Germany, 
expected to be defeated soon. Part two contains an analysis of how French 
diplomats compared the river Oder – actual border of Poland – to the river 
Rhine that France wanted to make its eastern border at that time. France 
had been excluded from Potsdam but still had ways of controlling Germa-
ny’s reconstruction, notably due to the seat on the Allied Control Council 
it was granted in September, 1945 (Bossuat 1997: 37ﬀ.). At that point, the 
Cold War seemed unavoidable to the countries that defeated Germany. 
France had already chosen an alliance with America at the expense of an 
alliance with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Part three describes the reversal 
of the French diplomatic position on the new border, which then had been 
adopted by Warsaw. From 1948 to 1950, diplomats contrasted the failures 
of Polish colonization on the Oder to the modernization being achieved in 
France through the Marshall and Schuman plans and called attention to 
the fate of Germans who had stayed in Poland. 
FR ANCE AT WAR AND THE BEGINNINGS OF POL AND’S 
GESTURES TO THE WEST: SYMPATHY AND CAUTION 
(OCTOBER 1944 – AUGUST 1945)
The Free French (those who had decided to carry on ﬁghting despite of the 
French defeat and to follow General de Gaulle after June 1940) gathered 
in London under de Gaulle’s command, were able to meet the soldiers 
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and the members of the Polish government of General Sikorski who had 
gone into exile. Remembering the sometimes diﬃcult relationships with 
Poland during the inter-war period, the Free French viewed the ﬁrst Pol-
ish projects of annexation of German territories that were presented in 
October 1940 suspiciously (Marès 1982). In 1941, the deadlock gradually 
dissolved: the common interest of Free France and the Polish government 
in cooperation, the commitment to the historical alliance between the two 
countries, and personal relationships established during the exile melt-
ed French reluctance. When in March 1942, Polish diplomats delivered 
a memorandum to the Foreign Oﬃce calling for the annexation of East 
Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Gdansk, the French were inclined to back 
it. In January 1942, de Gaulle gave his conditional consent. The head of 
the CNF (Comité National Français) had indeed ensured to Sikorski that 
France would support the Polish plan and that he was interested in reviv-
ing the historical alliance between the two countries. Besides the wish to 
beneﬁt from a strong alliance within Europe, the French support ﬁt into 
a wider scheme of eﬀorts ﬁrst launched by Clemenceau at the Paris Con-
ference (January 1919- August 1920). France had then supported Polish 
claims on Upper Silesia, Gdansk, and Eastern Prussia against Germany, 
notably in the prospect of weakening this country to the advantage of a 
trustworthy ally.4 The strategic weight of the German borders in Poland 
had urged France to sign a treaty of alliance with Warsaw in February 1921. 
Yet, de Gaulle demanded that the Polish cooperate with the Soviet Union. 
He admitted to Sikorski that he wished to deal carefully with the Moscow 
alliance and that France would not interfere in a conﬂict over Poland’s 
eastern boundary. Free France avoided giving any guarantee regarding 
Poland’s eastern borders. It oﬀered support of Poland’s plan to advance its 
western borders at Germany’s expense, which in consequence would be 
beneﬁcial to Paris.
An alliance with the Soviets was interesting for French diplomats who 
not only wished to revive the 1892 Franco-Russian alliance to dominate 
Germany permanently and also to counterbalance American inﬂuence 
after the victory (Laforêt 1999). The will to maintain a worldwide balance 
of power was closely linked to the goal of opposing its allies on Germany. 
4 | “Security on the Vistula complemented security on the Rhine, and the more 
Germany was weakened in the east, the less menace she offered on the west” 
(Wandycz 1962: 29).
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Paris suggested at that time that Germany should be divided, that the 
Ruhr and Rhineland should be economically united to France and that 
Saarland should be annexed to France outright. The Rhineland plan 
elaborated by the French Committee of National Liberation was intend-
ed to strengthen France’s security and guarantee access to German coal, 
thought to be indispensable for rebuilding Europe (Bossuat 1997: 37ﬀ.). 
These plans had been refused by London and Washington as early as the 
Yalta conference (February 4-11, 1945) but seemed to France to be backed 
by the USSR. Soviet diplomacy gave some hope to Paris. At that point, 
Stalin did not hide his goal of permanently annexing the Polish eastern 
border territories, which triggered a crisis in London. To France at war, it 
became obvious that the Polish government in London was doomed due 
to the progress of the Soviets towards the West and that it was necessary to 
keep it at a distance (Marès 1982: 325).
Initiatives had been taken by French diplomats in Moscow as early as 
1943, showing the importance of rapprochement with Poland regarding 
the new borders of Germany. The ambassador in Moscow, Roger Garreau, 
went on to play a major role in the Franco-Soviet alliance treaty in De-
cember 1944. He thought that Soviet control over Poland, as inevitable 
as it was, would not prevent Poland from allying with France because it 
would lead to the weakening of Germany and accorded with Moscow’s 
security requirements (Bariéty 2008: 210). Having been in contact with 
Polish communists since the end of 1943, Garreau managed to convince 
de Gaulle to tacitly recognise the PKWN, a rival of the government in Lon-
don, so that Stalin’s condition would be met when signing the December 
1944 treaty. At ﬁrst, this treaty was not a way to organize a Franco-Polish 
rapprochement at the expense of Germany’s borders. De Gaulle was very 
reluctant to abandon his Polish friends in London and was disappointed 
by Stalin’s ignoring France, which was not even invited to Yalta. Besides, 
reports written between January and March 1945 by Christian Fouchet, 
French diplomat in Poland and a friend of de Gaulle, gave a clear indica-
tion to de Gaulle that Poland, occupied by the Red Army, was becoming a 
vassal state where communism prevailed.5
Paradoxically, de Gaulle’s foiled hopes did not prevent French diplo-
mats from comparing Poland’s recognized territorial claims on the Oder 
5 | AMAE, Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, Politique intérieure et recon-
struction de l’État polonais, pp. 129ff.
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to the French claims on the Rhine. Garreau actively worked with the un-
oﬃcial Polish foreign minister Zygmunt Modzelewski. In France, which 
was then governed by an alliance composed of socialist and communist 
resistance ﬁghters as well as Christian democrats, the idea of a rapproche-
ment with the PKWN (Laforêt 1999) – which claimed to be a national 
union as well – against Germany was developing. This rapprochement 
could have counterbalanced the creation of blocs in Europe, which would 
have been in keeping with de Gaulle’s politics as head of the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic. The French ambassador in London, 
René Massigli’s, was skeptical regarding the renewal of inter-war alliances 
with Central European countries now occupied by the Red Army, but the 
press and the parties in power subscribed to it (Soutou 1993).
The Potsdam Agreements (August 2, 1945) strengthened the rap-
prochement of France and Poland. France, who was not invited to the con-
ference, learned that the “Big Three” had not accepted the division of Ger-
many or the separation of the Rhineland. Yet, the former had conﬁrmed 
to Paris it was an occupying power and had therefore the power to stop the 
constitution of a central administration in Germany. Thanks to its seat at 
the Allied Control Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris 
was able to stop the recovery of a democratic Germany that was ready to 
sign a permanent peace agreement with the Allies. This could only be a 
transitory situation. The PKWN worried that the British and the Ameri-
can had successfully insisted for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line only 
as a Polish administrative border. France was now aware of the importance 
of the territorial move in Eastern Germany and declared that was ready to 
recognize it in August 1945 under the condition that its plans for Rhine-
land (annexation of Saarland, internationalization of the Ruhr) would 
be added. As Warsaw and Paris developed relationships, France used de 
Gaulle’s support for Polish annexations (which dated to January 1942) and 
related them to its claim. It does not seem that French diplomats thought 
thoroughly about the deportations of millions of Germans from Poland, as 
did their British counterpart (Frank 2007: 86ﬀ.). France oﬃcially opposed 
the deportation of Germans from Central Europe to avoid a socio-econom-
ic imbalance but yet considering the same option – on a smaller scale – to 
secure possession of mining resources in Saarland (Soutou 1998: 170). 
The refusal to acknowledge the deportation of Germans from Poland that 
had started in June 1945 could be explained by the defense of French inter-
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ests in Germany and was received by French diplomats who were enthusi-
astic about Polish colonization of the recovered territories.
THE RHINE/ODER COMPARISON  
(SEP TEMBER 1945 – NOVEMBER 1947)
From September 1945 to April 1947, France strongly disagreed with the 
reconstruction of a uniﬁed Germany, reclaiming at the same time its 
projects for Rhineland to be set up: the separation of the Ruhr and the 
Rhineland and the annexation of the Saarland6. During this period, the 
view French diplomacy cast on the German-Polish border shift appeared 
as a parallel between the rivers Rhine and Oder. In August 1945, French 
diplomacy declared that it agreed with the setting up of the Eastern border 
of Germany along the Oder-Neisse line, linking its oﬃcial recognition to 
the French claims that the Western borders of Germany had to be modi-
ﬁed7. Moreover, by renewing its alliance with Warsaw, Paris tried to escape 
from its isolation regarding this topic. The two countries worked on the 
re-launching of the 1921 treaty. The rapprochement with Poland may look 
surprising considering London’s mistrust towards Warsaw and its alle-
giance to Moscow. To the French, this rapprochement did not act against 
the USSR security; on the contrary, it strengthened it. This presumptuous 
comparison between the river Rhine and the river Oder – in the eyes of the 
Quai d’Orsay, or at least of its people in favour of Moscow – was useful on 
three points: a reinforced security against Germany, the access to German 
coal and the rapprochement with a government supposedly of national 
unity, like in France. As for the German expelled out of Central Europe 
towards occupied areas in Germany, it was granted to Paris that out of the 
6,5 million of German refugees from Central Europe that were planned to 
be resettled in Germany until July 1946, only 150.000 would go to and stay 
6 | In fact, it became in 1946 clear to the French diplomacy that the annexation 
of Saarland was quite impossible. However, it kept on demanding it officially until 
October 1956 in order to please French public opinion and to make the US accept 
a custom union between France and Saarland (Defrance/Pfeil 2012).
7 | AMAE, Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, Frontière germano-polonaise 
et politique polonaise à l’égard de l’Allemagne, 1945-1947, note of August 7, 
1945, unknown author, to Soviet, Britsh and Americain ambassadors in Paris, p.7.
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in the French occupied zone (Soutou 1998: 171). The overpopulation of the 
US and British zones was consequently made worse but this rendered the 
situation easier for the French zone which was dependant on the Amer-
ican, notably for food. In the higher levels of French diplomacy, it was of 
utmost importance not to handle the issue of the deported Germans.
French diplomats in Warsaw, Szczecin, Wrocław and Gdańsk looked 
favourably at the Polish colonisation of recovered territories. During their 
diplomatic missions, diplomats lived in villas whose German owners had 
been dispossessed of them and did not hesitate to pilfer (szaber in Polish) 
to equip the houses8. In post-war Poland, the colonists and the admin-
istrators proved to be francophiles who were happy to help the French. 
Consequently, the opinion on Polish colonisation that can be read in the 
reports sent by the diplomats to Paris is clearly positive. Agreeing on the 
fact that 9 million Germans replaced by 5 million of Polish refugees did 
not make things easy, the French diplomats considered that the eﬀorts 
made by the Polish would allow them to populate the former German 
territories and revive their economy. The French, who were happy with the 
work done by the administrators of the Polish Workers Party (PPR), con-
sidered the terror they had established on the East side of the river Oder as 
a way – brutal but suitable, according to them – to handle the instability of 
the area. Turning a blind eye to the political issues linked to colonisation, 
the French diplomats considered questions that were exclusively linked to 
France.
Consequently, on September 10, 1946, Garreau, since 1945 the French 
ambassador in Warsaw, harshly criticised what James F. Byrnes, US Sec-
retary of state in Stuttgart said on September 6 when reminding that the 
Oder-Neisse line was to be a provisional border until the establishment of 
a global peace treaty with Germany. Garreau recognised, in the name of 
“the French” Poland’s new border and brieﬂy praised the Polish coloni-
sation, specifying that the German democratic ﬂaws would necessitate 
the setting up of Paris’ plans of Rhineland9. Some French diplomats were 
8 | AMAE, Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, Silésie et territoires de 
l’ouest (Silesia and Western Territories), report of doctor-lieutenant Pauliac, 
transmitted by cabinet of general de Gaulle to sous-direction Europe centrale, 
August 25, 1945, p. 33.
9 | AMAE, Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, Frontière germano-polonaise 
et politique polonaise à l’égard de l’Allemagne, 1945-1947, pp. 236ff.
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more careful, underlining that all the Polish people worked together for 
their nation’s greatness rather than staying divided by their ideological 
beliefs. The appearing political pluralism that the communist adminis-
tration of the recovered territories and its minister Władysław Gomułka 
claimed to be representative of, attracted the French diplomats whose 
country had been reconstructed by an alliance ranging from the Christian 
Democrats to the Communist Party (until March 1947). The Quai d’Orsay 
also thought that the Poles could in the future free themselves from the 
Soviet hold by using German industries and coal mines as an impulse 
towards reconstruction. This reminded of France being obsessed by the 
fear of being dependent on the US and on their loans given to reconstruct 
(Soutou 2007: 148).
French diplomats were indiﬀerent to the Germans who had stayed or 
to the conditions of their deportations towards the occupied zones. They 
only mentioned those points when the British government raised them, 
criticising what Warsaw had done to the Germans in the Polish territories. 
In this Anglo-Polish argument, the French were in favour of the Poles, 
stating that the British remonstrance was groundless. Yet they did not 
check the veracity of those, not going in person to check the conditions 
of deportations. The accounts made by the French diplomats regarding 
the relationships that they had with the Germans who had stayed on the 
East side of the Oder river are telling in this respect. The Wrocław consul 
evicted 22 Germans out of the villa chosen as a consulate and would un-
derline the arrogance of the Germans who had stayed in Breslau10. These 
nationalist a priori assumptions against the Germans were to be found in 
other circles. During a stay in Gdańsk in May 1945, Madeleine Pauliac, 
doctor-lieutenant in the French Red Cross, talked to a German lady which 
complained about the fate of her counterparts who had been raped in great 
number by Soviets and Poles. Pauliac answered back mentioning the con-
centration camps11. In her report to de Gaulle’s Cabinet, she described 
the situation of the Polish civilians in Gdańsk but only addressed very 
10 | AMAE, Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, Silésie et territoires de 
l’ouest, report of the French consul in Lower-Silesia, Charles Birckel on Wrocław 
city, December, 1945, pp. 67-73.
11 | AMAE, Courneuve, Europe 1944-1970, Pologne, Silésie et territoires de 
l’ouest, report of doctor-lieutenant Pauliac, transmitted by cabinet of general de 
Gaulle to sous-direction Europe centrale, August 25, 1945, p. 33.
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brieﬂy the lot of the deported German, evoking the French press mock-
ing the German expelled from Alsace in 1918. This hostile indiﬀerence 
for the German on the part of the French diplomats and relief workers 
contrasts with the opinion of their British counterparts in Poland. The 
French position can be explained by the suﬀerings of the German occu-
pation in France, and by the sympathy for the Poles. The strengthening of 
the Soviet and communist oppression on Poland ordered by Stalin during 
the Szklarska Poręba conference (September 22-27, 1947) led the French 
diplomats to watch powerlessly a friend-country being submitted to sovi-
etisation and Stalinism.
THE SHIF T OF THE FRENCH DIPLOMATIC VIE W ON  
THE ODER-NEISSE LINE (NOVEMBER 1947 – JULY 1950)
The shift of the French diplomatic perception on the new German-Pol-
ish border started in the last months of 1947, characterised by the end of 
the four-party government in Germany and the beginning of the Cold 
War. Paris then realised that its attempts to make the most of the con-
ﬂict between the Anglo Americans and the Soviets was starting to be too 
dangerous. The French government – scared by the Soviet aggressiveness 
– managed to rally the side of London and Washington under one condi-
tion: a custom union and the uniﬁcation of Saarland to France. France 
also obtained 2.4 billions of dollars, out of 13 billion that had been given to 
Europe through the Marshall plan in June 1947. Paris had chosen its side. 
The USSR urged the powerful French Communist Party to counteract 
and in December 1947 strikes were set up and the government – boycotted 
by the communists since March – had to call for 80.000 reservists. Close 
the USA, the Quai d’Orsay was backed on parliamentary and governmen-
tal levels by the non-communist parties and their electorship who were 
shocked by the Prague coup in 1948 much more than by the Berlin block-
ade in June. In an old democratic European country, a well-structured 
communist party – with the help of Moscow – had taken the power in the 
absence of the Red Army.
A strong US military presence enabled by the Brussels treaty (March 
1948) in return, Paris had to give its support to the setting up of some-
thing that it had always dreaded: the setting up of a Western German state 
with an important industrial potential. France had become a cold warrior 
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ready to defend the river Elbe when signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 
April 1949. On the other side of this river, serving as a border for Europe 
and for Germany between West and East, Warsaw had taken the same 
way, but in an opposite direction. Despite strong cultural, economic and 
sometimes diplomatic exchanges until 1947, France and Poland stopped 
trying to maintain their friendship and started a little cold war in 1949 (Ja-
rosz/Pasztor 2005: 120ﬀ.). The Polish government sued French diplomats 
arrested in Poland, accusing them of being spies. And Paris responded by 
police retaliations on the Poles of France close to the Polish United Work-
ers Party (PZPR).
Contrarily to how it stood in 1945, Polish propaganda praised the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR) and its good Germans in order to oppose 
them to France, accused of being the slave of American imperialism. Po-
land’s ﬂatorous words to the GDR were rewarded by the Görlitz/Zgorzelec 
treaty signed on July 6, 1950. Through this treaty, the GDR recognised 
the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s Eastern border. Imposed by Moscow, 
this position on the part of the GDR was immediately criticised by Bonn, 
Washington and London which considered as a violation of the Potsdam 
agreement all territorial shifts impacting on Germany’s sovereignty that 
were made without the consent of the Potsdam signatories. From 1945 
to April 1947, Paris supported unoﬃcially the Oder-Neisse line in order 
to defend its interests in Germany. On July 1950, France declared that it 
only recognized the FRG as the legitimate German state and its right to 
represent this country in its 1937 borders (Laurent 1974/75: 122ﬀ.). This 
statement showed a modiﬁcation in France’s way of considering the bor-
der shift between Germany and Poland but according to us, this position 
can better be explained by a realist continuity of the French position rather 
than by an idealist break that would have beneﬁted to German people. 
Between 1945 and 1947, three criteria had conditioned the creation of a 
parallel made by the French between the rivers Rhine and Oder: the se-
curity against Germany, the access to its coal and a projection on Poland 
of a political project that was wished by the French opinion. This diplo-
matic shift was to be found amongst the French diplomats in Poland who 
expressed diﬀerent, although closely related reasons (the political project 
was in 1949 reconciliation with the Germans).
Some observers of the Polish colonisation noted that the sovietisation 
of the economy in the recovered territories created in 1947 had dreadful 
economic consequences. Added to this point was the critique of political 
The View of French Diplomacy on the German-Polish Border Shif t 229
Stalinism imposed on Poland as early as 1948 with Gomułka being evict-
ed in favour of Bolesław Bierut. Through the description of the fear of the 
colonists subjected to political pressures that ceaselessly grew stronger, 
French diplomats draw a panorama pervaded by the image of the Quai 
d’Orsay’s close relationship with the USA. For instance, the gathering of 
Soviet troops in Western Poland and the weight of local politics were de-
scribed as the persistence of late Prussia, which symbolised for the French 
the totalitarianism which was a characteristic of the Third Reich and Ger-
man militarism12. Similarly, experts at the Quai d’Orsay gave no credit to 
the declarations of friendship and cooperation of the GDR and Poland. 
Economic necessity rather than reconciliation, bloc perspective rather that 
spontaneity of the peoples: the French diplomats could have brought close 
the German-Polish cooperation on the Oder line and the Franco-German 
reconciliation that was beginning with the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity. But the French experts chose to oppose the colons’ hatred for the 
Germans and the nationalist propaganda of the PZPR against the Euro-
pean and international opening-up of France. The freedom of movement 
of goods and people that was occurring in Western Europe undeniably 
contrasted with the situation experienced by the Germans who had stayed 
in Poland where they were often exploited. In 1950, Poland had extended 
the status of germanised Poles to almost all the Germans that had not 
been expelled13. Oﬃcially, this was to enable families who could prove that 
they had ties with Poland to stay, unoﬃcially, this aimed at keeping work-
ers and minds that were necessary to the reconstruction of the recovered 
territories. The French made no mistake about it, considering that these 
Germans played a key role against the economic failures of decolonisation. 
Consequently, they paid attention to their plights that they had ignored in 
1945 and 1946. This new idealist empathy relied on a realist critique of the 
Poland’s politico-economic evolution.
This new interest had a consequence on Paris’s position regarding the 
conﬂict opposing the British occupying authorities and Warsaw in March 
1950. Following talks between these two parties, it had been planned that 
12 | AMAE, Nantes, Ambassy in Warsaw, carton n° 25, Terres de l’ouest, report of 
French consul in Wrocław Guy Monge on an exhibition on the Recovered Territories 
in the city, June 2, 1948.
13 | Atlas Zwangsumsiedlung, Flucht und Vertreibung, Ostmitteleuropa, 1939-
1959, Warsaw: Demart 2009, p. 202.
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at that moment, thousands of Germans who had stayed in Poland could 
join their families in Western Germany. And yet Poland kept the Ger-
mans who were useful for its economy or enabled them to join the GDR 
and with the latter, they screened the “unproductive people” letting them 
move to the FRG. London and Washington immediately expressed their 
opposition, denouncing on the one hand the violation of the agreements 
and on the other the damage done to the people deported and their fam-
ily. Humanitarian arguments were taken over by the French ambassador 
in Warsaw adding some weight to France’s view on these Anglo Saxon 
critiques against Poland14. These very same critiques had seemed ground-
less a few years ago for the French diplomats. It would be too hasty to 
conclude that France’s position was only fed by an idealist concern to help 
the refugees’ families of the FRG. The High Commission of the French 
Republic in Germany compared Warsaw’s attitude towards the German 
repatriates to the harsh recruitment by this capital city of Polish minors 
in the North of France to cover the German minors of Silesia15. This com-
mitment towards the FRG in March 1950 was nurtured by French resent-
ments against Poland due to the competition that had been on since 1946 
for labour force.
CONCLUSION
The reversal in the way French diplomacy regarded the German-Pol-
ish border shift from 1940 to 1950 can largely be explained by the Cold 
War, which was a turning point for Europe. Its impact can be observed 
at the three levels. In 1945, the French government unoﬃcially backed 
the Oder-Neisse line, hoping to create an alliance with Poland with the 
consent of the USSR. A condoned Polish alliance would have granted 
France reinforced security against Germany and access to coal. In 1950, 
the French government, absent the communists, who had left it in March 
14 | AMAE, Nantes, Ambassy in Warsaw, carton n° 20, Transferts de populations, 
note of Jean Baelen ambassador in Poland to Polish foreign ministry, March 9, 
1950.
15 | AMAE, Nantes, Ambassy in Warsaw, carton n° 28, OTC in organisation de 
l’Allemagne, 1950-1952, note of François Seydoux, chief of the direction Europe, 
to French embassy in Warsaw, April 4, 1950.
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1947, acknowledged the 1937 German-Polish border after having signed 
two months earlier a treaty of alliance with the FRG. The USA as an occu-
pying force of West Germany, guaranteed coal and security to France. In 
1945, part of the Quai d’Orsay tried to revive the inter-war alliances with 
Central Europe to encircle Germany and stop the bloc partition in Eu-
rope. In 1950, the French Foreign ministry agreed with the FRG to guard 
against a potential Soviet expansion over the Elbe line. In 1945, diplomats 
in the recovered territories, referring to issues related to France, described 
in positive terms the Polish colonization, considering deportation to be 
but a minor detail. This way of considering the situation lasted until 1950 
and represented the Oder-Neisse line as a foil to the plans of Marshall and 
Schuman.
In spite of that turning point, it must be underscored that the con-
tinuity characteristic of French diplomacy and its relationships with 
Warsaw played a key role in the reversal of its view on the Polish shift. A 
concurrence on immigration between Paris and Warsaw, and diplomatic 
relations that were actually more complex than implied by their mutual 
declarations of friendship, worsened the Franco-Polish friendship. More-
over, a structural weaknesses in the two countries urged them to call for 
help from outside Europe. Tensions between the Polish and French gov-
ernments must be taken into account if one wants to understand the rift 
between the two countries. Yet both countries treated this new conﬂict as 
an accidental break in their historical friendship, and in 1953, after Stalin’s 
death, they took the initiative to resume contact (Jarosz/Pasztor 2005). Fi-
nally, the reversal of French opinion on Poland’s border from 1940 to 1950 
can also be explained by the evolution of the concept of border within 
French diplomacy. In 1945, borders were used as a diplomatic tool to cre-
ate new German boundaries in order to check German power. A parallel 
between the rivers Rhine and Oder was drawn, for instance. But by 1950, 
from the viewpoint of Paris, the contestation of the borders had become 
an obstacle to the constitution of a strong and peaceful Europe, and France 
had begun opening up its own borders, notably with Germany. Yet French 
diplomats in Poland still insisted that Poland was tightening its borders 
with its neighbors and with Western Europe as well as strengthening the 
military and police takeover of the western voivodeships. This stands in 
stark contrast to the opening up of France’s borders within Western Eu-
rope that was then underway.
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Over the long term, France was to abandon its negative view of the 
Oder-Neisse line and insisted that the FRG recognize it as Germany’s east-
ern border. In March 1959, de Gaulle, who was recently back in power, 
required the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line by the FRG as the pre-
requisite for any future German reuniﬁcation. Thirty years later, François 
Mitterrand obtained from the FRG the deﬁnite recognition of the Pots-
dam line as one of the preconditions for receiving French support for 
German reuniﬁcation. France was aware of the perils linked to territorial 
resentment between Poland and Germany and thus worked to normalize 
east-west relations and to put an end to the Oder-Neisse disagreement.
Translated from French by Charlotte Faucher
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Cross-Border Interaction in  
Europe’s Neighbourhood

Borders, De Facto Borders and Mobility 
Policies in Conflict Transformation 
The Cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Giulia Prelz Oltramonti
INTRODUCTION
The two separatist conﬂicts that led to the establishment of de facto in-
dependences from Georgia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 
1990s1 created a status quo regarding territorial boundaries that lasted 
until the Russo-Georgian conﬂict of August 2008. However, far from be-
ing immutable, the dividing lines between the separatist territories and 
the rest of Georgia were subject to processes of “hardening and softening,” 
inﬂuenced both by state and non-state actors, throughout the stalemates 
that characterized most of the 1990s and 2000s.
This contribution looks at the inﬂuence of regional and local actors on 
the evolution of external and internal boundaries, borders, and de facto 
borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia between the ceaseﬁre agreements 
of the early 1990s and the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Although a range 
of variables can aﬀect the transformation of boundaries and borders con-
currently, the main focus of the following analysis is on mobility poli-
cies – policies aimed at enhancing or reduce the movement of goods and 
people. As argued below, these have proven to be a key factor framing the 
social and economic boundaries and borders in the case of Georgia and its 
separatist territories.
The analysis begins by distinguishing between borders, ceaseﬁre lines, 
and de facto borders in order to clarify the speciﬁc nature of the dividing 
1 | For an overview of de facto states in the former Soviet Union, see Lynch (2004).
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lines that separate Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia. It 
then provides a review of mobility policies in conﬂict situations, which are 
traditionally conﬁned to trade sanctions and trade incentives. Analytically, 
there is a need to expand upon a narrow approach to mobility policies to 
include both formal and informal policies promoted by state and non-state 
actors. A wider understanding of mobility policies is therefore proposed 
before approaching the empirical cases. 
BORDERS, CE ASEFIRE LINES, AND DE FACTO BORDERS
Although the words “boundary” and “border” are terms used in everyday 
language, clarity requires some brief deﬁning remarks. If boundaries are 
the dividing lines at which something changes, separating areas of certain 
rules of behavior (Migdal 2004), borders can be deﬁned as “ﬁxed, legal, 
geopolitical entities” (Goodhand 2008). In cases of conﬂict, borders’ very 
permanence and legality may be tested, for example by a change in the 
interpretation of international law, by diﬀerences in the way key parties 
interpret the law, by a change in international law itself, or in the constel-
lation of geopolitical factors. As expressed by Jackson, “[borders] are not 
a permanence but merely a staged claim to permanence” (Jackson 2008: 
269). Moreover, the permanence and the legality of borders may fail to 
coincide.
Not all the boundaries containing Abkhazia and South Ossetia fall 
under the category of “border.” While the lines dividing the Russian Fed-
eration from Abkhazia and South Ossetia were, during the timeframe 
under scrutiny, internationally recognized borders between Georgia and 
the Russian Federation, the status of the lines separating these two de 
facto states and Georgia is less clear. The ceaseﬁre lines of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia remained ﬁxed dividing lines, patrolled respectively by a 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force stationed 
under the observation of a small United Nations Military Observer Mis-
sion since 1993, and a peacekeeping force of Ossetians, Russians, and 
Georgians, monitored by a mission of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, since 1992. 
However, the term “ceaseﬁre line” does not capture the multifaceted 
dynamics that shape relations between two neighbors in any areas other 
than security and the cessation of hostilities. Ceaseﬁre agreements usu-
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ally lead either to peace accords or to the resumption of conﬂict. In some 
cases, however, ceaseﬁre agreements linger on as the status quo for pro-
longed periods of time. Ceaseﬁre lines can therefore evolve into demili-
tarized and highly securitized zones, such as in the cases of Korea and 
Nagarno-Karabakh, or into semi-permeable boundaries with low levels of 
violence, such as in the case of Transdniestria. During prolonged stale-
mates, ceaseﬁre lines take on the traits of borders, with the exception of 
legal recognition under international law. Parallel to the denomination of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “de facto states”, we will thus refer to their 
borders as “de facto borders.” 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF BORDERS AND BORDERL ANDS
Boundaries can be hardened or softened to suit various interests, a pro-
cess deﬁned as “boundary activation” (Tilly 2003). Borders can undergo 
similar processes. Inquiries into what happens when a border is activated, 
especially on the impact of the porosity of borders on stakeholders of bor-
der systems, centered initially on anthropological issues of identity (Don-
nan/Wilson 1999; Flynn 1997; Long/Villarreal 1999). However, a better 
understanding of political-economic agendas in civil wars (Berdal/Malone 
2000) has led scholars to pay greater attention to war economies in their 
regional contexts (Pugh/Cooper 2004), including also the transitional lo-
cations between state and region and, accordingly, borders and surround-
ing borderlands (Goodhand 2008). 
Conventional liberal wisdom is that when boundaries harden, oppor-
tunities are lost. However, studies have shown that reality is multifaceted, 
with winners and losers arising from border activation. Jackson points out 
that borderlands in fact generally create “energies and opportunities aris-
ing from the contrasts and discontinuities that they both create and then 
police” (Jackson 2008: 266).
In order to understand the mechanisms behind such processes, we 
should ﬁrst elucidate the role of borders in political economies. Borders 
are ﬁrst and foremost “sites and symbols of power” (Donnan/Wilson 
1999: 1) As such, borders are key locations where the state asserts its au-
thority by erecting border and customs posts and by limiting the ﬂows 
of people and goods eligible for transit. Because of the costs of transit 
authorities can impose, an incentive to cross the border is created: the 
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service of moving goods (and people) across the regulated boundary can 
bring proﬁts. As Donnan and Wilson assert, “[the] existence [of borders] 
as barriers to movement can simultaneously create reasons to cross them” 
(Donnan/Wilson 1999: 87). To illustrate, let us point out that for the resi-
dents of the borderlands commerce across dividing lines often represents 
one of the few ways to make a living. For the private sector, borders repre-
sent a hurdle (in terms of logistics and ﬁnances) but also an opportunity 
to increase proﬁts from additional services. For administrations and law 
enforcement agencies, borders are the line along which taxation can be 
extracted, whether oﬃcially through duties or unoﬃcially through bribes. 
Stakeholders of border systems are therefore numerous and diverse.
Mobility across borders is a priced asset that inﬂuences the livelihoods 
and the economies of the regions surrounding them. Hence, elucidating 
what sort of inﬂuence various stakeholders have in determining the poros-
ity and permeability of conﬂict borders leads to a new understanding of 
the dynamics that underpin conﬂicts in borderlands. 
MOBILIT Y POLICIES IN CONFLICT SE T TINGS
Because borders are never static, mobility policies aﬀect the evolution of 
borders and boundaries (Newman/Paasi 1998). States and non-state ac-
tors can harden or soften borders according to their particular interests 
and can draw on a multiplicity of methods for doing so. Within this frame-
work, mobility policies should be examined carefully in cases of conﬂict 
because of the unusual nature of the political economy of borderlands. 
For cases of conﬂict, mobility policies traditionally have been ana-
lyzed in terms of formal arrangements that regulate the ﬂow of goods. 
The two most scrutinized options are trade sanctions and trade incentives 
of various kinds.2 A combination of the two can also be implemented, a 
method that has been hailed as the most eﬀective (Amini 1997). Since 
the early 1990s, support for all-encompassing economic sanctions weak-
ened because they were generally deemed ineﬀective in bringing about 
major changes in policy (Hufbauer et al. 1990: 94). Their negative impact 
on civilian livelihoods and their fostering of criminal behavior were also 
put forward as reasons for discontinuing or avoiding embargos (Ballen-
2 | For an analysis of power relations in sanctions see Baldwin (1971).
Borders, De Facto Borders and Mobility Policies 241
tine 2003: 279). While it is extremely diﬃcult to quantify the results of 
sanctions, their eﬀectiveness depends “on what goals they are measured 
against” (Dowty 1994: 192). Relevant goals have been classiﬁed into three 
main categories: behavioral change, containment, and regime change 
(O’Sullivan 2003).
In some cases, all-encompassing sanctions proved not only ineﬀective, 
but also counterproductive, generating a “rally ‘round the ﬂag” eﬀect (Cor-
tright 2007b: 392). In the Abkhaz case, they reinforced a siege mentality 
(Matveeva 2002: 419); the impact of trade restrictions on South Ossetia in 
2004, discussed below, is similar in this sense. On the other hand, how-
ever, sanctions can at times support the creation of internal opposition, as 
has happened in the case of Transdniestria in 2006. Diﬀerent reactions to 
commercial restrictions depend on the varying nature, implementation, 
and framework of changes in customs regulation. 
A general preference for incentives versus negative sanctions has in-
creased in the last decade (Newham 2000: 8). In both cases, however, the 
eﬀectiveness of inducement strategies depends on the sender’s objectives, 
the nature of the recipient regime, the political dynamics between sender 
and recipient and, crucially, the presence or absence of exogenous incen-
tives (Cortright 1997a: 272-290; Rock 2000). Two more factors aﬀect the 
eﬀectiveness of both sanctions and incentives. First, receivers may per-
ceive economic pressure diﬀerently than intended by senders. Secondly, 
the ability of countries to implement sanctions and incentives varies, as 
does their ability to monitor ﬁnancial and commercial ﬂows regionally. 
These factors partly depend on the state capacity of senders; the role of 
the neighboring countries and of regional powers is also crucial in the 
implementation of national strategies for dealing with separatist entities. 
However, the failure to implement sanctions consistently alters their ef-
fectiveness while undermining the legitimacy of the sender (Pugh/Coo-
per 2004: 227). 
The sanctions/incentives approach, however, reﬂects the actions of a 
very limited pool of actors, namely governments and international bod-
ies, and fails to take into consideration the micro-dimension of boundary 
dynamics. The need arises then to expand our understanding of mobility 
policies in order to encompass the large variety of actors, both formal and 
informal, and methods that aﬀect the de facto borders under scrutiny. In 
the framework of this contribution, mobility policies are thus understood 
to include formal policies aimed at allowing or limiting the movement of 
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people and goods, planning of infrastructure that facilitates or hampers 
the movement of people and goods, and commercial policies between de 
facto states and other regional actors. They also involve unoﬃcial policies, 
such as facilitating or impeding unsanctioned trade, inﬂuencing peace-
keeping operations, and promoting or reining in non-state violence in the 
borderlands.
This approach expands the understanding of the scope of mobility pol-
icies, which traditionally included only sanctions and incentives, to a wid-
er concurrence of factors behind the hardening and softening of borders. 
An analysis of such mobility policies shows clearly which actors sought to 
harden and which actors sought to soften borders and boundaries, asking 
also why and how. 
GEORGIA’S AND RUSSIA’S MOBILIT Y POLICIES: 
IMPLEMENTING AND UNDERMINING SANCTIONS  
AND INCENTIVES 
The two actors that had a decisive impact on the borders, whether de facto 
or de jure, of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are Georgia and the Russian 
Federation, being the only two countries that share a border with the de 
facto states. South Ossetia is in fact landlocked by its two larger neighbors, 
while Abkhazia has an extensive coastline along the Black Sea. 
Georgia lost control over most of the territory of the two separatist 
regions after the 1991-1992 conﬂict with South Ossetia and the 1992-1994 
conﬂict with Abkhazia. Although ceaseﬁre agreements held, with some 
resumption of violence, until 2008, no peace agreement was reached. 
Georgia never recognized the independence of the de facto states; its 
stated goal remains to reintegrate the two regions within the Georgian 
state, following the principles of territorial integrity and national sover-
eignty. The Georgian authorities decisively rejected the status quo and 
attempted to craft their mobility policies accordingly. In the case of Russia, 
however, the implementation of mobility policies with regard to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia must be seen in the context of its policy regarding its 
neighbor countries and, more generally, of its foreign policy. While there 
is no straightforward interpretation of Russia’s policy towards its closest 
neighbors or the South Caucasus, especially in the 1990s, the key factor 
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underlying it was the attempt to maintain a strong inﬂuence over border-
ing countries and to secure its own borderlands.3 
In the case of Abkhazia, the CIS-imposed embargo banned oﬃcial 
contacts for all CIS members, restricted economic co-operation, and pro-
hibited trade of most goods without licenses from the Georgian central 
government with the exception of food and medical supplies (Soviet Bezo-
pasnosti SNG 1996: 377ﬀ.). Notwithstanding the trade restrictions, Geor-
gia and Russia remained the two main trading partners of Abkhazia. Add-
ing barriers and burdensome bureaucratic procedures to any movement 
of goods, the restrictions contributed to the creation of a grey economy 
(Closson 2007: 168; Chkhartishvili et al. 2004: 134). Although oﬃcially 
upheld by all parties, they were increasingly ignored since the late 1990s. 
Obstacles to crossing are circumvented by illegal trading along the Inguri 
and Psou Rivers and through the Abkhaz seaports, as well as by bribing 
low-wage state oﬃcials at checkpoints on the ceaseﬁre line (Closson 2007: 
168). 
Commercial dynamics along the Psou River, marking the de jure bor-
der between Russia and Georgia, and the de facto border between Russia 
and Abkhazia, largely reﬂected political shifts in the relationship between 
Russia and Georgia. In 1999, the Russian President Vladimir Putin ab-
rogated by decree the Russian commitment to uphold the embargo, can-
celing most restrictions on crossing the Psou River. While repeatedly 
claiming to uphold the blockade, Putin expressed in 2004 the belief that 
this commitment did not include curtailment of commercial activities or 
private investments. 
On the Abkhaz-Georgian ceaseﬁre line, on the contrary, the embargo 
was always oﬃcially upheld, and repeated eﬀorts were made to curtail 
smuggling (Kukhianidze et al. 2004: 55). However, under the presidency 
of Eduard Shevardnadze, pervasive corruption at all levels of the securi-
ty forces and state institutions made the ceaseﬁre line highly permeable 
to smugglers (Closson 2007: 170). Commodities smuggled through the 
ceaseﬁre line included petroleum products, scrap metal, stolen cars, and 
timber. These goods entered the Georgian market or were re-exported 
through the ports of Batumi and Poti (Kukhianidze et al. 2004: 15; Kukh-
ianidze et al. 2007: 77).
3 | For an analysis of Russia’s foreign policy and Russia’s policies in the Cauca-
sus, see Lynch (2005), Baev (1997).
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In 2004, the Georgian government attempted to limit the various ac-
tors who participated in trade across the ceaseﬁre line and to limit the 
overall volume of trade. These policies were born out of the necessity 
to augment the Georgian budget and the belief that Abkhazia could be 
forced to negotiate if its sources of revenue dried up. The Georgian pres-
ident Mikhail Saakashvili insisted on the implementation of trade sanc-
tions with other regional governments, repressed paramilitary groups and 
corrupted bureaucrats involved in smuggling, and attempted to reduce 
sea-borne trade (Lynch 2006: 41; Sepashvili 2004c). Nevertheless, smug-
gling increased slightly as a consequence of the shift of trading routes 
after the closure of the Ergneti market in South Ossetia (Kupatadze 2005: 
70). In 2008, Tbilisi made the ﬁrst attempts at initiating a dialogue on 
some forms of economic cooperation, such as a customs-free zone and 
investments; the conﬂict in August choked oﬀ these initial belated steps.4
On the South Ossetian front, the movement of people and goods was 
practically unrestricted until December of 2003, when the newly elected 
Georgian leadership started anti-smuggling operations along the cease-
ﬁre line and then proceeded to close the Ergneti market in May and June 
2004. A de facto economic blockade was imposed, as forces of the interior 
ministry controlled access roads and villages in the southern part of the 
region, and some roads used for contraband were destroyed.5 The logic 
behind this move was the belief that that the de facto regime would col-
lapse if deprived of revenue (Khutsidze 2004). It is noteworthy that the 
anti-smuggling operation entailed an increased presence of Georgian se-
curity forces, which in turn was perceived as a build-up for military ag-
gression (ICG 2004: 11f.). At the same time, the Georgian government 
repeatedly declared that it would diﬀerentiate between the regime and 
the civilian population, oﬀering a range of incentives (Lynch 2006: 42; 
Sepashvili 2004a, 2004b). However, armed conﬂict ﬂared up again in Au-
gust 2004, when the Georgian military and police retreated, sustaining 
seventeen casualties. 
Tbilisi’s policy backﬁred as it antagonized both the South Ossetian 
elite and large segments of the South Ossetian population. Expectedly, 
4 | Interview with Gia Jandieri, a founder and the vice-president of the New Eco-
nomic School of Georgia, July 2008.
5 | ‘Governor Blows up By-Roads to Prevent Smuggling’, Civil Georgia, 23 Decem-
ber 2003.
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the regime denounced Tbilisi’s humanitarian initiatives as “a destabili-
zation attempt” and suspended relations with Tbilisi.6 The civilian pop-
ulation did not respond positively and did not contribute to destabilizing 
the regime of the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity. On the contrary, 
the blockade had a boomerang eﬀect, strengthening Kokoity’s popularity 
(ICG 2004: 13) and signiﬁcantly reducing the possibility of employment in 
trade and the accessibility of Tbilisi’s markets for small producers (Freese 
2004). Incentives were in poor relation to needs. The restoration of the 
railway to Tsinkhvali and the support to farmers through the provision of 
fertilizers could have proven eﬀective in the long-term; more immediate 
actions, such as a medical mission that distributed medicines in Tskhin-
vali, had little reach into the South Ossetian population.7 Finally, aid was 
seen with suspicion and, as its delivery was not coordinated with Tskhin-
vali, the local police barred intended recipients from accepting it.
Trading did not stop outright, but it was considerably curtailed by the 
closure of the Ergneti market and the enforcement of trade regulations 
at roadblocks. It was initially diverted to the only legal border crossing 
between Russia and Georgia, the Zemo Larsi checkpoint (Freese 2004). 
This new route bypassed South Ossetia, depriving its inhabitants of trade 
revenues; moreover, the trade of some commodities was abandoned, as it 
was no longer proﬁtable after the imposition of customs duties. In 2006, 
this route was also suppressed, as Russia closed the checkpoint indeﬁnite-
ly for maintenance.8 This not only paralyzed traﬃc between the two states 
but severely aﬀected the region as a whole and, in particular, Armenia and 
North Ossetia.9 In retaliation, Georgia closed the checkpoint at Ergneti, 
which had allowed the transit of people between 2004 and 2006.10 Still a 
soft border in 2003, the de facto border between Georgia and South Osse-
6 | ‘Tskhinvali Cuts Links with Tbilisi, Demands Compensation’, Civil Georgia, 12 
June 2004.
7 | Georgian Healthcare Minister Visits Tskhinvali, Delivers Aid’, Civil Georgia, 8 
June 2004.
8 | ‘Russia Closes Border Checkpoint with Georgia’, Civil Georgia, 8 July 2006.
9 | ‘Armenia for Reopening of Russo-Georgian Border Checkpoint’, Civil Georgia, 
11 July 2006; ICG (2004: 25); Alieva (2005).
10 | ‘Tbilisi Denies Entry to Passengers Coming via Roki Tunnel’, Civil Georgia, 10 
July 2006.
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tia had hardened considerably by 2006; after the 2008 conﬂict, that same 
border became sealed altogether. 
A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF MOBILIT Y POLICIES: 
THE ROLE OF ABKHA ZIA, SOUTH OSSE TIA, AND LOCAL 
STAKEHOLDERS
From within Abkhazia and South Ossetia, variations in the state of their 
external de facto borders was linked to aspirations for state-building har-
bored by the leadership of both de facto states. But it was also linked to 
opportunities for proﬁt that the leaders of the de facto states and of the 
neighboring regions crafted through boundary activation. Therefore, the 
approach to the management of dividing lines greatly diﬀered between 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia not only because of their history, demograph-
ics, geographical situation, and economic viability, but also because of the 
stakeholders’ interests.
In the case of Abkhazia, the destruction caused by the war and the 
blockade imposed by the CIS in 1996 led to a dramatic decline in social 
and economic conditions (Closson 2007: 165). Damaged and looted in-
frastructure, both public and private, remained unreconstructed (UNDP 
1998). Both agriculture and tourism, the two main pillars of the pre-war 
Abkhaz economy, suﬀered from war destruction, the subsequent isolation 
of Abkhazia, and underinvestment (Gotsiridze 2002). Railways, which 
traditionally played the main role in heavy-cargo transportation, fell into 
despair during the conﬂict. The role of the state-run Russian Railway 
Company in rebuilding the railway in 2004 was crucial and, for many, an 
intentional provocation (Lynch 2006: 49; Sepashvili 2004c). The Abkhaz 
leadership greatly encouraged the restoration of infrastructure between 
Abkhazia and the Russian Federation, linking its hopes for economic via-
bility of their de facto state to its northern neighbor. 
The restoration of the railway and other forms of infrastructure link-
ing Abkhazia and Georgia was seen as a national security problem (Rim-
ple 2005). Abkhaz authorities neither sealed the de facto border nor did 
they facilitate transit. While Russian peacekeeping forces patrolled the 
ceaseﬁre line, Abkhaz authorities left the adjacent borderland, which was 
traditionally mainly inhabited by ethnic Georgians, to the control of mili-
tia. Abkhaz militia turned the Gali region borderland into an opportunity 
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zone, activating the security/insecurity boundary, and creating opportu-
nities for proﬁt making. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
they carried out periodic sweeps through the Gali region, contributing to 
the movement of internally displaced persons back and forth across the 
Inguri River (Billingsley 2001). 
However, actors other than the Abkhaz militias and authorities ben-
eﬁted from this boundary activation. Along the security zone straddling 
the Inguri River, stakeholders in large smuggling networks included se-
curity services (Russian, Abkhaz, and Georgian), militias (Abkhaz and 
Georgian), oﬃcials (Abkhaz and Georgian), as well as peacekeeping 
forces, suppliers, and distributors of various nationalities (Closson 2007: 
170). In addition, residents of the adjacent areas, often returnees to the 
Gali region or IDPs from the Gali region living in Sagramelo, carried out 
small-scale smuggling (Kukhianidze et al. 2004: 6). It allowed them to 
make a living, given the state of economic despair of the Gali region and 
the serious problem with landmines in ﬁelds previously used for agricul-
ture (Kukhianidze et al. 2007: 84). Also, smuggling allowed residents of 
Abkhazia to have some access to consumer goods in spite of the embargo.
Along the ceaseﬁre line, the involvement of Georgian security forc-
es and bureaucracy was crucial for smuggling networks until 2004. 
Low-waged Georgian oﬃcials, earning as little as 7 USD per month, de-
manded bribes to supplement their income (Korsaia et al. 2002). Local 
departments of law enforcement agencies and inﬂuential actors in the 
Sagramelo region controlled large-scale smuggling, in particular of pe-
troleum products (Closson 2007: 168, 172f.). The Abkhaz Government in 
Exile, the Georgian Tax Department and MPs from Sagramelo owning 
petrol stations were identiﬁed as having providing support to groups in-
volved in smuggling (Closson 2007: 173f.). Oﬃcials within the Ministry 
of Interior had stakes in drug and weapons smuggling, kidnapping, and 
extortion;11 senior oﬃcers of anti-drug departments were involved in trade 
of narcotics (Cornell 2003: 33).
South Ossetia opted for the opposite approach to security/insecurity 
boundary activation in the borderlands straddling the ceaseﬁre line. Until 
2004, the South Ossetian authorities guaranteed secure passage to goods 
crossing the de facto state line and maintained a policy of permeable de 
11 | Interview with G. Baramidze, Saakashvili’s new Minister of the Interior, repor-
ted in K. Stier (2003).
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facto borders from within South Ossetia. These did not represent mecha-
nisms of legal trade along the Transcaucasian highway (TransCam) (ICG 
2004: 25). Goods usually bypassed Russian customs fees and bureaucrat-
ic procedures through customary payments of bribes; at the same time, 
they were not subjected to Georgian customs, as Tbilisi was unable to 
establish border posts at the Roki tunnel. The Georgian central govern-
ment refrained from setting up customs posts along the ceaseﬁre line be-
tween Georgia and South Ossetia, being adamant that the ceaseﬁre line 
should be treated as an internal administrative boundary (Kukhianidze 
et al. 2007). The circulation of goods between Tskhinvali, the market vil-
lage of Ergneti, located on the border, and Tbilisi, although unsanctioned, 
proceeded ﬂuidly, relying on the support of corrupted Georgian oﬃcials. 
Access to and from the Ergneti market was highly proﬁtable, as protection 
was provided for a price (Closson 2007: 181).
In the early 2000s, the European Commission proposed the establish-
ment of a joint customs regime; as an act of compensation, it would have 
contributed to the overhaul of the TransCam itself. The South Ossetian 
government rejected it, on the grounds that it would have curtailed its sov-
ereignty; more realistically, such an agreement would have curtailed the 
scope of smuggling and future proﬁts (OCHA Georgia 2003: 2).
In fact, the stakeholders’ analysis of the South Ossetian stalemate 
revolves around the TransCam trade and the evolution of trade regimes. 
A trans-territorial network composed of Russians, South Ossetians and 
Georgians orchestrated the trade; the stakeholders of this network were 
members of the elite, bureaucracy, business groups, and consumers (Clos-
son 2007: 180). IDPs, refugees, and residents of the conﬂict areas conduct-
ed mainly small-scale trade. Although control over TransCam smuggling 
was gradually concentrated into the hands of a few well-connected busi-
nessmen and members of the elite, the trade continued to provide a living 
to residents of South Ossetia and adjacent areas in Georgia. It created jobs 
and contributed to keeping prices of basic goods low, being as they were 
virtually duty-free (ICG 2004: 10).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESE ARCH
The medium- and long-term consequences of the hardening and soften-
ing of boundaries in the interwar period were numerous and had econom-
Borders, De Facto Borders and Mobility Policies 249
ic, social, and political impacts both on the borderlands examined here 
and on the wider region. Indeed, the resurgence of full-scale violence in 
South Ossetia in 2004 shows that mobility policies had eﬀects that were 
not limited to the transit of people and goods. While this aspect deserves 
a separate study, a few repercussions can already be discerned in terms 
of the diplomatic relations between the major actors at stake, processes of 
conﬂict resolution and conﬁdence building between Georgia and the de 
facto states, the viability of the de facto states, and the livelihoods of bor-
derland populations. Such analysis, however, should build on an aware-
ness of the long-term dynamics and short-term consequences of the hard-
ening and softening of boundaries during the interwar period.
Russia’s mobility policies were consistent with its policy of maintain-
ing a presence in the South Caucasus. The increasing permeability of the 
international border between the Russian Federation and the two de facto 
states led to a northward orientation of the two separatist regions in terms 
of trade and economic reliance. However, Russia’s refusal to acknowledge 
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence until 2008 shows that, in-
stead of an institutional approach, it opted for a more practical and infor-
mal strategy in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
Georgia’s mobility policies, on the other hand, were at times in oppo-
sition to its overarching goal of the reintegration of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Its insistence on the implementation of the CIS embargo in Ab-
khazia and the lack of initiative in establishing commercial and transport 
links across the de facto border led to a further widening of the cleavage 
between Abkhazia and the motherland. Its more pragmatic approach in 
South Ossetia contributed to peaceful relations and reduced animosity 
until early 2004, when the decision to curtail the commercial ﬂow on the 
TransCam precipitated conﬂict. In addition, limitations on the movement 
of goods and people across the de facto borders (whether explicit or im-
plicitly generated by a lack of legal framework and infrastructure) severely 
impacted the livelihoods of borderland populations and of the residents 
of the de facto states, creating a siege mentality and failing to foster re-
spect for Georgian sovereignty. At the same time, as this study showed, a 
multiplicity of actors were involved, including non-state actors who prof-
ited through boundary activation. In the case of Abkhazia, and in South 
Ossetia before 2004, the maintenance of a de facto border, respectively 
semi-permeable and permeable, suited the interests of key stakeholders of 
borderland economies.
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A similar variety of actors and interests characterized the drive for 
boundary activation and deactivation within the de facto states, which 
in turn aﬀected economic viability and aspirations for state building. In-
evitably, local actors reacted to the policies implemented by their larger 
neighbors, accommodating themselves to Georgian and Russian policies 
that sustained the process of hardening and softening of the boundaries. 
They nevertheless contributed to boundary dynamics within the territo-
ries under their control, whether by acquiescing to violence as a method 
for boundary activation in the Gali region, or by regulating trade and in-
creasing security on the TransCam.
A new scenario has emerged for the post-2008 observer. South Osse-
tia’s de facto border is sealed; regional residents, IDPs, and internation-
al organizations are prevented from crossing it. Along the line dividing 
Georgia and Abkhazia, it is business as usual for the most part, with a 
stronger military presence. It seems that Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s 
mobility policies have taken diﬀerent trajectories, under strong pressures 
from their Russian ally. At the same time, Georgia is seeking to soften the 
de facto borders through its 2010 State Strategy on Occupied Territories. 
Its proposal, so far, has gone unanswered.
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“Good fences make…”  
The Separation Fence in Israel and its Influence on Society 
Simon Falke
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the question is still 
asked in many places whether “good fences make good neighbors.” This 
is a quote from Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall (Frost 1914). In a re-
cently published book, the former SED-Generals Heinz Kessler and Fritz 
Streletz (2011) praise the beneﬁts of the Berlin Wall. Without it, there 
would have been war, they argue, although the public seems to have made 
a diﬀerent judgment. For many, walls and fences belong to a long-obso-
lete world of conﬂict between nation-states, and the end of a bipolar world 
order was seen as the beginning of a so called “borderless world” (Ohmae 
1995). But in fact, after the worldwide euphoria over the demolition of the 
Berlin Wall, border conﬂicts actually expanded in the globalized 21st cen-
tury. The future of border conﬂicts continues to be discussed intensely. In 
a recent contribution to these debates, Michael Gehler and Andreas Pudlat 
(2009) put out an edited volume entitled Borders in Europe, whose con-
tributors draw a multifaceted picture of the history and social importance 
of Europe’s borders. The European Union is certainly a special case. The 
Schengen Agreement regulates the free movement of goods and people 
within the EU, but the boundaries of member states certainly have not lost 
importance, as shown by intensiﬁed border controls in Denmark, Italy, 
and France last year. 
All these developments have stimulated interest in international “bor-
der research.” In clear contradiction to the “borderless world” prognosti-
cation, border conﬂicts have increased during the last 20 years. New walls 
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and new fences are thus often playing new and important roles in social 
conﬂict. This time around, scholars take boundaries to mean not only the 
lines between nation-states, although these certainly remain signiﬁcant 
because of their external eﬀects. Current scholarship from various institu-
tions is based on a much more diﬀerentiated concept of borders, as seen in 
the work of John Agnew, G.H. Blake, David Newman, or Anssi Paasi. The 
new approach aims “to understand the boundary phenomenon as it takes 
place within diﬀerent social and spatial dimensions” (Newman 2003). 
These authors argue that the construction of new fences and walls has 
long-term repercussions on both sides of the border they create. Although 
they often do serve protective functions, at least for a short time, artiﬁcial 
boundaries can become a catalyst for intra-societal conﬂicts and conﬂict-
ual constellations. However, the study of long-term interactive eﬀects of 
borders and the societies they encompass is a large enterprise, and this 
contribution focuses on more direct eﬀects of fences and walls.
GENER AL ASPECTS OF BORDERS AND  
THE ISR AELI SITUATION
During the last few years, the erection of walls became an issue of debate 
in North America along the US-Mexico line and in Greece along its main-
land border with Turkey. Saudi Arabia, too, is considering the option of 
fencing itself oﬀ completely from Iraq and Israel. Above all, however, the 
cordoning oﬀ of the West Bank, which for Israel also includes Judea and 
Samaria, has received great attention and much criticism globally. The 
Israeli policy marked a temporary climax to the discussion about borders 
and walls, but even the European Union has had to deal with conﬂicts 
over border fences since the accession of Cyprus and the failure of the 
Annan-Plan to be ratiﬁed by referendum in 2004. 
The actual signiﬁcance of physical demarcation for the development 
of amicable relations with neighboring states and peoples remains un-
clear. In this context, the conference “Fences, Walls and Borders: State of 
Insecurity?” held in 2011 in Montreal, raised the question of whether we 
have entered a new phase of ﬁxed borders after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Contrary to the expectations of many after the end of the Cold War, the 
21st century has seen a new boom of security along national borders. The 
question is whether the return to border fences and walls as a political tool 
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is symptomatic for a new era of international relations. State actors pursue 
diﬀerent legal, economic, and demographic strategies when they tighten 
border security by erecting walls and fences. However, diﬀerent national 
motivations for the physical demarcations and the respective geographic 
circumstances make it diﬃcult to see any overall pattern internationally. 
The separation fence1 in Israel is a prominent example of such a de-
marcation. It is not an international symbol like the Berlin Wall was. How-
ever, it is an important within the Middle East conﬂict, which regularly 
sends global shock waves. From the Israeli point of view, the separation 
fence is a response to the violence that erupted during the course of the 
Second Intifada. Viewed in isolation from the international context, bor-
der issues in Israel and Palestine oﬀer the possibility of examining the 
meaning of borders for society and society’s inﬂuence on the geography 
of the state. 
During Benjamin Netanjahu’s visit in Washington D.C. in 2011, Pres-
ident Barack Obama tried to contribute new impulses to the discussion 
of a peace solution in the Middle East. His demand that Israel return to 
a modiﬁed version of its 1967 borders failed to generate popular support 
in Israel. According to a Dahaf survey from the same year, 77 percent of 
Israelis reject a return to these borders (Hoﬀmann 2011). Recent clashes 
between Syrian and Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli soldiers along 
the border on the Golan have transformed this area, where a cease-ﬁre 
agreement had held for years, into a combat zone again. The border fence 
between Israel and Egypt will be completed in 2012. This barrier should 
prevent illegal immigration of Africans to Israel. The representative of 
the Knesset Ya’acov Katz recently pointed out that every year about 7000 
people immigrate illegally over this border to Israel, commenting that if 
“inﬁltrators continue to enter at this rate, there will be 50,000 by the end 
of 2012, 40,000 in Tel Aviv […] It pains me that ten percent of Tel Aviv’s 
residents will be inﬁltrators” (Harkov 2011). Israel seems to have problems 
on every border. However, the boundaries in the north and south of the 
country are diﬀerent from the demarcation of the West Bank on a decisive 
point: the separation fence along the West Bank is not a national border.
1 | Depending on one’s point of view, the fence is called dif ferent things: separa-
tion fence, security barrier, apartheid wall etc. In this contribution, the term “se-
paration fence,” which underscores its function of separating societies, is used.
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Let us now examine the West Bank as a materialized territorial de-
marcation and turn the focus inwards onto the residents of the state of 
Israel. The interactions between boundaries and people’s lives can be un-
derstood using material indicators, although this is a very complex under-
taking. Newman points out that “the linkage between territorial demar-
cation and the formation of ethnic and/or national identity is a “chicken 
and egg,” mutually enforcing, relationship” (Newman 2004). Israel’s very 
heterogeneous society is certainly a large ﬁeld for social experimentation. 
The following discussion thus focuses on the political elite at the time of 
construction of the separation fence; social reactions are examined using 
monthly “Peace index”2 surveys by Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann. 
FENCES, WALLS AND THE SE T TLEMENTS 
In the Middle East, the perception of boundaries plays a central role in con-
ﬂicts of nation building, territory, and resources. In Israel and Palestine, 
for both sides the concept of the border “is a vague, elusive and problem-
atic term, after they have lived more than one hundred years without clear 
boundaries, but lived with constant, mutual attacks” (Grossmann 2003). 
The drawing of political borders generally fails because of the fact that 
internationally accepted borders may serve to separate something from 
something else but they only work if the people they separate recognize 
them as legitimate (Wokart 1995). The conﬂict in the Middle East shows 
that a national border can encourage mutual recognition of national sover-
eignty. Since the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 
1994, the boundaries between Israel and these two Arab neighbors have 
been set. The borders with Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinians have yet 
to be settled, however. The absence of immovable national boundaries is 
the driving force behind today’s political and social discussions in Israel. 
Under the administration of Ariel Sharon, Israel began with the con-
struction of the separation fence along the West Bank in June of 2002. 
According to government sources, it does not signify a political and diplo-
matic separation from the Palestinians (Landau 2004; Tirza 2006). The 
fence is ostensibly intended to fulﬁll only security functions for the citi-
2 | Yaar, Ephraim; Hermann, Tamar: Peace Index, available online: www.tau.ac.il/
peace/(08.02.2012).
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zens of Israel (Rabinowitz 2001). For the former UN ambassador and ne-
gotiator in the peace process with the Palestinians, Dore Gold, the fence is 
a purely military barrier (Gold 2003). Ariel Sharon’s government insisted 
that this arrangement does not reﬂect a new political border between Is-
rael and Palestine (Tirza 2006). Since its founding, the concept of border 
is of central importance for Israel, and its boundaries have been subject 
to constant changes since 1948. The unilateral construction of the separa-
tion fence could be seen as deﬁning a new horizon for relations between 
Israeli and Palestinian societies. It is doubtful that the eastern border, in 
the form of an impenetrable wall, will ever guarantee security for the state 
of Israel. As a consequence, a basic question arises. Will the fence func-
tion as a border between both societies at all, and if so, how? 
One example of the problems associated with the wall as a means of 
improving security lies in the fact that Israeli settlements were established 
beyond the Six Day War armistice line of 1949. Their position clearly com-
plicates the regulation of a state border along the West Bank. A large num-
ber of settlements are located beyond the bounded territory. The presence 
of settlers, whose properties expressly belong to the state of Israel, pre-
cludes any possible claim that the wall is intended to mark a political bor-
der. Eva Horn argues that settlers are not on this or that side of the border. 
Rather, their political signiﬁcance derives from the fact that they them-
selves represent the border (Horn 2004). The settlements therefore mark 
a diﬀerent argumentative level in the Israeli-Palestinian border conﬂict. 
Characteristically, Eyal Weizman has employed the term “elastic borders” 
(Weizman 2009). For this reason, a political signiﬁcance can hardly be 
ascribed to the separation fence. According to Georg Simmel, a political 
border should symbolize the consciousness that power and right do not 
extend to the other side (Simmel 1983). So far, however, settlements in the 
occupied territories have prevented the creation of a politically binding, 
mutually recognized border between Israeli and Palestinian society. “At 
no stage has the state of Israel deﬁned its own borders – optimal, oﬃcial, 
secured – or acted to constitute these borders and win international rec-
ognition for them” (Zertal 2005). In the Middle East, national borders are 
judged necessary for the production of identity, peace, and security (Rab-
inowitz 2001). The lack of such borders, argues Tom Segev (2007), means 
that the citizens of Israel live in uncertainty and tentativeness, which hin-
ders their search for their own identity. 
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IMPACT ON SOCIE T Y 
Quite concrete demands arise from this approach for the constitution of 
the Israeli society. The unilateral initiative of Palestinian President Mah-
moud Abbas to seek recognition of a Palestinian state made national bor-
ders an even more urgent issue on the political agenda. Territorial borders 
are anything but obsolete. Especially in Israel and Palestine, their impor-
tance will increase. The state of Israel is facing a development that will 
determine its future. The ﬁnal deﬁnition of its state borders forms the 
central component of the Middle East peace process because borders are 
not only a place of diﬀerentiation and demarcation, but also of transition, 
convergence, and mixture. As Stephane Hessel (2011) said in an interview 
with Die Zeit, “I can cross the border separating me from my neighbor, 
but I cannot cross all borders. Still, if there were no borders, we would feel 
no need to cross them.” Through the construction of the separation fence, 
the isolation of society takes place from inside and outside by deﬁning 
“Palestinian” as an exclusion criterion. Therefore, the separation fence 
functions as a social demarcation. This perception is of great importance 
because the majority supports the idea of separation within the Israeli 
society. The search for societal limits lies behind the objective of diﬀeren-
tiating oneself from the Palestinians, but it could also indicate a process 
taking place in space within the society. In this way the separation fence 
might be seen as an element of social cohesion. “Society is characterized 
by the fact that the space of its existence is enclosed by clearly deliberate 
borders and internally belongs together” (Simmel 1983). The separation 
fence could be an expression of the direction society is taking. Indeed, 
Barry Rubin describes the focus on political security, apparent since the 
outbreak of the Second Intifada, as a new paradigm for Israeli society (Ru-
bin 2006). 
The border-society mindset is related to social motivations for the 
construction of the separation fence. Boundaries are the result of social 
relations within a society (Simmel 1983). Or, as Newman puts it, the “ex-
istence of lines and territorial compartments in the form of states creates 
a territorial frame within which the social construction of national iden-
tity has an important territorial dimension” (Newman 2004). The consti-
tution of the Jewish population was particularly strongly inﬂuenced by 
the experience and trauma of the years 1939-1945 and 1973, according to 
Moshe Zimmermann (1996) and Tom Segev (1995). The border situation 
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and threats from the outside have always been a central part of the history 
of the state of Israel (Primor 2010). “This unique border situation is as-
sumed to inﬂuence the individual, his comprehension and conceptualiza-
tion of reality, and the interrelationship between individual and collective 
processes” (Shalit 1987). Georg Simmel describes the security function 
of the border as a framework that has meaning, much like a work of art, 
for the social group (Simmel 1983). With the help of such a “work of art,” 
the Israeli society has been trying to create a buﬀer from the world and to 
enclose itself since the foundation of the state. From this viewpoint, the 
construction of the separation fence becomes a metaphoric mirror of the 
society. Approval or disapproval of this fence reveals one’s attitude about 
the social order. Danny Tirza called the separation fence, therefore, a “po-
litical seismograph” (Weizman 2009). 
Acceptance among the Israeli population of the construction of the 
separation fence was very high at the outset; surveys by Ephraim Yaar 
and Tamar Hermann (2003) showed an agreement of 57 percent among 
Israelis in June, 2002. The majority desired social separation at that time 
(Primor 2010; Witzthum 2004). Palestinians, too, desired separation (Ar-
ian 2002). The demand and search for security, according to Moshe Zim-
mermann, has moved people to vote for a separation of both populations 
(Zimmermann 1996). A vast majority of the Israeli population supports 
the demarcation along the West Bank and is therefore against the idea 
of soft borders in the Middle East. From this perspective, the separation 
fence can stimulate the images of danger, self-protection, and defense. As 
terror and violence spiraled upward, a large majority of public opinion (71 
percent) supported Sharon’s national unity government and its policies 
to achieve peace and security in 2003 (Arian 2002). Interesting to note 
is the increased participation of the “undecided population” during the 
last elections. The political divisions of right and left have lost their social 
bases (Primor 2003). Ten years after the beginning of construction, the 
separation fence is there for all to see along the West Bank. It separates 
the conﬂicting parties. And for the ﬁrst time most Israelis now can clearly 
visualize where a possible future border would be. Although these bound-
aries are not necessarily permanent because they also create new reali-
ties and aﬀect people’s lives (Newman 2004), the social protests in Israel 
during the past summer can be understood as a consequence of the inner 
dynamics set in motion by the placement of these artiﬁcial boundaries. 
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CONCLUSION 
The demarcation has become a guiding theme of policies supported by 
the majority (Elizur 2003).3 An epochal political transformation is being 
caused by the construction of the separation fence and in the consolidation 
of left and right positions on the issue (Baskin 2002; Witzthum 2004). 
Ariel Sharon succeeded, by constructing the separation fence, in taking 
up an original idea of the Israeli left and in reconstructing it with his own 
territorial vision (Lagerquist 2004). Neither Zionist revisionism nor com-
plete separation had been able to prevail within Israeli society, but the real-
ization of a physical and social demarcation has generated a new sense of 
national unity (Lagerquist 2004). David Grossman argues, signiﬁcantly, 
that the Israeli enthusiasm for the construction of the separation fence is 
more a psychological need than a well-considered diplomatic and military 
policy (Grossmann 2003). “Israelis and Palestinians will eventually have 
to sit down together to solve their problems. Since such negotiations are 
unlikely for the time being, however, a properly constructed fence could 
serve as an interim measure” (Makovsky 2004). According to this view, 
the separation fence acts as a preliminary stage for peace negotiations in 
the Middle East. It can contribute to overcome the emotionality stoked by 
the demands to a return to the 1967 borders, a line that has become the 
“default boundary” (Newman 2004) for all political negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
Where borders are drawn, power is exercised. In this respect the bor-
der discourse is at the same time a national discourse. The separation 
fence became a mirror of the Israeli society. Do good fences make good 
neighbors? Within the state of Israel, the separation fence seems to be 
making the majority adjust to necessary changes. In this context, Robert 
Frost’s famous question could be reversed: Do good fences make good 
inhabitants? Territory plays a signiﬁcant role in the way in which their 
identity is expressed. This perspective should be considered, although 
border walls and fences are sometimes negatively connoted. The “social 
protesters” in Israel have yet to express their views on this topic, but at 
least the European media are reporting on internal political and social 
3 | According to Peace Index, approval of the politics of the “unilateral dissolu-
tion” was at 60 percent of the Israeli population in 2012 (Yaar, Ephraim; Hermann, 
Tamar: Peace Index, available online: www.tau.ac.il/peace/(08.02.2012).
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conﬂicts in Israel in detail for the ﬁrst time. This I regard as a positive de-
velopment. Israeli society deﬁnes itself no longer through the distinction 
to the Palestinians or the “Arab world.” They look with increasing scrutiny 
at their own social groups. Similar to the German border discourse in 
the 1920s, the West Bank borderland will have to be re-understood as a 
common cultural space (see Kreienbrock 2010). Geography still serves the 
art of war in the Middle East, but it can become part of the art of change if 
there is an overarching counterstrategy. The emotionally charged borders 
of 1967 urgently need a new accentuation. Israel is situated at the transi-
tion from imperial to national borders. The separation fence stands as a 
symbol for the security needs of Israel. As a security border it has taken 
on an integral role in everyday life. The separation fence is thereby becom-
ing a cultural institution and serves by discursive practices to break the 
recurring argument of the “non-defensible borders of 1967” (Gold 2003; 
Landau 2004; Sharon 2005; Tirza 2006)4. A good fence does not make 
equally good neighbors and inhabitants, but a secure fence along the West 
Bank can help to give the necessary stability, the stability of a national 
border, that the Israeli society needs in order to ﬁnd a way to peace in 
the Middle East. Even if it means that the settlers in the West Bank who 
live beyond the fence will be separated and thus become the losers of this 
intra-societal process. 
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